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Abstract
Walter Lippmann’s intellectual journey represents the journey of American liberalism in the
20th century: an attempted return from infatuation with the progressive ideals of inevitable
historical development and scientific progress to the stability of human rights and freedom.
America’s path to defining its brand of liberalism finds expression in the philosophical works
of Lippmann, who was at the center of this struggle. Lippmann was a defender of the liberal
democratic state whose value as a thinker derives from his attempt to understand the
problem of political freedom (are people competent to self-rule in a mass democracy?)
throughout this critical time period. In this struggle Lippmann remains a nuanced, though
fierce exponent of political freedom as he sought to verify the foundations of political
legitimacy and authority on which true political freedom depends. He began his quest as a
progressive, averring scientific realism against entrenched dogmas and traditions, but, by
remaining consistent on this question of political freedom (insofar as he sought to preserve
and expand it), was led to conclude his quest arguing for a sustainable liberalism
characterized by an attentiveness to the human person.

iv

Introduction – A Hero for Sustainable Liberalism
Of all the towering figures in 20th century American political life, few were as
versatile and insightful as Walter Lippmann. His intellectual and personal history traced,
better than any other single man, the character of America in the 20th century: he began
his career in all the hope and optimism of an unchallenged progressivism, and ended it
amidst the Vietnam conflict, despair, and disillusionment. Neither academician nor
politician, Lippmann is best known for his career as a journalist. His column, “Today and
Tomorrow”, ran in all major newspapers in the United States for almost 40 years, regularly
commanding the attention of millions of the most politically engaged people in America.12
Yet, despite Lippmann’s fame as a journalist, this is at best only half the story of his career.
Beginning with A Preface to Politics in 1913, and culminating with Essays in the Public
Philosophy in 1955, Lippmann also authored many significant works of political philosophy.
His proximity to events in the political arena, and his access to the public mind through his
columns ascribe an unique character and importance to these works of political philosophy
as a valuable resource to understanding the American mind, and with it the tumultuous
development of liberalism in 20th century America.
Lippmann’s intellectual journey represents the journey of American liberalism in
the 20th century: an attempted return from infatuation with the progressive ideals of
inevitable historical development and scientific progress to the stability of human rights

Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980) xvii
As an additional prefatory note, it must be said that the most outstanding of all works concerning Lippmann is
Ronald Steel’s biography, Walter Lippmann and the American Century. Steel places Lippmann in the context of 20th
century politics and culture, writing about Lippmann’s personal life as well as his place in the public sphere. It is an
exceptional biography, and an indispensable reference for any scholar interested in Lippmann. I have used it
extensively to understand the biographical curiosities of Lippmann’s life and times. All quotations hereafter in the
format of, Steel, pg. x.
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and freedom. America’s path to defining its brand of liberalism finds expression in the
philosophical works of Lippmann, who was at the center of this struggle. Lippmann was a
defender of the liberal democratic state whose value as a thinker derives from his attempt
to understand the problem of political freedom (are people competent to self-rule in a mass
democracy?) throughout this critical time period. In this struggle Lippmann remains a
nuanced, though fierce exponent of political freedom as he sought to verify the foundations
of political legitimacy and authority on which true political freedom depends. He began his
quest as a progressive, averring scientific realism against entrenched dogmas and
traditions, but, by remaining consistent on this question of political freedom (insofar as he
sought to preserve and expand it), was led to conclude his quest arguing for a sustainable
liberalism characterized by an attentiveness to the human person. The key, then, to
understanding Lippmann and the great depth of his contribution to American liberalism is
to understand his philosophical journey through careful exegesis of his major works of
explicit political philosophy.
Lippmann’s popularity, as well as his unique versatility and perceptiveness has
prompted a large amount of secondary literature about his life, politics, philosophy, and
influence. What is unique to my goal of a philosophical analysis of Lippmann’s major works
of political philosophy is my attempt connect a common theme through Lippmann’s works
to show consistency amidst his widely varied philosophies,3 and then to situate that

3 In addressing the majority of those who have sought to apprehend some vision of Lippmann’s mind, the
central misunderstanding of his thought in his major works of political theory follows in reaction the ‘turn
towards conservatism’ in his late works, The Good Society, and Essays in the Public Philosophy. Hari N. Dam,
Heinz Eulau, Charles Forcey, Christopher Lasch, David Elliot Weingast, Morton White, and, most prominently
Benjamin Wright, have all written on this theme, portraying Lippmann, in varying degrees of harshness, as a
betrayer of his progressive, liberal, or democratic roots.
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journey in regard to American liberalism’s engagement with progressive idealism. No work
accomplishes both of these goals, and only two book length studies4 argue for any serious
continuity in Lippmann’s political philosophy. My analysis is distinctive because it
evaluates Lippmann’s thought explicitly for lessons on a sustainable liberalism with a new
interpretation of Lippmann’s works that stresses a limited, but present continuity on the
grounds of Lippmann’s intellectual consistency. This emphasis on continuity offers greater
sensitivity to the corrections Lippmann makes to his own work, and greater insight into the
consequences of these corrections for liberal democracy.
Chapter One – The Context of Lippmann’s Political Thought: Some Important Features of
Liberalism and Progressivism
To achieve the ends of my thesis, it must be shown that there is a conflict between
liberalism and progressivism that is at the heart of American political life in the 20th
century, and that Lippmann’s career engages these political trends and thereby offers
insight into the disambiguation of liberalism and progressivism. The central difficulty in
this dissertation will be to associate elements of progressive or liberal philosophy, linked
traditions with slippery and contentious definitions, to Lippmann’s somewhat discursive
works of political philosophy. Because it is my desire to offer a new reading of Lippmann
that offers insight into the way Lippmann’s engages with these traditions, I direct my
argument through a set of main themes that encompass the crux of the division between
liberalism and progressivism, and then connect these themes through each of Lippmann’s

Larry L. Adams, Walter Lippmann (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1977) and Charles Wellborn, Twentieth
Century Pilgrimage: Walter Lippmann and the Public Philosophy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1969)
4
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works. One of the central problems with this approach is that, as any observer of American
political history will attest, our definitions of liberalism, and progressivism are easily
confounded, and no simple analytic will fully distribute the traditions in a way that is
satisfactory to all. It is therefore my aim that the interpretative categories I establish should
express essential (though not always comprehensive) features of liberalism and
progressivism that are also predominate in Lippmann’s work.
The methodological framework is primarily defined in my first chapter, which
describes liberalism and progressivism in the context of American political thought,
primarily in contradistinction to the liberalism of the American founders. The purpose of
this account is to establish an intellectual framework for discussing constitutionalism,
natural rights, and human nature, political categories which I believe are the most essential
to productively differentiating progressivism and liberalism, and which attach readily to
Lippmann’s arguments. I structure my examination of Lippmann’s works around these
themes in order to draw nuanced conclusions about his philosophical development, and,
because the categories are well established in the origins of American political thought, the
design allows for direct reflection upon how Lippmann’s philosophical development was
responsive to intellectual trends of American political thought.
Chapter Two - A Preface to Politics: Reason and Nuanced Progressive Idealism
This chapter opens the discussion of Lippmann’s philosophical career, and begins
with a brief biographical sketch with a focus on Lippmann’s intellectual influences leading
up to A Preface to Politics. Though it is my intention to limit my exegesis to the content of
his philosophical works, and avoid an intellectual biography, in order to understand

4

Lippmann as he understood himself, it is necessary to pay attention to his immediate
influences and antagonists. The most lengthy manifestation of this in this study comes in
discussing his early years at Harvard and shortly thereafter, before the publication of his
first work of political philosophy. In Preface, we find, as I will argue is present in all of
Lippmann’s works, recourse to both Nature and History, to the founders and the
progressives, to strands of both progressivism and liberalism across the categories of
constitutionalism, natural rights, and human nature. Lippmann consolidates these varied
and disparate elements into a defense of a particular vision of human freedom. Every
chapter in this study finds that Lippmann’s works all manifest some element of this
quixotic desire to diagnose the means by which men enjoy the most political freedom. It is
through engagement with this problem that my framework defining liberalism and
progressivism gains cogency.
Chapter Three: Drift, Mastery and Scientific Realism
Lippmann’s ‘sequel’5 to A Preface to Politics, called, Drift and Mastery(1914),
retained the iconoclastic spirit of its predecessor, but also contained many revisions and
new ideas such that it is difficult to draw too strong a connection to Preface, a book written
just one year prior. He continues the themes of rejecting the past with hope for the future,
he increases his emphasis on the development of the future through scientific realism and
what he calls “industrial statesmanship.” The book moves Lippmann closer to one of his
idols, Teddy Roosevelt, and his political platform, and includes striking condemnations, not

5

His friends and admirers, notably Graham Wallas, expected this book to be a sequel to Preface to Politics. Indeed,
most commentators did view it as a continuance of Lippmann’s youthful iconoclasm, though my argument
contends that there is a notable divide between Preface and Drift.
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of private property in its full scope, but rather private property as a stultifying, sacrosanct
tradition. Lippmann both claims that the productivity of the economy should not be
hampered by government action, and that the time has come for government takeover of
basic industries, mining operations, railroads, and the like.67 The seeming paradox is
resolved in Lippmann’s mind because of his stark optimism in scientific/bureaucratic
management, but offers a curious contrast from the later Lippmann who values property
rights. I will attempt to dissolve part of this tension by suggesting that Lippmann’s youthful
self has downplayed the role of scarcity in his theoretical political musings, and that his
conclusions are more ideologically neutral as a result.
Lippmann later said glibly of his early books that he attempted to “solve all the
world’s problems,” but if the subject of my study is the development of Lippmann’s thought
as context for American political theory, it is imperative that the texts be read closely and
purposefully. A close reading and attempt to make sense of Lippmann’s motivations is key
to this enterprise, and sets up interesting conflagrations with the more well-known works
by Lippmann.
Chapter Four – Public Opinion and the Tyranny of the Masses: A Democratic Critique
In this chapter I combine my analysis of, Public Opinion (1922), Lippmann’s most
famous book, and The Phantom Public (1925), two works that formed the basis of
Lippmann’s democratic critique and signaled his growing disillusionment with progressive
idealism, particularly in the wake of WWI. This chapter is critical to describing the

6
7

Walter Lippmann, Drift and Mastery (New York: Mitchell Kennerley, 1914) Ch. 6
For details on the citation index, see the section of this paper labeled, “Notes.”
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development of Lippmann’s thought, which is particularly compelling concerning his views
of ‘social science.’ Early Lippmann is confident in the role of social science/science in
facilitating the work of great men who rule, who have both the need and talent to
transgress institutional limitations. In this middle period of Lippmann’s thought,
knowledge and the authority of science are largely assumed, and represented in masterful
men who manifest an idealized form of statesmanship. Though he remains animated by a
need to provide new, progressive solutions the new problems of mass democracy, this very
spirit is what leads him closer to the founders and the principle of Nature as a foundation
for the ‘traditions of civility.’
Chapter Five – Solving Society: The Disinterested Humanist
A Preface to Morals (1929)8 seems like a natural corollary to Phantom’s pessimism
insofar as Lippmann appears to retreat from the intractability of political affairs to
humanistic moral philosophy. But it also feels strangely apolitical for someone who accused
Plato of defining an ideal society, only to leave the world to Machiavelli.9 My argument is
that this retreat by Lippmann reflects both his progressive and liberal inclinations. On one
hand he argues that political thinking is “Notably inferior in realism and in pertinence to
the economic thinking which now plays so important a part in the direction of industry.”10
This reflects a subtle confidence in the progress of economic industry, where one is granted
the luxury of eschewing political affairs. This also grounds itself in Nature through appeals
he makes to the role of government, which is dramatically reduced, and ameliorates the

Walter Lippmann. A Preface to Morals (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers 1982)
Walter Lippmann. Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. 1960) Ch. 28
10 Morals, Ch. 13
8
9
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abstractions necessary to circumvent institutional governance. Despite a harsh tone of
realism, Lippmann’s political commentary in Morals primarily serves to disinvest the
seemingly abstract government of its power in favor of refocusing our attention on the
state of the souls which inhabit the polity. Lippmann follows this theme, the management
of political affairs through the education of human affairs, into his last work, Essays in the
Public Philosophy (1955) where he adds to the disinterested humanism of Morals the
support of what he calls the ‘traditions of civility.’
Chapter Six – Economics, Material Well-Being, and The Good Society
Lippmann’s Method of Freedom (1934) is an astounding reentry into political life.
The essential point of Method and its sequel, The New Imperative (1935), is that the
government should be responsible for the maintenance of the standard of living of its
people. At first glance, this is diametrically opposed to the Lippmann in Morals, and even of
Opinion and Phantom, however, Lippmann retains certain characteristics of humility
amidst his new optimism. Fundamentally, he claims that human liberty should extend as
far as possible, and that “the state is the servant and not the master of the people.”11 He
explains a method of ‘free collectivism’ that is distinct from the collectivism of communist
and fascist societies primarily in its ability to continually reorient itself around private
enterprise, and to adopt temporary emergency measures in response to events such as the
Great Depression. This emphasis on emergency methods for emergency situations helps
explain his support and later break from FDR and the New Deal programs. The works again
split Lippmann ideologically, on one hand he appeals to a natural right to work (a new

11

Walter Lippmann. Method of Freedom (New York: Macmillen, 1934), Part III
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world without a frontier means that there are occasions where there are no opportunities
to get jobs unassisted), and on another, he again appeals to executive authority, shunning
legislative institutions which he sees corrupted by special interest groups. Not only does
Lippmann continue to tacitly balance progressivism with liberalism, but he explicitly calls
for a balancing of their proxies, liberty and authority.12
The Good Society (1937)13 overlaps strongly, and is in some ways a prequel to Essays
in the Public Philosophy (1955), but it is chronologically more compatible with Imperative
and Method, and because it is often mistakenly viewed as a complete repudiation of those
works, they must be examined together.14 I will stress two themes of continuity with his
previous works: one, that the model of free collectivism is refined rather than completely
abandoned, and two, that what progressives and some liberals see as a retreat to free
market moralism, comes only with heavy qualifications from Lippmann, and familiar
repudiations of past models of laissez-faire dogmas. To the former, his explicit rejection of
New Deal style programs is tempered by a call, repeated from Method and Imperative, for
money spent (not on direct public assistance) on public works, education and heath as both
“relief and remedy.”15 To the latter, Lippmann emphasizes what he sees as a false
dichotomy between individual rights/laissez faire, and progressive stateism/collectivism.16
He envisions property rights as managed extensively through a court system that depends
on common law jurisprudence.

Walter Lippmann. The New Imperative (New York: Macmillen, 1935) , Part II
Walter Lippmann. The Good Society (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers 2005)
14 See Wright, Ch.4 and 5.
15 Walter Lippmann. The Good Society (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers 2005) Ch. 11
16 Good, Ch. 12
12
13

9

Chapter Seven – Making Liberalism Sustainable: The Public Philosophy
Whatever vicissitudes Lippmann’s thought underwent, he always remained
preeminently concerned with the problem of freedom in the modern world. Essays in the
Public Philosophy (1955) was no different. While Lippmann retains some hallmarks of the
progressive mind in that he saw in the modern world a new, and unmet challenge to the old
order of natural law: “The school of natural law has not been able to cope with the
pluralism of the later modern age—with the pluralism which has resulted from the
industrial revolution and from the enfranchisement and the emancipation of the masses of
the people.”17 The mature Lippmann, however, instead of rebelling against the tradition,
cites that very rebellion as the cause for our inability to cope with modernity’s new
challenges. Essays is a culmination of Lippmann’s search to support liberal democracy, and
his conclusion that the revival of American political life and discourse depends on the
rearticulating of a political philosophy expressed as natural law is an outgrowth of his new
understanding, and fervent desire to protect men and keep them free in the modern age.

17

Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy (Transaction Publishers, 1989), Ch. 8
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Chapter One – The Context of Lippmann’s Political Thought: Some Important
Features of Liberalism and Progressivism
Liberal Origins
To understand Lippmann’s search for a profitable, sustainable liberal democracy,
the origins of and dangers to liberalism need to be sketched.18 Perhaps better than any
other democratic thinker, Alexis de Tocqueville understood the great consequence and
tenor of the liberal tide. In one of the most passionate lines of Democracy in America,
Tocqueville states that, “the entire book you are going to read was written under the
pressure of a sort of religious terror in the author’s soul, produced by the sight of this
irresistible revolution that for so many centuries has marched over all obstacles, and that
one sees still advancing today amid the ruins it has made.”19 For Tocqueville, democracy’s
ascendance is providential, and he is severely aware of the diverse challenges that will face
those who wish to restrain and govern it.
The path and development of liberalism began in Europe and was driven by
theologico-political problem, and by the slow withdrawal of aristocratic, classical mores
and virtues in the face of their liberal democratic heirs. Liberal thinkers who wish to
sustain democracy tend to recognize the acute limitations of liberal democratic progress.
Walter Lippmann’s thought was characterized by constant doubt and worry about the

18

Pierre Manet’s works, particularly, An Intellectual History of Liberalism, Trans. Rebecca Balinski (University of
Princeton Press, 1996) were particularly influential in my understanding of, and framing of the liberal project in this
context.
19 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Harvey Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (University of
Chicago Press, 2002), 6
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capacity of liberal democratic politics, and to understand that concern is to touch a nerve
deep within the original birth and logical path of the liberal revolution.
The insistence at the great heart of liberalism that, as Hobbes says, “every man
acknowledge another for his equal by nature,”20 conflicts with the aristocratic, classical
impulse for excellence. How is one to be excellent and thus distinguished while being
inherently the same? Hobbes condemns those who succumb to the passion of excellence,
“The breach of this precept is pride.”21 Liberalism in some ways sets itself against the
passions, against human nature. But does liberalism seek to conquer the passions
definitely, or to balance them? The former option inclines toward apotheosis and utopia,
and the latter to modest politics, and perhaps a greater freedom. How to sustain particular
liberal democratic regimes is coevally a question of human nature, and one side to a
problem generated by the theologico-political problem.
The theologico-poltiical problem is the conflict of locating political power in the
temporal or the spiritual, in reason or in revelation, in Athens, or in Jerusalem. It is the
essential question about the locus of political authority, though the division extends
naturally to particular human activity. The nub of this immensely complex issue is that
Church’s elemental good, salvation, is not of this world, but the Church is nonetheless
tasked with leading men to that salvation. The corollary duty to oversee human action then
manifests in the politically problematic pressure to oversee the actions of rulers,
particularly those who in the church’s view endangered the salvation of their subjects. It is
not difficult to see how the imposition of theocracy therefore tends to follow into temporal

20
21

Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan, Chapter XV
Ibid.
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orders. The political problem for the Christian West was then how to allow political unions
the latitude needed to govern themselves while respecting the universal authority of the
Church.
The principle of the liberal revolution seeks to reunite this divided man by
reconsidering the terms of political association. The result is a radical political freedom
expressed as natural rights, foremost among them liberty, property, and life
(security/freedom from oppression/pursuit of happiness). Natural rights doctrines at the
heart of liberalism’s revolution are therefore expressed as freedom of movement,
particularly as unconstrained movement, which is a response to the ancien regime’s
impossible demand of lawful obedience to divided authorities. Political freedom then, the
destruction of obstacles, is the aim of liberalism.
This revolution therefore operates between actors who can be delineated in
accordance with their response to this movement: the reactionary seeks to return to an
older era, predating liberalism’s natural rights rhetoric; liberals support the project of
liberalism (more conservative liberals wish to slow its momentum, while more liberal
supporters want to nudge it along); and progressives wish to accelerate liberalism’s
progress indefinitely. These movements and antagonisms occur within the liberal regime
along the axis of the state and civil society. In a liberal regime, the state’s authority and
legitimacy are conferred through consent of the governed. The regime’s constitutional
order or institutional arrangements are agreed upon for the purpose of expressing natural
rights claims through the demolition of obstacles to those freedoms. The civil society exists

13

naturally insofar as it is an expression of the social nature of man, but in a liberal regime it
exists in contradistinction to the state.
The state and the civil society are codependents in a tensional relationship. The
state’s justice rests primarily upon the politicized virtues attendant to its claim to rule
impartially—it is no coincidence that Hobbes, Locke, and other liberal philosophers
imagine an Archimedean point, the ‘state of nature’ wherefrom the justice of social order
can be theorized and computed. The civil society, usually manifested as some form of
commercial society in liberal regimes, is left ‘free’ through the construction of laws which
ensure unrestraint. Where the ancien regimes commanded from on high, the liberal regime
was content to leave men to be free, socially and economically. Civil society needs the state
to enforce laws, and fundamental natural rights, and the state needs commercial society to
produce wealth (a product of free association in commercial society) and consent (tacit, or
otherwise in accordance with a particular constitutional order) to furnish its effective
power.
For all the great benefits men have reaped from the rise of liberalism, there is an
implicit crisis concerning the direction of liberalism’s momentum. The problem emerges
from liberalism’s internal logic which pressures the incessant dismantling of all obstacles
to human freedom: once the obstacles are removed, where should one go? Against what
force should liberal society direct itself? There is a lack of positive affirmation for particular
conduct in private life in liberalism, unlike every other political regime before it, all
directed by visions of virtue, excellence, holiness, conquest, etc. Liberal regimes are
typically slow to acknowledge that liberty is a condition for human action, but not an end in

14

itself. What is the right to the pursuit of happiness if people do not possess knowledge of
that which they pursue? The conflict is embodied in the desire to forge a strong (intentional
and essential) communion of the great freedom in liberal society and a vision of truth
which merits perpetuation. To say this another way, can men secure in liberalism the
natural objects of their desire? That a society has a purpose is a condition for its
sustainability, else its perpetuation is conditioned upon radical contingency.
Liberty and equality work harmoniously when there are clear barriers to abolish,
but when the barriers are obscured, when people disagree about which barriers need to go,
when they begin interrogating small obstacles in the same manner as they once
interrogated the great edifices which initially oppressed the promises of liberty and
equality, there is more strife and little consensus. Disconcert is the price of liberalism’s
triumph, and liberalism frays in the face of this search for common purpose, and struggles
to account for expanding definitions within what Rawls defined (broadly, he hoped) as the
liberal principle of legitimacy: “Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it
is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and
equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals
acceptable to their common human reason.”22 Liberals expect reason to immaculately
generate consensus, and uncritical liberals often fail to acknowledge that this consensus is
innately threatened by limitless liberty. Consider Locke in Chapter XXI, Section 55, of his
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, “Were all the concerns of man terminated in this
life, why one followed study and knowledge, and another hawking and hunting: why one

22

John Rawls, Political Liberalism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).
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chose luxury and debauchery, and another sobriety and riches, would not be because every
one of these did NOT aim at his own happiness; but because their happiness was placed in
different things.” Locke’s observation can be read as a warning, particularly of the taste for
material well-being if left unchecked by some moral satisfaction: there no limit to the
diversity of pursuits in the name of happiness. A sustainable liberalism inherently depends
on the character and agreement of these ‘happinesses.’ In America, Tocqueville saw the
civil society’s preponderance of religiosity as an essential bulwark against the materialistic
temperament engendered by the equalizing of conditions brought on by the rise of
democracy. The freedom to pursue a diversity of individual, material happinesses was
constructively hemmed by a coeval desire for moral satisfaction, in this case manifest
through American religious character. Whether waning religiosity is a symptom or cause of
the liberal democratic revolution, it is liberalism’s friendly critics, like Lippmann, who are
interesting because they sense this lacuna of purpose, and judiciously warn and hope to
guide, farsighted, against these tendencies and, often, their remedies.
To suppose in response that the indeterminable freedom of liberal society should be
somehow guided is not as heartening as it is obvious. The great danger resides in how
exactly liberal peoples should do this. To secure the natural objects of men’s desire the
state could assign quotas and direct behavior more combatively, but this would threaten
the success of the commercial civil society and roundly weaken its underlying assumptions,
and guarantees of rights, liberty and equality. On the other hand, it is not clear that a
rudderless liberal society, prone to authoritarianism when confronted by hardships,
particularly economic crisis, can alone approach an end outside of indeterminate liberty. It
is no coincidence that Lippmann and other friendly liberal democratic critics felt so sharply
16

the sting of the first and second world wars. Liberalism’s substitute purpose, for the
moment, is a faith that it is moving toward a human order that is in some measure
satisfying. Caught between despotism/dogmatic truth and indeterminate faith, it is not
surprising that modern liberals should wonder: what exactly were the medieval shackles
from which liberalism was supposed to free them?
This intractable situation is the basis of the balancing act that is at the heart of
modern liberalism. At stake is the capacity of the liberal democratic regime’s ability to selfsustain. It is exactly this question of a sustainable liberal regime which was taken up by the
American founding fathers. Few were either reactionaries or progressives, seeking a return
to pre-enlightenment (pre-liberal) political orders, or pro forma Jacobin radicals devoted to
impalpable progress. In the sense of the preceding discussion, they were all liberals whose
prescriptions were grounded in the claim of nature, of philosophy, which dampened their
radicalism, but allowed them varying degrees of conservativism and liberalism as it relates
to arresting or cautiously encouraging movement of the liberal regime to its unspecified
end. The founders’ later antagonists, the progressives, would be less bothered by the
indeterminable structure of the liberal regime, less bothered by the question of
sustainability, and fundamentally buoyed by their radical faith in History to deliver the
regime to a welcome future. Understanding liberalism’s origins and its crisis, the balance of
the state and the civil society, the great promise of its guarantee of rights and the great
danger of its momentum, sets the stage for a more particular discussion of its movement in
America.
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Liberalism and Progressivism: Definitions for Evaluating Lippmann’s Thought

To evaluate the continuity and message of Lippmann’s political thought requires

both foundations and criteria well suited for the exegesis of Lippmann’s works of political
philosophy. In this case the pursuit of these definitions runs headlong into a vast literature
of academic and political debate, not to mention the canon of western political thought. The
sheer volume which burdens those who would explain and articulate the antagonisms
between liberalism and progressivism suggests that any pretense of comprehensiveness
would be too ambitious. This diversity plagues the goal of comprehensiveness also invites
the indictment of ‘cherry-picking.’ The goal here is identifying a set of working definitions,
no more, no less.
Disentangling liberalism and progressivism in American political life and culture is
largely a Sisyphean task. Academicians, politicians, pundits, and especially the casual
political observer all find it difficult to separate the two political philosophies due to a
perceived overlap both historically and politically. The very terms ‘progressive’ and ‘liberal’
have come in and out of vogue in the world of political capital, often used and shunned by
various institutions with remarkably diverse sets of political beliefs. Yet through the fog of
war, persistent distinctions have existed through American political history, and continue
to persist though substantive philosophical inclinations within the (mostly) competing
doctrines. What follows is a presentation of an useful set of philosophical distinctions
which separate the core substance of liberalism from progressivism, traced through the
history of political thought into the American context. This distinction will then be used to
characterize Lippmann’s thought, and pursue an understanding of his development as a
thinker. This opening chapter will be successful if it produces a working understanding that
separates the hallmarks of liberal and progressive thought while also placing the debate in
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the larger context of American political philosophy, and western political philosophy. This
understanding will then be used as a means by which Lippmann’s works will be
interpreted, and his development as thinker studied.
One promising approach is to set Lippmann’s thought within the framework of
political foundations. The structure of this framework is as follows: liberalism takes
Nature23 as its political foundation, progressivism, History.24 A recent work by political
scientist James Ceaser, Designing a Polity, attempts a definition: “a foundation is a first
principle that explains or justifies a general political orientation; it is offered as an
authoritative standard or fundamental idea of right.”25 Though the very term
“foundationalism” really only exists in contradistinction to non-foundationalism, particular
‘foundations’ can be understood “merely as a formal property of any polity.”26 This useful
typology divides American foundational concepts into two categories: History and Nature,
which are readily available in American Political Thought, and in Lippmann’s books of

When speaking of nature as a foundational concept, I will capitalize it for the sake of clarity. However, I will
also capitalize History, and this creates a certain ambiguity. History is, in this context as well as others,
perceived by progressives as a process (ex. “Progress”), to speak in quasi-Hegelian terms, of dialectical
changes unfolding in the flow of time toward a vision of an ‘ethical state.’ I in no way wish to, by association,
offer a deleterious definition of ‘Nature as process to a fixed end’ through its capitalization. This should be
evident through my exegesis, but bears mentioning at the outset.
24Political scientist James Ceaser defines a foundation, “merely as the formal property of any polity.” This sort
of conceptual organization offers immediate connection between one ideological persuasion in the American
tradition, and its animating form. The central advantage of this approach arises by offering categories which
are philosophical in nature. James A. Ceaser, Designing a Polity (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,
2011), pg. 7
25 James A. Ceaser, Designing a Polity (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011) pg. 7
26 Ibid
23
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political theory.27 These categories are broad, but can be identified roughly with currents in
liberalism and progressivism.28
Within the inquiry through foundations the founders, as liberals, and the
progressives naturally seem to adopt Nature, and History, respectively. This makes
exploring their antagonisms worthwhile, because to American progressives, their political
philosophy embodies some combination of a correction or a repudiation of the philosophy
of the American founders. For reasons often as much rhetorical as philosophical, this
sometimes manifests as an re-articulation of the aims of the founders29 that maintains their
spirit, or, more combatively, sometimes as arguments directly against the liberalism
espoused by men such as Washington, Madison, Hamilton and Jefferson. For whatever
purposes the progressives make reference to the founders, there is in that tendency a point
of departure: it is necessary to understand the liberalism of the founders to understand the
motivations of the progressives. The division between the two camps offers a useful proxy
between the foundational concepts of Nature and History. This distinction is present in
Lippmann’s thought as he often turns to the founders either for the purpose of criticism or
inspiration, often both. This is one of many points of contact with his thought, offering deep

Ceaser also includes the category of Faith, which is an important explanatory feature of American political
thought and practice. Foundations in faith operate primarily in culture, providential teachings can be found at
the heart of the progressive’s “social gospel” movement, and deductions from religious teachings are merge
with and buttress claims on behalf of “the laws of nature and nature’s God.” However, it is almost completely
absent in the works of Lippmann, present only as a difficult sort of Neoplatonism. The absence of faith is, of
course, important, but is better treated as the philosophical portrait of Lippmann emerges in the exegesis of
his work.
28 “Progressive” will be capitalized only when referring to the Progressive party. The lower-case progressive,
will be a reference to the generalized ideology.
29 See Wilson on the Founding. Newtonian Science. In I. Bernard Cohen, Science and the Founding Fathers
(Norton, 1997)
27
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insight though an extended brief on the foundationalism of the founders and the
progressives.
Liberalism of the Founders: Grounded in Nature
In Federalist 1, Alexander Hamilton introduces the great question of governing a
liberal constitutional republic, of judging “whether societies of men are really capable or
not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are
forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.” Hamilton
sensed the magnitude of the moment, the great experiment of a government of “reflection
and choice”, and rightly judged that failure in this project would “deserve to be considered
as the general misfortune of mankind.”30 The Federalist is preeminently concerned with the
political consequences of this new project, which would determine whether men could live
in liberty and freedom, or would instead be forever fated to live slavishly under essentially
despotic, contingent political orders.
Fundamental to the founders’ political science was constitutionalism, natural rights
doctrine, and a realist view of human nature. Consider Jefferson: “We had no occasion to
search into musty records, to hunt up royal parchments, or to investigate the laws and
institutions of a semi-barbarous ancestry. We appealed to those of nature, and found them
engraved in our hearts.”31 A foundation in Nature is a foundation in rational
philosophical/scientific inquiry. Though for some of the founders this meant a Christian
rationalism, and others a political psychology, the amalgam of their views amounted to an

30
31

Federalist 1
Quoted in Designing a Polity, 8

21

articulation of natural rights doctrine. “Not myth, mystery, or History, but philosophy or
science—the terms were then synonyms—could serve, perhaps in a simplified version, as a
public foundational concept. There could be ‘public philosophy’”.32 The foundation in Nature
formed the grounds upon which the Founders rested their political prescriptions for
institutional governance. This political science of natural rights stands in opposition to the
philosophy of History, and a rigorous, almost strictly empirical natural scientism, both of
which would beget the later forms of progressive opposition to the philosophy of the
founders.33
Progressives: A Lost Foundation and Modern Crisis
The progressive movement, though nebulous and difficult to study as a continuous
body of thought, often manifests as a rejection of the founders and their political science.
Progressive leaders and intellectuals view the world as complex and unmanageable
without a large, active central government. The view, engendered in large part by rapid
industrialization34 in the eras following the founding, is animated by the idea of progress
within history35 which rejects natural rights theory and pronounces a belief in the

Designing a Polity, 10 Emphasis mine.
Designing a Polity, pg. 68 Cesear speaks extensively about both the Philosophy of History and natural
history as opponents to the natural rights theory of the founders. He finds the latter to be the forerunner of
biology, anthropology, etc. And as such it constitutes the branch of progressive opposition to the founders
expounded in highly scientific theories of social order which are to be administered by the central
government. Both the Philosophy of History and natural history (as just briefly outlined) will be treated in the
section of this paper that deals with the progressives, but more emphasis will be placed on the former as a
definitive element of the Progressive mind-frame.
34 Though many progressive accounts of this phenomenon exist, see, for example, the work of American
progressive leader and economist, Richard T. Ely in "Industrial Liberty" Publications of the American
Economic Association 3rd Series, 3 no. 1 (1902)
35 Much of my analysis for this section, as well as my understanding of the categories of foundationalism and
non-foundationalism rely on the work of James A. Ceaser, Nature and History in American Political
Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), as well as Designing a Polity (Rowman and
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011)
32
33
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unassailable progress of humanity. The words of Woodrow Wilson stand as ready as any
encapsulation of the promise of History:
Progress! Did you ever reflect that that word is almost a new
one? No word comes more often or more naturally to the lips
of modern man, as if the thing it stands for were almost
synonymous with life itself, and yet men through many
thousand years never talked or thought of progress. They
thought in the other direction. Their stories of heroisms and
glory were tales of the past. The ancestor wore the heavier
armor and carried the larger spear. "There were giants in those
days." Now all that has altered. We think of the future, not the
past, as the more glorious time in comparison with which the
present is nothing. Progress, development,—those are modern
words. The modern idea is to leave the past and press onward
to something new.36
Though the concept of History well defines the foundation of all progressive
thought, in considering the progressive allegiance to the general idea of progress, it is
helpful to consider the writing of enlightenment forerunner to the progressives, Marquis de
Condorcet in his Outlines of an Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind:
This picture, therefore, is historical; since subjected as it will
be to perpetual variations, it is formed by the successive
observation of human societies at the different eras through
which they have passed. It will accordingly exhibit the order in
which the changes have taken place, explain the influence of
every past period upon that which follows it, and thus show, by
the modifications which the human species has experienced, in
its incessant renovation through the immensity of ages, the
course which it has pursued, and the steps which it has
advanced towards knowledge and happiness. From these
observations on what man has heretofore been, and what he is
at present, we shall be led to the means of securing and of

Woodrow Wilson, from The New Freedom, 1913. American Progressivism: A Reader. editors Ronald
J.Pestritto and William J. Atto, (Lexington Books, 2008) pg 49
36
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accelerating the still further progress, of which, from his
nature, we may indulge the hope.37
Because of this enlightenment era introduction of the idea of progress, Progressivism is
perhaps best understood by its relation to enlightenment thought: on the one hand it can
be seen as a continuance of enlightenment thought in an ‘new’ era fashioned by the
industrial revolution, and, in another version, it can be seen as a philosophy of History and
wholesale rejection of the enlightenment tradition’s attempt to understand nature.38 The
former accentuates the sciences of political economy and institutional tools of an active
central government, and is grounded more in the immediate observable progress within
history noted by Condorcet. The idea of progress, at first closely tied to observable
progress, initiated by positivists such as Concordcet, was once the central organizing
principle of the otherwise nebulous movement.
The science of History furnished an age where men sought to direct the inexorable
force of movement in history. “The task of directing progress now fell to the pragmatic
philosophers and social scientists.”39 So long as History’s movement was guided, and
remained true to its perceived course, the progressive movement had no difficulty in
connecting their goals with those of the end of History. “We may indulge the hope,” said
Condorcet. A second conception banishes the virtue of hope within history for a radical

Marquis de Condorcet, Outlines of an historical view of the progress of the human mind (translated
from the French) (Philadelphia, 1796). Accessed from http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/1669/789 on
9/23/2015.
38 This classification of the different types of progressive thought is given in James Stoner’s conference paper,
“Progressivism, Social Science, and Catholic Social Teaching in the Building of the American Welfare State,” at
a conference on “Progressive Challenges to the Constitution,” sponsored by the Center for Political and
Economic Thought, St. Vincent College, Latrobe, Pennsylvania, April 9, 2011. I have found it very useful for
conceptually organizing the different strands of progressive thought in America.
39 Designing a Polity, 10
37
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faith in the limitless perfectibility of man. Exacerbated by the collapse of immediately
observable progress in the wake of WWI and the totalitarian cataclysms of the 20th century,
the radicalized faith in History moved away from observable hope for progress, and
became more antagonistic towards constitutional limits, natural rights, and realism
concerning human nature. In many ways the Progressive movement predating WWI was
shattered, and rearticulated in a manner hostile to the natural rights foundation on which a
sustainable Liberalism depends. This coexistence has been the story of the 20th Century,
and the story of Lippmann’s public philosophy. To delve more deeply the categories of
those divisions must be examined more thoroughly.
The competing doctrines can be shown to coexist in a relatively balanced political
climate until the foundation of the progressivism which rested in the
observational/empirical progress of history crumbled, and divided the progressive
movement in two: empirical progressivism disappeared, and non-foundational
progressivism, characterized by an explicit rejection of natural rights doctrine, emerged,
revealing itself as an always-present element in empirical progressivism and as the future
of the movement which would continue to aver against the liberal consensus in the 20th
century. The attack on nature as a foundational concept was launched by the nonfoundational progressives, particularly John Dewey, who were unwilling to concede any
standard of natural rights, considering it untenable as a metaphysical position. Because the
idea of natural rights entailed a fixed human nature that necessarily limits man’s
possibilities, these progressives instead opted for a more robust notion of progress that is
foundationless. By questioning the idea of progress in History some philosophers and
progressive leaders began to reevaluate the very idea of foundations. They rejected the
25

empirically flawed notion of progress in History as an outdated form of “historicism,” and
instead embraced a new sort of non-foundationalism that took the idea of eventual
progress on nothing more than “an act of faith.” It became the hallmark of a fatalistic
progressivism. The distinction between the observable and fatalistic progressivism will help
clarify what parts of Lippmann’s thought, particularly his early thought, remained
consistent and active throughout the course of his career.
Refining Categories for Lippmann’s Political Thought
Through the density and variety of this brief on the distinctions within and
motivations of liberalism, the scope of American political thought offers many potential
modes of interpretation. However, there are three categories that form the crux of the
division: Constitutionalism, Natural Rights, and Human Nature. Evident in each is the
tension between Nature and History, where claims on behalf of Nature and liberalism are
distinct from those of History and progressivism because the former tend to imply limits on
political order, and the latter tend to reject them.
To broadly identify these tensions:
Natural right’s appeal to Nature amounts to assertions of truth and falsehood as a pursuit
of the good in an ordered universe. The progressive rejection of nature argues some
version of the historicity of moral-political judgments: that they are circumscribed by their
particular place and time, or that there is no ground, providential or natural, for the very
concept of natural right. A notion of progress within History is instead inserted as guide
and master.
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Constitutionalism appeals to Nature as a doctrine of limits (natural rights, limited power)
through which a people enumerate the terms and conditions under which they consent to
be governed. Limited government is possible only in democratic societies if the demos is
willing to impose limits upon itself though representation (rather than direct democracy)
and agreed institutional mechanisms. Constitutionalism tends to appeal to History when it
is treated as an evolving organic process, thus moving towards an idealized ‘ethical’ state.
Constitutional limits are often diminished through active political actors who circumvent
institutional structures, and through excessively sweeping jurisprudence which seeks a
particular result identified though an appeal to History.
The view of Human Nature endorsed by the foundation in Nature is rooted in fixed ends of
human flourishing engendered by a particular philosophical anthropology. History,
conversely, rejects the ideas of fixity and limits engaged by the traditional study of man,
and instead advocates a faith in the perfectibility of humanity through state intervention
and guidance. Nature aligns with the notion that the government is the product of the
exercise of practical wisdom naturally available to those who practice self-government, and
History favors man in motion, directed towards his apotheosis by the state as the basis of
all morality.
Where does this leave us in the quest for a distinction between liberalism and
progressivism? At the very least, there are two foundational concepts, Nature and History.
Each formalizes properties constitutive of liberalism and progressivism and divides them
in a way that can organize the interpretation of Lippmann’s thought. Yet the distinction is
incomplete: there is too much overlap, too much rhetoric to disambiguate the ideological
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doctrines within a single factor analytic. The real task of disambiguation will come through
examination of the particular with reference to the general framework. The benefits of
foundational categories extend to the task of clarifying Lippmann’s political ideas in the
scope of the political ideas which animate the varieties of liberal and progressive thought.
Further, by stepping away from the secondary literature’s tendency toward indexical
analysis of Lippmann as a partisan in one particular tradition on the basis of practical
politics and/or biographical circumstance, there can be clarification of his purposes
through a re-reading of his engagement with the philosophical trends of the 20th century,
and a new philosophical understanding of the ideas which form the basis of political
ideologies. That task, however, can only be completed through sustained, careful, and
philosophically motivated exegesis of Lippmann’s treaties on political philosophy.
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Chapter Two - A Preface to Politics: Reason and Nuanced Progressive Idealism
Lippmann’s first book was nothing less than an astonishing success in the
estimation of its contemporary cultural and political observers. Teddy Roosevelt went so
far as to call Lippmann: “the most brilliant young man of his age in all the United States.”40
The book is an unique and in some ways even a profound tackling of the deepest elements
of a dueling progressivism and liberalism that would persist throughout his corpus. Yet for
all its complexity in this regard, its incoherencies are difficult to overlook. Many friends and
critics attribute this to the boisterous optimism of his youth, but it is in large part due to his
split allegiance to History and Nature as guiding principles, and the beginning of his quest
to resolve their dispute. To understand this context for his first book begins with the
immediate intellectual influences upon its authorship. In discussing his first book, the most
relevant influences felt by a young Walter Lippmann occurred during his time at Harvard,
which was in turned shaped by his early life.
Though uneventful, Lippmann’s childhood was pleasant, and offers a picture of the
man he was to become. He was born in New York City on September 23, 1889 to Jacob and
Daisy Lippmann. Jacob’s family were comfortably upper-middle class garment
manufacturers, quickly rising when the Lippmanns inherited a substantial fortune upon the
death of Daisy’s father. Walter was born and bred as a gentleman, accompanying his
parents on regular trips to Europe, exposed to the social and cultural elite, and enjoying a
secure existence as their child. He was educated well, and in Jewish preparatory schools

Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., “Walter Lippmann: The Intellectual v. Politics, : in Walter Lippmann and His Times,
ed. Marquis Childs and James Reston (New York Harcourt, Brace, 1959) pg. 197
40
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where the climate stressed assimilation and submerging that Jewish identity in New York
cultural life, and Lippmann often hid through omission his Jewish identity.
One hallmark through all of Lippmann’s career has always been his fascination with
men of action, leaders possessed of both the reason and moral courage to manifest
productive change in accord with democratic sensibilities. His father was not such a man,
genial and kind, but cowed by his wife and uninspiring to the young Lippmann. He would
turn elsewhere for fatherly advice and tutelage, to such figures as Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Graham Wallas, Judge Learned Hand, and art historian Bernard Berenson, among others.
Professionally Lippmann was also drawn to political figures with a sort of mastery and
commitment to innovation and democracy. Among these figures numbered Teddy
Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Winston Churchill, and Charles de Gaulle. Though each fell in
and out of favor with Lippmann, they each in some way represented an avatar for the
contemplative Lippmann. Active leaders who would accomplished much through
boundless energies, particularly Teddy Roosevelt, whom Lippmann very much admired
early in his career.41
All of these men were revered for their ability to disperse the bogeys of ‘constructed
evils,’ a term he uses in his early work, Drift and Mastery, to describe the stultifying effects
of ‘stale tradition.’ Biographer Ronald Steel notes that for Lippmann, “Reason became a
kind of religion...And he continued to look for men who could see beyond the ‘bogeys’ and
‘constructed evils,’ for great leaders who could direct the passions of lonely men in crowds
and guide them toward higher paths.”42 Steel notes a story Lippmann tells in Drift and
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Mastery about a telling confrontation in Lippmann’s youth, what he called the most heroic
moment of his life: a confrontation with a suspected ghost. A family maid planted the idea
in the impressionable child’s mind, and, in the darkness of his bedroom, Lippmann resolved
to confront an image which appeared to him to be that of a ghost. Lippmann lauds himself
for stepping out of bed, turning on the light and identifying the ghost as a laced curtain, and
returning to sleep. While it is clear Lippmann was indeed gratified and motivated by this
guide of reason, it is less clear whether either he or Steel realized that the youth still
needed to get out of bed to disperse the bogeys, reason alone being unequal to the task.
Shunning the recommendations of his father and prep school debate coach that he
become a lawyer, Lippmann chose a rather more romantic profession for himself, that of an
art historian. Deeply influenced by John Ruskin, a Victorian era art and social critic,
Lippmann spent his European vacations in museums, ignoring the simple pleasures of rest
and relaxation enjoyed by his parents. Ruskin’s work had inculcated a social awareness,
and reformist sensibility in Lippmann, but, importantly, had also linked it to an aesthetic
purity. This is particularly telling concerning Ruskin’s view of labor and art:
We want one man to be always thinking, and another to be
always working, and we call one a gentleman, and the other an
operative; whereas the workman ought often to be thinking,
and the thinker often to be working, and both should be
gentlemen, in the best sense. As it is, we make both ungentle,
the one envying, the other despising, his brother; and the mass
of society is made up of morbid thinkers and miserable
workers. Now it is only by labour that thought can be made
healthy, and only by thought that labour can be made happy,
and the two cannot be separated with impunity.43

The Works of John Ruskin, Edited by Edward Tyas Cook, and Alexander Wedderburn (Cambridge university
Press, 2010)
43
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Lippmann was primed with this sense and expectation of the continuity of aesthetic
nobility with decent labor, something that informed his early criticism of the excesses of
private property support of corporatism, and later restrained his endorsement of the right
of private property in a liberal democratic state. Both Lippmann and Ruskin admired preclassical Greek and Roman, and Gothic architecture, and were disparaging of the vulgarity
of self-expression and indulgence of the renaissance artists. Together they condemned the
perversions and corrupting influence of the modern world. Lippmann entered Harvard, just
days shy of his seventeenth birthday, convinced he would follow this career of art historian,
reformer, and social critic.
Harvard was a truly unique experience for a young man with Lippmann’s innate
intellectual curiosity. Spurned by the socially elite clubs on account of his Jewishness,
Lippmann found a home in the intellectualism of the university, rejection fueling his
emerging social conscience. An iconoclast at even a young age, one of Lippmann’s first
published articles was an attack on a professor: Barret Wendell, author of a recent work
called The Privileged Classes, a condemnation of mass tastes on behalf of a sort of
anglophillic cultural absolutism. Lippmann penned an acerbic critical piece for a school
magazine, replete with all the expected indignation of a progressive anti-elitist. The work
caught the attention of retired Professor William James, who personally sought out and
congratulated Lippmann on his insights, and began a friendship with the young man
centered around weekly tea times on Thursday mornings.44
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Ronald Steel notes that while Lippmann was never drawn to the gloomy social
Darwinism of Herbert Spencer, he found great accord with the iconoclasm of James,
particularly in James’ explicit rejection of all dogmas in the favor of experience and
rigorous empiricism. James influenced Lippmann’s early views with his experimental
pluralism and view of truth as efficiency. “‘The true’, to put it very briefly, is only the
expedient in the way of our thinking, just as ‘the right’ is only the expedient in the way of
our behaving. Expedient in almost any fashion; and expedient in the long run and on the
whole, of course.” 45 The meliorism and practicality tempered any dramatic utopian
thinking in which Lippmann may have engaged without James’ influence, but James also
impressed upon the early Lippmann the notion that moral judgments are ineffectual guides
to understanding the value and purpose of life, also complicating any recourse Lippmann
might have made to the realm of essences in engaging a teleological view of man. James’
freethinking openness appealed strongly to Lippmann, but Lippmann was never fully
satisfied with the incompleteness of James’ experimental pluralism.
James’s influence, though prominent, was contradicted by Lippmann’s confessed
fascination with Santayana, who fostered in Lippmann the idea that reason exists to
dominate experience and could assist in the search for reality beyond experiences rooted in
neo-platonic ‘essences.’ What Lippmann did not find in James in regard to aesthetic
philosophical judgment, he found in Santayana’s appeal to reason as the guide to moral
essences beyond human experience. Santayana’s star pupil, Lippmann read his Life of
Reason, and quickly impressed the old Spaniard with his wit and curiosity. Santayana shook
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him out of the moral relativism of James’ philosophy, condemning it as ‘romantic
cosmology.’46 Steel notes a letter Lippmann would later pen to friend and art critic Bernard
Berenson ten years after Harvard: “I love James more than any very great man I ever saw,
but increasingly I find Santayana inescapable.”47 Lippmann never fully abandoned James,
and there is more of Santayana’s aestheticism present in his early works than is commonly
recognized, but for the more directly political prescriptions in Preface, perhaps no one was
more influential than Graham Wallas.
In Lippmann final semester at Harvard, Graham Wallas, a leader of the Fabian
movement, offered a seminar that would form the substance of his next book, The Great
Society. So impressed was Wallas with Lippmann, that he dedicated this book to his
student. The content of Wallas’ work included a critique of politics as an essentially
irrational phenomenon directed not by reasoned weighing of facts, but instinct, prejudice
and habit.48 Wallas further imparted to Lippmann a buttressing of his impression of a
complex and unwieldy modernity (first initiated aesthetically in reading Ruskin), and
skepticism concerning the socialist reform movements, Wallas having disputed with the
Fabians, and Lippmann previously flirting with socialist inspired reformism. Wallas’ impact
inculcated in Lippmann an emphasis on human psychology, and human nature as the
center of politics, as he critiqued those who would prefer to govern by statistics alone. Steel
quotes Lippmann crediting Wallas as having, “turned back the study of politics back to the
humane tradition of Plato and Machiavelli—of having made man the center of political

Steel, pg. 20. Steel also notes James’ rejoinder that Santayana’s philosophy amounted to nothing more than
‘the perfection of rottenness.’
47 Steel, pg. 21
48 Steel, pg. 27
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investigation.”49 Never mind for now what differences might have been overlooked
between Plato and Machiavelli; Lippmann’s point was, and would remain, that human
nature is the center of good political investigation.
Lippmann left Harvard, ending his position as Santayana’s teaching assistant, to take
a job as a reporter with a newly started news magazine, the Boston Common. Bored by the
shallowness of its moderate progressive rhetoric, he reached out to muckraking journalist
Lincoln Steffens for guidance. Steffens, known for his evangelical socialism, and his work on
local corruption, The Shame of Cities, was preparing to begin an investigation into the
practices of big banking and was eager for an apprentice whom he could mold into a
journalist, and he offered the job to Lippmann. Together they delved into the
underpinnings of big business. Lippmann did the legwork, pouring over documents and
interviewing anyone who would speak with him, assembling a dense report describing the
secret deals made between big banks, and financial houses on Wall Street. Their work
would help trigger the Pujo Committee investigations, which in turn helped create public
support for the 16th Amendment, the Clayton Antitrust Act, and the Federal Reserve Act.
Steffens impressed upon Lippmann more of a method of good, fact based journalism than
an intellectual legacy, yet Lippmann left his employ confirming the idea that corruption is
an inescapable part of the system, and with a healthy skepticism about the inherent
goodness of the common man.50
The intellectual mind of Lippmann on the eve of his first book is as mixed as the
tensions between Nature and History that begin to manifest in all his works. The emerging
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picture is that of an idealistic, reformist, young progressive, as many interpreters have
charged, but there as a great depth to that idealism, particularly in regard to what he
expected of humanity. On one hand, the young man was fascinated by Ruskin’s aesthetic
sensibility, including condemnation of the vulgarity of Renaissance art and expressionism.
Yet he objects boldly to an elitist work by a professor condemning mass tastes. His religion
of reason is confronted by James’ emphasis on will and empiricism. This confusion was met
with his longing for the neo-platonistic aesthetic beauty from Santayana, and Graham
Wallas’ emphasis on social psychology, which somehow provided a sort of ground on which
to reconcile the expressly political corollaries of these dissensions. With the final
experience of corruption in the trenches of Wall Street with Lincoln Steffens, Lippmann had
no end of unresolved intellectual currents with which he had to contend. These are large
pending questions, and despite the triumph and boldness with which it was written,
Lippmann’s first book was only his first attempt to resolve them.
Lippmann knew that he wanted to write a book, and even penned a letter to Graham
Wallas informing him of his intention to produce a series of essays aimed at popularizing
Wallas’ Human Nature in Politics.51 To produce such a work Lippmann had retreated to the
backwoods of Maine with friend and Harvard alum, Alfred Kuttner. Kuttner, a patient and
disciple of Freudian psychoanalysis, was resolved to work on his translation of Freud’s On
the Interpretation of Dreams. In their nightly discussions Lippmann found in Freud a sort of
hook, a novelty to invigorate his discursive, intellectually eclectic examination of the
progressive platform. Lippmann saw Freud’s view of the unconscious as an ally in the
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difficult problem presented by Wallas’ social psychological approach to political and
cultural life—that reason is insufficient for understanding human actions. In Freud
Lippmann found not only tools to further Wallas’ approach, but also Freudian slogans to
explain just how reason might conquer, or ‘sublimate,’ the political destructiveness of the
emotional/irrational man.
A Preface to Politics (1913) is traditionally thought of as a progressive tome,
emblematic of a young Lippmann and a young century, optimism and reform. And while it
is those things, it is also much more, for a nuanced reading easily finds recourse to both
Nature and History, to the founders and the progressives, to strands of both progressivism
and liberalism across the categories of constitutionalism, natural rights, and human nature.
Lippmann consolidates these varied and disparate elements into a defense of a particular
vision of human freedom articulated in the mode of philosophical inquiry. Every chapter in
this study finds that Lippmann’s works all manifest some element of his quixotic desire to
diagnose the means by which men enjoy the most political freedom. In this work, widely
thought to be his most fancifully progressive, he continues to insist on democratic freedom
in his pursuit of a defense of civilization which the modern era so desperately requires.
In many ways, A Preface to Politics (1913) is a discursive romp through the stable of
progressive reformism, dealing with the expected issues of voting reform, anti-trust and
business regulations, muckraking, party politics, and all other manner of corruption in
political and social life. However, the excited prose signals a startling optimism about
something new Lippmann is bringing to the progressive catalogue. Though Lippmann’s
optimism is evident, it shouldn’t be overstated. To understand his method it is important to
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note that he also includes various reminders to his reader that the work is nothing more
than a, “a preliminary sketch for a theory of politics, a preface to thinking. Like all
speculation about human affairs, it is the result of a grapple with problems as they appear
in the experience of one man. For though a personal vision may at times assume an
eloquent and universal language, it is well never to forget that all philosophies are the
language of particular men.”52 Though the grand tone of the book is difficult to square with
such a disclaimer, it is nonetheless important to understand that Lippmann’s goal here is to
sketch a new method of political science, a new ‘philosophy.’ Though he cloyingly
admonishes his subjectivity, his objective is sweeping, and his method is politicalphilosophical. The type and nature of this philosophy emerges in-between undergraduate
references to a scattered list of favorite philosophers. Part of the task of interpretation is to
determine the character and nature of this philosophy.
Taken with his insistence that the world is undergoing massive, and unwieldy
corporate and industrial reorganizations, it’s not difficult to hear Tocqueville’s sentiments
in Democracy in America echoed in Lippmann’s introduction: “A new political science is
needed for a world altogether new.”53 Lippmann understands himself as on the brink of a
discovery of a new politics.
The details of this new philosophy emerge in a tightly argued nine chapters. Though
Steffens’ style of factual presentation is obvious in Lippmann’s construction, the book feels
oddly unconsummated. Lippmann sticks to his understated goal of developing a ‘preface to
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thinking,’ but therein never fully illuminates a specific way forward. His central argument
seems to be that each problem in the ‘machine’ of political life, particularly in the inchoate,
rapidly industrializing/corporatizing modern world, evokes unique brands of corruption.
The only means for dealing with these many and varied corruptions is a scientific, inventive
social psychology which takes human nature as its guiding principle.
The term social psychology receives somewhat ambiguous usage throughout
Lippmann’s book. The best source for a concise definition comes instead from Graham
Wallas’ The Great Society, the book Wallas dedicated to Lippmann and constructed from the
seminar he gave at Harvard: “The science of social psychology aims at discovering and
arranging the knowledge which will enable us to forecast, and therefore to influence, the
conduct of large numbers of human beings organized in society.”54 The type and nature of
this knowledge comes in the form of a catalogue of human events and their causes which
together illuminate the disposition of the event’s actors. Wallas continues: “It is further
convenient to use the term ‘human nature’ as meaning the sum total of the human
‘dispositions.’”55 Taken thusly there is little to connect this view of human nature with a
foundation in Nature. Wallas’ view, at least superficially,56 is merely a summation of parts
of the human psyche, subject to Historical examination, revision, and (perhaps infinite)
modification. Yet the salient question seems to be what arenas remain open to social
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psychological inquiry, and what, if any, limits there are to the modification or perfectibility
of human persons.
In Lippmann’s case, his view on the fixity of human nature and existence of natural
rights is not altogether clear in Preface, partly because of the way he treats the irrational.
Lippmann’s novelty, the twist he imposes on Wallas’ method, is to extend social psychology
into the realm of the unconscious with the use of Freudian terminology. Lippmann
introduces Freud’s term, ‘sublimation’ in a discussion on how a ‘boy’s gang’ might better
spend its energies as a Boy Scout troop. He claims, “In each individual the original
differences are small. Training and opportunity decide in the main how men's lust shall
emerge. Left to themselves, or ignorantly tabooed, they break forth in some barbaric or
morbid form. Only by supplying our passions with civilized interests can we escape their
destructive force.”57 The goal is clear, but the method is not. Lippmann seems to be arguing
that a well-ordered inquiry into these ‘ignorant taboos’ and small differences will provide a
path forward to a better citizen, someone with ‘civilized interests.’
The civilized interests by which this civilizing effect is manifest are often
enumerated, and include the traditional norms of family, school, religion, art and science.58
However, there is an unexamined relativism implicit in the assumed value of what
Lippmann expects to be considered civilized interests. Nowhere is there a complete
discussion of the principle, which is further complicated by the straightforwardly
relativistic first chapters which seem to collapse the good and bad in a pseudo-Nietzschean
fashion: “Politics does not exist for the sake of demonstrating the superior righteousness of
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anybody. It is not a competition in deportment. In fact, before you can begin to think about
politics at all you have to abandon the notion that there is a war between good men and
bad men.”59 These opening sentences can be read to suggest that as there is no
righteousness, there is no right. Lippmann’s faith appears to be invested in a nuanced,
historical development furnished by scientific method. In his case the scientific method
applied eschews traditional statistical approaches because he has sensed the depth and
complexity of human nature, represented as the encounter with the irrational. This
position only serves to obscure the essential promise Lippmann finds in historical
development of society, of expected progress in History.
One of the hallmarks of natural right, of classical political rationalism, that politics is
pursuit of the question of ‘what is good for the city, for the man?’ further suggests that
Lippmann has indeed explicitly rejected Nature or natural right as a source and guide for
political order. However, Lippmann’s point seems to extend beyond a superficial dismissal
insofar as he goes on to condemn these questions of ‘righteousness’ only in regard to their
arresting impact on political organization. He claims, “if one half of the people is bent upon
proving how wicked a man is and the other half is determined to show how good he is,
neither half will think very much about the nation.”60 It seems that Lippmann is making a
positive claim about the good of the city, that it is stultified by constant bickering,
particularly in Congress, over facile claims of the good and evil of an endless litany of
parsimonious ejaculations.
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It does not seem to be the case that Lippmann understands himself to be a relativist,
but rather that he has observed that political culture is easily halted by creeds, taboos and
dogmas which attach easily to simple pronouncements of what is right and wrong. The real
issue stems from the great difficulty the average person has in discerning the politically
salient issues and responses:
If you stare at a checkerboard you can see it as black on red, or
red on black, as series of horizontal, vertical or diagonal steps
which recede or protrude. The longer you look the more
patterns you can trace, and the more certain it becomes that
there is no single way of looking at the board. So with political
issues. There is no obvious cleavage which everyone
recognizes. Many patterns appear in the national life. The
"progressives" say the issue is between "Privilege" and the
"People"; the Socialists, that it is between the "working class"
and the "master class." An apologist for dynamite told me once
that society was divided into the weak and the strong, and
there are people who draw a line between Philistia and
Bohemia.61
This sixth paragraph of the twenty-three year old’s first book uses an analogy which would
re-emerge in various forms throughout his future works, and draws attention to the basis
of his critique of democratic citizenship on the grounds that most citizens are unprepared
and incapable of the complexities of political life. But even at this stage Lippmann knows
that his argument is insufficient—while he has critiqued the inefficiency of the good/bad
dogma, he does not have a replacement mechanism by which political life is to be
understood.
Lippmann reframes the conflict experienced in political life as that between the
routineer and the inventor, those given to an inflexible machine politics, and those willing
61
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to invent and create. Lippmann condemns all who subscribe to a ‘machine conception of
government,’ including the American Founders and constitution.62 He favors a dynamic
style of government led by statesman who interpret will and sentiment derived from sound
political psychology. The proposition is strange, particularly at this early stage of the
argument when Lippmann has yet to provide a convincing example of such leadership.
Lippmann struggles throughout the book to define the statesmanship he seeks,
hinting that it may be ineffable except in practice. He echoes Nietzsche in a description of
this brand of the ‘inventor’ which opposes the routineer: “It is, I believe, this power of being
aggressively active towards the world which gives man a miraculous assurance that the
world is something he can make.”63 Nietzsche’s influence is again apparent. The epigraph of
the entire book becomes clear: "A God wilt thou create for thyself out of thy seven devils.” It
is from Nietzsche’s Thus Spake Zarathustra, in the first book, under the subheading “The
Way of a Creating One.” For all the passages that Lippmann could have chosen from
Nietzsche, he picked one that highlights both a clarion call and an admonishment to those
who would follow it. To create in this fashion is to be alone, and to affirm a value of life
amidst the nihilism and loneliness of ‘the creating one’ is as much a damning as it is a
freeing endeavor. There is only a little-ease64 at the hands the seven demons,65 and
Nietzsche includes in that passage a line which Lippmann does not quote, that it is,
“Terrible it is to be alone with the judge and avenger of thy own law.”

This criticism, which Lippmann would reverse later in his career, is largely incoherent in Preface, and
reflects a deep misunderstanding of the founder’s political science. More will be discussed on this subject
below.
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While it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss Nietzsche’s place in the
situation of the foundational ideas of Nature and History, it is clear that Lippmann moves
away from natural right in embracing this Nietzschean inventor-statesman. Lippmann
again references Nietzsche in the definition of the inventor as someone capable of
sublimating the passions in service of civilization, as, “he who has the courage of existence
will put it triumphantly, crying "yea" as Nietzsche did, and recognizing that all the passions
of men are the motive powers of a fine life.”66 It seems that the early Lippmann is indeed
hostile to natural right, and to its foundation in Nature. Yet there remains a difficulty in
placing him in the historicist/relativist persuasion: his recourse to philosophy.
Lippmann has charted for himself a truly unique line as a Natural Rights
progressive. It is clearly facile to claim that any positive assertion about human rights
belongs to the same category as a natural right foundation in Nature, in essences and
philosophical reasoning. However, Lippmann’s tie to a foundation in Nature is present
through his continued appeal to rationalism amidst the strange naturalistic reasoning that
he is forcing to accompany his ideal of statesmanship. The awkwardness of this
comportment pits the ‘wisdom of civilization’ against a social naturalism, that is, an antirationalistic method of problem solving that escapes a priori theorizing. Lippmann does not
seem to have a solution to, nor even see, the problem: his enterprise in Preface builds a
philosophical statecraft.
The reader is left with a confusing choice: either take Lippmann at his word and
accept that there is no foundation to his prescriptions other than an expectation of
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progress, or to accept that his philosophic enterprise also expresses philosophical
openness. Both premises seem to be operative. Take for instance Lippmann’s description of
the inventor in contradistinction to the routineer: “While the routineers see machinery and
precedents revolving with mankind as puppets, he puts the deliberate, conscious, willing
individual at the center of his philosophy. This reversal is pregnant with a new outlook for
statecraft. I hope to show that it alone can keep step with life; it alone is humanly relevant;
and it alone achieves valuable results.”67 Constant references to this philosophy imply that
Lippmann expects the scientific method ostensibly grounded in historical development to
be carried by digestion of experimentation and subsequent improvement at the hands of
inventors. The inventor more and more resembles a philosopher, as a sort of expert who
supplants the inevitably routineer-ing politician. After blamelessly drawing attention to the
way the inventive Woodrow Wilson inescapably descended to routineer status through
campaigning, Lippmann makes the curious comment: “If a nation's destiny were really
bound up with the politics reported in newspapers, the impasse would be discouraging. If
the important sovereignty of a country were in what is called its parliamentary life, then
the day of Plato's philosopher-kings would be far off indeed. 68 Though he does not claim it
explicitly, the lesson is appears to be that the ideal society is in fact that ruled by the
philosopher, and that, perhaps, this is exactly the sort of person the inventor has to
become.
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Though Lippmann isn’t blind to the difficulties in this proposition, he suspects that
this is already partly the function of the government ancillaries of which the bureaucracy is
composed:
Certainly nobody expects our politicians to become
philosophers. When they do they hide the fact. And when
philosophers try to be politicians they generally cease to be
philosophers. But the truth is that we overestimate
enormously the importance of nominations, campaigns, and
office-holding. If we are discouraged it is because we tend to
identify statecraft with that official government which is
merely one of its instruments. Vastly over-advertised, we have
mistaken an inflated fragment for the real political life of the
country.69
The refrain against machinist political culture again is heard. Lippmann’s optimism extends
in the form of the unnamed trappings of the political organism as philosopher-kings adopt
a rather more humble role as scientific managers. However, Lippmann insists that they
retain a philosophical attitude, one that shuns dogma and creed (a fundamental attribute of
any philosopher unburdened by sophistry), and, critically, that thereby wisdom is left in
charge of politics. While placing wisdom at the helm of politics is far from securing a
natural right foundation in Nature, it does temper the creative zeal of the inventor through
philosophical openness to new ideas and information. What most commenters have seen as
an exercise in progressive triumphalism can in fact be tempered by Lippmann’s essential
reliance on reason as the source and structure of philosophical statesmanship which
advances the progressive cause. This is certainly not to say that his position is without
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difficulties, but that there is a present tension concerning his treatment of natural right
between History and Nature.
This ambiguity continues into the only examples Lippmann attempts to give of his
experimental, inventive statecraft. In the middle of the book, the Fifth Chapter, “Well
Meaning but Unmeaning: The Chicago Vice Report,” 70 finally gives an example by which to
explain and critique social organization. The Vice Commission was tasked with determining
whether Chicago should continue allowing regulated prostitution in special ‘vice’ districts,
or to outlaw the districts altogether. The investigation included interviews with local
community leaders, police, prostitutes, and neighborhood organizations, as well as a
detailed statistical section. The Commission decided to abolish vice districts altogether, and
enumerated a list of procedures to end prostitution in Chicago. Lippmann concludes that,
“the Commission’s method was poor, not its intentions. It was an average body of American
citizens aroused to action by an obvious evil.”71 To rid itself of vice is a noble goal, but to
draft measures limited to re-education, and law enforcement amounts to fruitless
repression of the human impulse toward vice.
His criticism of the report hinges on two lines which he highlights together:
"So long as there is lust in the hearts of men it will seek out some method of expression.
Until the hearts of men are changed we can hope for no absolute annihilation of the Social
Evil."

Mary Linehan, The Electronic Encyclopedia of Chicago. Chicago Historical Society. Date Accessed:
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"Constant and persistent repression of prostitution the immediate method; absolute
annihilation the ultimate ideal."72
Lippmann suggests that advancing these two contradictory notions is not an intellectual or
sematic failing of the Commission, but rather that it is emblematic of the deep ‘confusion of
mind’ which plagues politics. By dealing with vice as a taboo to be eliminated, they fail to
engage it was an artifact of human nature, and something which can be sublimated, or
made right through the substitution of the civilizing of sexual impulse through other means
and institutions.
Lippmann’s goal, as he constantly reminds the reader, is to describe a new method
of politics, not to engage the problems of prostitution. Nonetheless, his off-hand
prescriptions are hopelessly vague, suggesting that “dance halls” and “social centers” hold
the key to conquering prostitution.
His lack of appropriate examples is critical as he condemns the proposals of the
committee on the basis that their goal is repression instead of substitution. “I am not
engaged in drawing up the plans for a reconstruction or in telling just what should be done.
Only the co-operation of expert minds can do that.”73 To his own conscience, this deficiency
is resolved through his continual appeal to great statesmen who can apprehend and act in
the massively complex world of economic realities which must be mastered before gradual
(he does stress that the change is slow and patient) change can occur. Like any progressive
he emphases economic factors, but also stresses that method is equally critical, that sexual
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impulse can be civilized if only human nature is properly understood, and if the taboos and
creeds which support it are abolished. “What stands between Chicago and civilization? No
one can doubt that to abolish prostitution means to abolish the shun and the dirty alley, to
stop overwork, underpay, the sweating and the torturing monotony of business, to breathe
a new life into education, ventilate society with frankness, and fill life with play and art,
with games, with passions which hold and suffuse the imagination.”74 Frankness about the
human condition is his cure, but economic reality is only a constituent difficulty of politics
that do not take human nature for their guide. Thus the typical preoccupations of
progressive policy are, in Lippmann’s view, unreasonable if their genesis does not rest in an
appropriate psychology attentive to human nature.
Lippmann’s method hinges on an understanding of the world as new, with new
challenges which demand a ‘human politics.’ The emerging philosopher statesmen who
somehow juggle its complexities are the ones that deliver change through social scientific
experimentation. It is important to note, however, that Lippmann is no utopian. He claims
that, “there is no short cut to civilization. We say that the truth will make us free. Yes, but
that truth is a thousand truths which grow and change. Nor do I see a final state of
blessedness. The world's end will surely find us still engaged in answering riddles.”75 The
quest for knowledge to govern does not rest only History in this aspect of Lippmann’s
thought, even in his ‘Idealistic’ youth. “This changing focus in politics is a tendency at work
all through our lives. There are many experiments. But the effort is half-conscious; only
here and there does it rise to a deliberate purpose. To make it an avowed ideal— a thing of
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will and intelligence— is to hasten its coming, to illumine its blunders, and, by giving it selfcriticism, to convert mistakes into wisdom.”76 There is a mixed heritage of progressive
idealism, and recourse to an enduring notion of wisdom in Lippmann’s early thinking.
Wisdom may be circumscribed by the ‘thousand changing truths,’ but the truth/wisdom is
none the less at the center of Lippmann’s politics.
Lippmann’s progressivist reaction is to what he sees as an endlessly evolving and
changing world. He is an empirical progressivist rather than a fatalistic progressivist. This
allows him to hold his strange position on natural rights, human nature, and other
‘constants’ which seem open to change but nonetheless change very little in history are
impossible to reconcile with a fatalistic progressivist’s expectation of apotheosis through
government. Change is practical in Preface, for all its high-mindedness. There is no
utopianism in Lippmann: “That is the great lesson which the Utopias teach by their
failure— that schemes, however nicely arranged, cannot be imposed upon human beings
who are interested in other things.”77
The corollary of the statesmen that gather this wisdom and discern action is that
they must act. Unfortunately there is no greater hurdle for action than constitutional limits.
Lippmann is fairly unrestrained in his contempt for the Founders and their “machine”
conception of politics. Following Woodrow Wilson, Lippmann opens Preface with by
aligning the Founders with the routineers, suggesting that they “Worked with the
philosophy of their age,”78 Newton and Montesquieu. Though Lippmann makes a
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distinction between the conservative and the routineer, and the inventor and the
progressive, it seems that what distinguishes them is not so much ideology, but approach,
or the method applied to politics. Conservative, or liberal, the founders’ political science
was arresting, yet another idol to be smashed en route to a human politics.
Lippmann argued against constitutionalism itself as a means to govern well. The
balancing of branches of government seems to him as though the founders “put their faith
in a scaffold, and it has been part of our national piety to pretend that they succeeded.”79
Against limited constitutionalism, the direct manifestation of the popular, irrational will
should come through active political actors: “[Statesmen] must find popular feeling,
organize it, and make that the motive power of government. If you study the success of
Roosevelt the point is re-enforced. He is a man of will in whom millions of people have felt
the embodiment of their own will.”80 Lippmann thus criticizes the machine conception of
politics he claims the founders (the routineers) orchestrated and rejects their liberalism.
There is little accord between this view of the constitution as anachronistic, and the
founder’s political science.
Yet, in the realm of human nature he finds implicit accord with the founders insofar
as he pleads for the return to setting human nature at the center of politics:
In other words, we must put man at the center of politics, even
though we are densely ignorant both of man and of politics.
This has always been the method of great political thinkers
from Plato to Bentham. But one difference we in this age must
note: they made their political man a dogma— we must leave
him an hypothesis. That is to say that our task is to temper
speculation with scientific humility. A paradox there is here,
79
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but a paradox of language, and not of fact. Men made bridges
before there was a science of bridge-building; they cured
disease before they knew medicine. Art came before aesthetics,
and righteousness before ethics. Conduct and theory react
upon each other. Hypothesis is confirmed and modified by
action, and action is guided by hypothesis. If it is a paradox to
ask for a human politics before we understand humanity or
politics, it is what Mr. Chesterton describes as one of those
paradoxes that sit beside the wells of truth.81
Although the practical difference between hypothesis and dogma is unclear, there is more
than a whisper here of a search for an essential understanding of human nature, despite his
ultimate rejection of the premise of an essential fixity to human nature. Confusingly, even in
regard to human nature, Lippmann remains antagonistic towards the founders despite a
deep and obvious kinship between his advocacy for attention to human nature and the
skepticism of the founders regarding direct democracy. Lippmann practically echoes The
Federalist when claiming in conclusion, “The one thing that no democrat may assume is
that the people are all dear good souls, fully competent for their task.”82 He remains as
critical as the founders of direct democracy, and for much the same reasons. Take for
instance Madison’s Federalist 51: “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The
interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be
a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses
of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human
nature?”83 Benjamin Wright attributes this to a lack of understanding on the part of a young
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Lippmann,84 and there is little reason to disagree, since Lippmann would reverse this
thinking later in his career. For now, the lesson seems to be that in Preface he holds sincere
disagreement about the machinist political system of the founders, but also dramatically
misunderstood and underestimated the importance of human nature in their design.
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Chapter Three – Drift, Mastery, and Scientific Organization
At some level Lippmann understood that Preface, with all its talk of iconoclasms, of
Nietzschean will and intuitionism rightly understood, was something less than a concrete
step towards a new politics. It was, as he pointed out throughout the text, and in its
introduction, merely a sketch of a method of thinking. No sooner had the book been
published than was Lippmann struck with a notion to write another. His political views had
grown less inclined towards the socialistic intellectual circles in which he traveled at
Harvard, and instead began to gravitate more towards the New Nationalism of Theodore
Roosevelt, to the more mainstream politics of the new American progressivism, and
particularly to the thought of Herbert Croly. With help from Graham Wallas, who was
eagerly expecting Lippmann’s sequel85 to Preface, Lippmann retired to Woking, Surrey, to a
comfortable country Inn, where he wrote the pages that would become Drift and Mastery:
An Attempt to Diagnose the Current Unrest (1914).
Though Preface had given Lippmann a solid reputation among the intellectually and
politically interested, he still lacked the sort of readership and influence he ultimately
desired. However, it was perhaps not simply influence Lippmann sought, but
understanding. From his diary, dated July 5, 1914, he writes, “A writer on public affairs
can’t pretend to despise reputation, for reputation is not only flattering to the vanity, it is
the only way of meeting the people you’ve got to know in order to understand the world.”86
Lippmann found the answer to this new need in the form of an unexpected invitation to
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meet with progressive theorist Herbert Croly who intended to recruit him as a founding
editor to a planned weekly periodical that would become The New Republic.
Croly had been impressed with Lippmann’s Preface, writing to Judge Learned Hand
that Lippmann, “has real felling, conviction and knowledge to give a certain assurance,
almost a certain dignity to his impertinence, and of course the ability to get away with the
impertinent is almost the best quality a political journalist can have.”87 Croly was as
suitably impressed by Lippmann’s person as he was by his idealism, and Lippmann leapt at
the chance to join Croly and Walter Weyl in their new endeavor, especially with Croly’s
claim that the weekly would be ‘radical without being socialist, pragmatic without being
doctrinaire.’88 Lippmann’s only quibble was with the addition of the adjective, ‘new,’ to the
original title, ‘The Republic.’ They changed it after finding “The Republic” to be an already
existing publication, but not without grumbling from Lippmann of a “positive dislike for
utopianism.”89
Some of Croly’s influence was present in Preface, though more emerged as
Lippmann sought to make his politics more concrete, more attainable in Drift. Their
primary arenas of confluence were that both Lippmann and Croly advocated, in similar
fashions, big government control of big business though capable, strong national
leadership. Both were partly influenced by the observation of the practical politics of Teddy
Roosevelt, and both shared a certain degree of resignation towards the existence of big
business and a desire to render it profitable though government interventionism,
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Lippmann being especially dismayed by the low probability of constructive socialist change
after his work as a reporter under Steffens.
Croly’s fame and philosophical influence stem largely from his seminal work, The
Promise of American Life (1909), a dense, thought-provoking attempt to assimilate elements
of American political thought into a new, and radical synthesis. It is difficult to overstate
Croly’s influence among the progressive intelligentsia. His argument in Promise is that what
restrains the pursuit of a more perfect democracy in America was not simply intractable
conservatism stultifying new liberals, but a more profound misunderstanding of the
American regime: both Jeffersonian agrarian individualism and democracy, and
Hamiltonian nationalism were alone insufficient to realize the promise of American ideals.
Jefferson refused overtures to expanding national power, and Hamilton feared and rejected
democracy. Jeffersonian individualism fought the Hamiltonian centralization of power.
Croly’s solution was to resolve this was to combine the two into a new nationalism: to
achieve Jeffersonian ends with Hamiltonian means.
Key to Croly’s argument is that for his purposes the role of government is essentially
unlimited. This was not the case for either Jefferson or Hamilton. Whatever most
progressives thought about Jefferson’s arguments for natural rights, they were hitherto
unable to resolve Hamiltonian centralization of power with free democracy. Croly’s
emphasis on nationalism and his purposeful forgetting of the founders’ view of the role of
government took place together: “The Higher American patriotism, on the other hand,
combines loyalty to historical tradition and precedent with the imaginative projection of an
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idea of national Promise.”90 Like Lippmann’s Preface, Croly assures the reader that this
synthesis will benevolently manifest in leaders with pure visions of the national interest.
The national interest amounts to the redistribution of property through centralized
government. Jeffersonian ‘equality’ through Hamiltonian ‘government.’ Croly argues that
property rights are an artifact of the open frontier, and industrial reality dictates that
future prosperity depends on the “individual subordination and self-denial...and [the]
necessity of subordinating the satisfaction of individual desires to the fulfillment of a
natural purpose.” Croly rejects laissez faire economic policy which motivated to some
extent both Jefferson and Hamilton, further arguing that, “The automatic fulfillment of the
American national Promise is to be abandoned, if at all, precisely because the traditional
American confidence in individual freedom has resulted in a morally and socially
undesirable distribution of wealth.”91 This argument for redistribution moves society
towards an equitable outcome at the cost of the constitutional mechanisms and natural
rights protections favored by the founders.
Croly ignores the importance of enforcing liberty through institutional checks on
Hamiltonian government, and likewise ignores the construction of Jeffersonian democracy
and limited government. His purpose reflects animosity toward natural rights doctrine, and
instead reveals a nationalistic desire to form a democratic community, composed of
citizens inherently perfectible through proper progressive ‘education’: “Democracy must
stand or fall on a platform of human perfectibility. If human nature cannot be improved by
institutions, democracy is at best a more than usually safe form of political organization;
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and the only interesting inquiry about its future would be: How long will it continue to
work?”92 The unlimited purpose of Croly’s government is to bring about the unlimited
perfection of man, to abjure constitutional restraints rather than to enforce constitutional
mechanisms around a permanent human type. Croly’s work has certainly some degree of
influence on Lippmann, in both Preface and Drift, but ultimately Lippmann’s views diverge
foundationally from Croly and other progressives.
Lippmann’s ‘sequel’ to A Preface to Politics, called Drift and Mastery (1914), retained
the iconoclastic spirit of its predecessor, but also contained many revisions and new ideas
such that it is difficult to draw too strong a connection to Preface, a book written just one
year prior. Nearly all of the secondary literature on Lippmann eagerly lumps these two
works together, perhaps because of the similarity of some of Lippmann’s themes, but also
perhaps because of their close chronology. Yet, Drift is a very purposeful response to
Preface, in particular because Lippmann seems to be sensitive to the obvious lack of
prescription omitted by the methods of political-emotional catharsis crudely outlined in
Preface. Where they are similar, Drift continues the themes of rejecting the past with hope
for the future, and increases the emphasis on the development of the future through
scientific realism and what Lippmann calls “industrial statesmanship.”
The book moves Lippmann closer to one of his idols, Teddy Roosevelt, and his 1912
“Bull Moose” political platform, and includes striking condemnations, not of private
property in its full scope, but rather private property as a stultifying, sacrosanct tradition.
Lippmann both claims that the productivity of the economy should not be hampered by
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government action, and that the time has come for government takeover of basic
industries, mining operations, railroads, etc.93 The seeming paradox is resolved in
Lippmann’s mind because of his stark optimism for a scientific/bureaucratic management
that takes little account of scarcity (except for the often implicit expectation that it will
decrease sharply), and offers a curious contrast from the later Lippmann who values
property rights more fully. Lippmann also continues to write passionately and
paradoxically in the realm of natural rights and philosophy, where it is attractive to try and
reconcile his bold, almost Nietzschean claims, such as his exhortation to, ‘break up routines,
make decisions, choose our ends, select [our] means,”94 with his other statements which
imply great philosophical openness, but there is a danger in trying to compartmentalize
these issues into a cohesive political philosophy. To understand Drift requires
circumspective reflection on Lippmann’s movement away from Preface.
The defining characteristic which offers continuity between Lippmann’s works is
philosophical openness in pursuit of a politically free, sustainable liberal democracy. The
introduction to Drift promises a following address to restricted political freedoms and
questions about the path of liberal democratic order. In early March, 1914 a man named
Frank Tannenbaum, a leader of the International Workers of the World union, led
unemployed protesters into New York City churches to demand restitutions for the poor, a
demand which many happily met. However, the result of this and other activisms was
continuing agitations from unemployed masses and sharply elevated consciousness in the
social elite. Lippmann, who spoke in Rutgers Square during the agitations,95 solemnly
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reports on the anarchist mood months later in Drift, almost exasperatedly cataloguing the
predictable counter by city administration to crack down on basic freedoms of assembly.
He makes note of both the inappropriateness of the city’s response, and, importantly, the
role of the protestors who had no message to give: “They knew what they were against, but
not what they were for, and their intellectual situation was as uncomfortable as one of
those bad dreams in which you find yourself half-clothed in a public space.”96 His concern
for the basic political freedoms is evident, yet implies that the entire situation is a result of
a deeper problem having to do with liberalism: “Without a tyrant to attack an immature
democracy is always somewhat bewildered.”97 There are two points to be made here: One,
that Lippmann attributes the agitations to bewilderment rather than, or at least as much as,
structural grievances with corporate compensatory systems, and, two, that liberty is not an
end in itself.
Lippmann is searching for purpose and how to wield the democratic sword, a
replacement for the tyrants democracy has overthrown. He explicitly aligns the foundation
of his thinking with Progress, claiming that: “The adjective ‘progressive’ is what we like,
and the word ‘new,’ be it the New Nationalism of Roosevelt, the New Freedom of Wilson, or
the New Socialism of the syndicalists.”98 He takes it for granted that the newness of the
world implies change; it is his empirical/observational progressivism that suggests new
methods are needed to achieve new ends—that “the battle for [progressives], in short, does
not lie against crusted prejudice, but against the chaos of a new freedom.”99 Lippmann
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concludes that to live with meaning, radicals now need to confront the weaknesses of
democracy with some “vision for the future.” He claims that this book will be some
approximation of his vision of that future.
Key to understanding the work is understanding the ‘modern condition’ of man.
Fortunately, it is on this issue Lippmann writes most authoritatively:
All of us are immigrants spiritually. We are all of us immigrants
in the industrial world, and we have no authority to lean upon.
We are an uprooted people, newly arrived, and nouveau riche.
As a nation we have all the vulgarity that goes with that, all the
scattering of soul. The modern man is not yet settled in his
world. It is strange to him, terrifying, alluring, and
incomprehensibly big. The evidence is everywhere: the
amusements of the city; the jokes that pass for jokes; the blare
that stands for beauty, the folksongs of Broadway, the feeble
and apologetic pulpits, the cruel standards of success, raucous
purity. We make love to ragtime and we die to it. We are blown
hither and thither like litter before the wind. Our days are
lumps of undigested experience. You have only to study what
newspapers regard as news to see how we are torn and
twisted by the irrelevant: in frenzy about issues that do not
concern us, bored with those that do. Is it a wild mistake to say
that the absence of central authority has disorganized our
souls, that our souls are like Peer Gynt's onion, in that they lack
a kernel?100
Lippmann offers deep questions about human place and purpose, and dares to offer some
hope about how these conditions, this drift, can be ameliorated, or mastered. His attempt to
offer a vision of how to proceed and master this restlessness of the new democratic age is
critically informed by the implications of a word so ‘incomprehensibly big.’
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The first part of his ‘vision’ seems to be introduced in his first chapter, much as he
had in Preface, by calling into question the capacity of citizens to participate in democracy.
He points out that even unfounded accusations in politics have the same practical
consequence as true claims, and cites the exploitation of the “Big Business” bogey as the,
“material for the feverish fantasy of illiterate thousands thrown out of kilter by the rack
and strain of the modern world.”101 He calls into question the muckrakers, but not their
motives. Muckrakers express the concerns of the bewildered and the downtrodden,
exposing their unknown grievances. For Lippmann, former aide to Lincoln Steffens, to
suggest that the muckrakers were insufficiently helpful in pursuit of this new order also
suggests how critically he saw the need for positive prescription in the wake of the
comparatively unhelpful Preface. In the light of his discussion of the restless anarchists, the
muckrakers seem little better than the agitators themselves, especially if they bring a sort
of chaos, albeit an enlightened one.
The great promise of the muckraking enterprise is that it continues to expand, and
itself thrives on, the demand of citizens for good governance: “when men’s vision of
government enlarged, then the cost of corruption and inefficiency rose: for they meant a
blighting of the whole possibility of the state. There has always been corruption in
American politics, but it didn’t worry people very much, so long as the sphere of the
government was narrowly limited.”102 With the (appropriately, in his mind) expanding
government, the concomitant expression of good government is a mixed blessing: more
agitations, more response. The key for Lippmann is that a positive vision of the future is
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needed to quell the present troubles. While this may on one hand seem to be a most solid
grounding for Lippmann’s thought in the value of Progress, it may in fact be quite the
opposite. While he is perhaps soundly animated by the observation that the distinctiveness
and rapidity of the world’s changes demand a new and unique response from government,
he is also attempting to explain a definite program for that change. It remains to be seen
whether a more fatalistic form of Progress would sustain the sort of exercise that
Lippmann believes integral to sustainable liberal democratic forms.
The demand for greater competence and honesty in government filters through to a
greater demand for competence and honesty in business. This demand is what Lippmann
diagnoses as the cause of the elevation of consciousness in the working classes, and the
commercial-government model is the entry point for his ‘vision’ of the promise of future
industry. Lippmann begins this way because this is the key to his prescriptive impulse in
Drift, and he needs to lay the philosophical groundwork for supporting the sort of
industrial statesmanship which he hopes will process the inchoate nationalization of the
great industries. Lippmann carefully explains that it is not commercial activity in general,
but ‘profit motive’ that he and the new progressive world have called in to question. He
notes that when radium was a suspected cancer cure, it was subject to ubiquitous calls for
the government to seize and ration it, thus demonstrating that man is naturally suspicious
of the profit motive, and that there is reason to doubt the simple laissez-faire notion that
profit-seeking can justly organize a complex commercial society.
Lippmann’s future argument for the public management of great industries depends
on the distrust of profiteering as well as suggesting, in principle, that competent
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management holds a vague, though great, promise for the spread of generalized well-being.
However, Lippmann also takes care to distance himself from those who would arrest all
commercial and industrial activity in the name of idealism: “I am not speaking in chorus
with those sentimentalists who regard industry as sordid. They merely inherit an ancient
and parasitic contempt for labor. I do not say for one instant that money is the root of evil,
that rich men are less honest than poor, or any equivalent nonsense.”103 This is one source
of continuity with the late Lippmann, whom many know from his defense of freedom of
commercial activity in The Good Society and his later writings. He has always recognized
that the civil market society depends on political freedoms as a condition of its wealth
creation, and was always hesitant to limit that enterprise. What he does emphasize is a
product of his faith in a new scientific realism, of an emerging capacity to centrally manage
large industries in the public interest. He continues, “I am simply trying to point out that
there is in everyday life a widespread rebellion against the profit motive. That rebellion is
not an attack on the creation of wealth. It is, on the contrary, a discovery that private
commercialism is an antiquated, feeble mean, and unimaginative way of dealing with the
possibilities of modern industry.’104 At this stage, Lippmann’s expectation is little more
than a hunch, and his drive to be prescriptive causes him to overstate this optimism in
various ways, just as his intellectual honesty prevents him from fully enumerating precisely
what industrial statesmanship looks like in practice.
The corollary question to Lippmann’s ambiguous but limited syndicalism is the
question of private property. For varied reasons, progressives tend to be dismissive of
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private property, often rejecting the premise of private possession in a modern state, or the
natural rights doctrine which supports it, or rejecting it on behalf of a competing rights
claim grounded in equality. The argument from the last option usually implies that some
concentration of wealth is protected by the right of the individual to ownership, and that
property should be confiscated in some measure to end cyclical and unequal distribution of
wealth. Consider Croly, “Americans who talk in this way seem blind to the fact that under a
legal system that holds private property sacred there may be equal rights, but there cannot
possibly be any equal opportunities for exercising such rights.”105 For Croly and most other
progressives, while there may be a sort of equality under the law, there is no effective
equality without some form of redistributive compensation for complex modern
mechanisms.
Croly and others did not fear to tread over private property rights in pursuit of
effective equality. And while Lippmann is attempting to articulate some grounding for the
manufacture of more effective equality and freedoms upon which liberal democracy
thrives, he makes his case in the language of natural rights doctrine. Croly and others made
appeals to equality, but as a principle tied to the expectation of redistributive policy, linking
it through that expectation to a foundation in History. Lippmann confronts the natural
rights background of private property to suggest that it is insufficient to its glorified past:
“Compare [the stockholder] with the farmer who owns his land, the homesteader or the
prospector, compare him with anyone who has a real sense of possession and you will find,
I think, that the modern shareholder is a very feeble representation of the institution of
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private property.”106 Often prone to impertinence, Lippmann abjures any glibness in this
discussion, illuminating an understanding of the right of private property as something
attached to individual rights grounded in Nature, in the natural order that comes through
labor and ownership. He points out that while other forms of ownership depended very
much on the sort of person who owned and maintained his property, any part of human
nature is omitted in the facelessness of stock holding.
The collectivism Lippmann proposes is supposed to remain in only the staple
industries and “public service corporations” such as railroads, leaving competitive business
and most agriculture to operate on the more traditional model of private property. By
accentuating the aspect of private property that qualifies ownership, Lippmann hopes to
reorient the question of collectivizing under public trust many industries: if private
corporate ownership is impugned, then there is more to be gained, or at least nothing is to
be lost, in terms of property rights, through transfer to overt public ownership. Like other
progressives, Lippmann’s prescriptions are influenced by the expectation that scientific
bureaucratic management will improve the efficiency of some industries: “The real
problem of collectivism is the difficulty of combining popular control with administrative
power.”107 However, without an exaggerated optimism in the efficiency of state-run
industries, it is not clear Lippmann would not have endorsed such a recommendation, even
in his early work. Thus the question of this industrial statesmanship is essentially a
practical issue, rather than a moral or class based advocacy. While Lippmann is not blind to
the mounting challenges of balancing the public and the private, he also pacifies himself,
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and the reader with occasional references to triumphs of supposed public collectivism,
such as the Panama Canal.
The other great limitation to the possibility of collectivism also curiously points
Lippmann to a fixity in human nature that seems more grounded in Nature than History.
Croly, social Darwinists, and other progressives typically expected to ameliorate the
theoretical limits of human socialist association by seeking a degree of change in the
aspects human nature which limit collective actions and ownership. Not so for Lippmann,
who does advocate a new approach for a new age, but is nevertheless adamant that
significant change is unworkable: “It lies at the root of most theoretical objection to
socialism in the famous "human nature" argument. Far from being a trivial question, as
socialist debaters like to pretend, it is the hardest nut they have to crack.”108 He suggests
that the syndicalists who are inclined to nationalize most, or all forms of commercial
activity, are themselves insufficiently prepared to deal with the exigencies of the modern
world because of their repeated overtures to unworkable systems: “They are proposing a
reconstruction of human society, and in all honesty, they cannot dodge the question as to
whether man as we know him is capable of what they ask.”109 Lippmann looks instead to
the historical distrust of the profit-motive, especially by the unemployed and
disenfranchised, and, combined with his discussion of rising consciousness, thereby adds
urgency to the development of new ‘progressive’ modes and orders of organizing
commercialism and labor.
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Much of Lippmann’s economic discussion hinges on the notion democracy is
imperiled, that we ‘drift’ where we have no clear strategy to combating the future
challenges of the industrial age. He argues that democracy itself depends on the presence of
labor unions insofar as they were the most available politically supportable means by
which consumers could press their demands on the industrial system. Strong unions were
a necessary component of the emergent democracy: “It seems to me simply that the effort
to build up unions is as much the work of pioneers, as the extension of civilization into the
wilderness. The unions are the first feeble effort to conquer the industrial jungle for
democratic life. They may not succeed, but if they don't their failure will be a tragedy for
civilization, a loss of cooperative effort, a baulking of energy, and the fixing in American life
of a class-structure.”110 The discussion of property and ownership served to raise the
question of unearned wealth in an industrialized society, and the corollary response for the
labor union is to create a mechanism by which these demands can be brought to the fore.
Labor is a curious issue for Lippmann. His argument is a full-throated endorsement
of unions, even going so far as to justify the physical ‘clubbing’ of scabs, “Far from being the
independent, liberty-loving soul he is sometimes painted, the scab is a traitor to the
economic foundations of democracy. ... The clubbing of scabs is not a pretty thing. The
importation of scabs is an uglier one.”111 This new frontier initiated by the labor movement
seems appropriately violent, justified by the metaphor. Yet Lippmann’s aim still appears to
be stability and freedom. He attempts to provide context for his support of unions though
appeals to constitutional rights as well as necessities of democratic progress: “They have
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won the very things the lack of which makes rebellion necessary. For if men are ground
down in poverty, if the rights of assemblage and free speech are denied them, if their
protests are ineffective and despised, then rebellion is the only possible way out. But when
there is something like a democracy where wrong is not a matter of life and death, but of
better and worse, then the preliminaries of civilization have been achieved, and more
deliberate tactics become possible.”112 It seems as though Lippmann views the unions as a
sort of release valve for the growing consciousness of the working class and their
increasing demands. However violent the situation is, it is buttressed through the context
of democratic institutions as well as the vague sense of civility that follows from the
amelioration of the first, basic threats of scarcity.
The implicit appeal to institutions is odd because of Lippmann’s continued (from
Preface) challenges to the American constitution. However, it appears that he continues to
denounce the founders and the constitution on the basis of a general suspicion of old
modes and orders for a new and modern world. Nowhere does Lippmann fully enumerate
the features of American constitutionalism and subject them to the scrutiny of the new
world, sufficiently content to lambast the routineer tendencies of those who would glorify
the past without addressing modern needs. He continues the critique by rearticulating his
support of masterful politicians, the coming industrial statesman (presumably men like
Teddy Roosevelt) against the New Freedom of Woodrow Wilson. While Lippmann does
recognize Wilson’s progressive rhetoric, ultimately Lippmann argues that Wilson is a
contradiction: a man who recognizes a brand new, shifting economic landscape, but who
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tries to apply unworkable 19th century policies. Lippmann argues that simple trust-busting
only makes way for incremental solutions: “That is the push and force of this New
Freedom, a freedom for the little profiteer, but no freedom for the nation from the
narrowness, the poor incentives, the limited vision of small competitors, no freedom from
clamorous advertisement, from wasteful selling, from duplication of plants, from
unnecessary enterprise, from the chaos, the welter, the strategy of industrial war.”113
Wilson is for Lippmann something of an unwitting ally to the old forces, offering nothing
unique or preferable because of his unwillingness to nationalize various industries through
scientific management.
Despite the repeated antagonism to constitutional form in favor of active political
figures, Lippmann’s true quibble with constitutional democracy is not in actuality a
discussion of institutional norms or their value. In fact, there is a great consensus at the
heart of Lippmann’s fears about mastering the democratic century and the aim of the
founders: capacity for self-government. Both the founders and Lippmann envision systems
that rise or fall based on the capacity of citizens. “A republic, if you can keep it,” Ben
Franklin is said to have quipped to an interrogatory woman after leaving the constitutional
convention. Lippmann is perhaps more pessimistic: “Men will do almost anything but
govern themselves. They don't want the responsibility. In the main, they are looking for a
benevolent guardian, be it a ‘good man in office’ or a perfect constitution, or the evolution
of nature. They want to be taken in charge. If they have to think for themselves they turn
either to the past or to a distant future: but they manage to escape the real effort of the
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imagination which is to weave a dream into the turning present.”114 Lippmann thus
identifies the two central problems of self-government: do people actually want to rule
themselves, and can they? His unwillingness to trust in the ‘good man’ or in a constitutional
order, or ‘evolution of nature’ rejects the social Darwinism and apotheosis seeking
behavior typified by some progressives, the limited capacity of even his favorite political
actors to maintain vast institutions, and a form of constitutionalism based strictly on social
contract theory, of the typical balancing of the liberal arrangements. He continues, “But no
one of these substitutes for self-government is really satisfactory, and the result is that a
state of chronic rebellion appears. That is our present situation. The most hopeful thing
about it is that through the confusion we can come to some closer understanding of why
the modem man lacks stability, why his soul is scattered. We may, perhaps, be able to see a
little better just what self-government implies.”115 What then is the solution?
Lippmann is again brought closer to the founders than even he realized. Recall that
the founders’ liberalism tended to be predicated on a either a Christian or classical
rationalism, political psychology, or some amalgam thereof, which amounted to a sort of
natural rights doctrine which was the basis of a more balanced, and perhaps more
sustainable liberalism. Lippmann’s search for sustainability brings him to a similar
precipice of natural rights doctrine, but he couches his prescriptions in terms of
philosophical openness. Where in Preface he placed much emphasis on the relativism of
Nietzsche, and thereby put himself in the untenable position of waiting on the ubermensch
for sustainable political order, his condition of ‘mastery’ refocuses this idea around a more
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humble philosophical openness in Drift. The central problem of the book is how to
introduce, as he says of his definition of ‘mastery,’ “the substitution of conscious intention
for unconscious striving.”116 He claims that the entire enterprise of civilization, much less
liberal democracy, “is just this constant effort to introduce plan where there has been clash,
and purpose into jungles of disordered growth. But to shape the world nearer to the heart’s
desire requires a knowledge of the heart’s desire and of the world.” 117 He nearly suggests
the Delphic injunction. For Lippmann politics ultimately rest on knowledge, no matter the
institutional form. Know thyself, know thy political order. Lippmann is an avatar for
philosophical openness. He roundly rejects romanticism from cultural conservatives and
reactionaries, criticizing his former teacher, Irving Babbitt, and all forms utopianism from
progressives. Philosophical openness is the middle ground between his search for
sustainable liberalism and his seemingly endless optimism in the continued observable
progressivism of his age: “This is what morality meant to the Greeks in their best period, an
estimate of what was valuable, not a code of what should be forbidden. It is this task that
morality must resume, for with the reappearance of a deliberate worldliness, it means
again a searching for the sources of earthly happiness. In some men this quest may lead to
luminous passion.”118 While it cannot be gainsaid that he intentionally or fully substitutes a
progressive faith in process and future for the calm of natural rights and tradition, he is
concurrently replacing the dogmatic corollaries of tradition with a sort of technical
philosophy which is linked necessarily to a sort of philosophical openness. He still believes
that the cohesion of the American political order depends on looking to the future, but that
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faith is represented though the management of science, an endeavor he will go to great
lengths to correctly orient in regard to democratic impulses.
Lippmann’s final chapter, “Fact and Fancy,” is a startling aberration from the rest of
the book. The half-conscious reader would likely have to look up and wonder if he had not
drifted into a different work. Every prescriptive inclination Lippmann offers depends on
some version of the scientific approach, and it is in his final chapter where he decides to
harshly interrogate the sort of scientific realism which is relentlessly trusted by other
progressives. He warns of scientists who, “seduced by a method of thought, the rigorous,
classifying method where each color is all one tone…come to regard...method as more
important than the blendings and interweavings of reality.”119 In a continuation of his
concern for open philosophical inquiry, Lippmann worries about “scientific bigots,” who
may seek to “annihilate all that they cannot weigh.”120 This scientist is prone to the
romanticism of the measurable world, and “like any dreamer he gives up the search for
truth in order to coddle himself in his simple, private universe. The hardness of such a
rationalist is on the surface only: at bottom there is a weakness which clings to stiff and
solid frames of thought because the subtlety of life is distressing.”121 Lippmann invokes
James’ religious pluralism and psychic investigations as an example of falsely lampooned
research, and Santayana to offer a case for the aesthetic authority of tradition.
The concern in the metanarrative of his vision for democratic political order
doubtlessly involves the role of authority: sensing a lack of will and direction (aka Drift),
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science inserts that authority for direction and stability (Mastery). No sooner had he made
the case for a new authority than he feels the need to investigate its flaws. Critically, his
version of scientific mastery differs from Croly and other progressives insofar as he
recognizes that humans are the ultimate authors of the momentum and character of this
new authority, buttressing modern science with philosophical openness which is sensitive
to the human person. Science is therefore grounded in the natural world and the human
interpreters of it. “If we try to ignore the desire that moves our thought, if we try in short to
be ‘absolutely objective,’ we succeed only in accumulating useless facts, or we become the
unconscious victims of our wishes. If thinking didn't serve desire, it would be the most
useless occupation in the world.”122 There is no internal mechanism which drives science
towards an end in History. Lippmann starkly confronts its limitation and finds its promise
in the human endeavor to understand Nature.
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Chapter Four – Public Opinion and the Tyranny of the Masses: A Democratic Critique
The First World War was an eventful and formative time for Walter Lippmann. His
political philosophy, already fomenting concerns about the capacities and requirements of
democratic citizenship, was shaken further by his experience as a propagandist, and his
hope and idealism on behalf of the American war effort lapsed into pessimistic realism
about international diplomacy. The essential feature of his political philosophy in this
tumultuous time is the development of his critique of knowledge and the capacity of the
democratic citizen. Though the focus of this chapter is on the democratic critiques of
Lippmann’s most famous book, Public Opinion (1922), and its sequel, The Phantom Public
(1925), Lippmann also penned two significant works about the war and politics, The Stakes
of Diplomacy (1915), and The Political Scene: An Essay on the Victory of 1918 (1919), as well
as the theoretical precursor to Opinion, and Phantom, Liberty and the News (1920). Overall,
the war years treated Lippmann about as well as anyone. In addition to this period of
prolific writing, he married his first wife, Faye Albertson in 1917, and gained influence
within the Wilson administration, particularly with Wilson’s advisor Colonel Edward
House, which put him in a position to help draft Wilson’s Fourteen Points, and later, on a
day’s notice, prepare an interpretation of the Fourteen Points for House in the seminal
peace talks between America and her European Allies before the Paris Peace Conference.
By the end of the war Lippmann had gained a great appreciation for the complexity of
international affairs and public opinion, and an even greater distrust of undirected
democratic action and policy.
Lippmann’s former antagonism to Wilson in Drift began to wane in the years leading
up to American involvement in the war. Teddy Roosevelt had begun to fall out of favor with
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the New Republic crowd over an editorial which offered light criticism to Roosevelt for
criticizing Wilson’s deficient response to the German invasion of Belgium when he had
himself remained silent on the issue, and further questioning Roosevelt’s strengthening ties
to more conservative members of the GOP. Roosevelt was, as Croly predicted,
disproportionately furious with the New Republic. Lippmann, began to gravitate to Wilson,
whom he described as the “most freely speculative mind we’ve had in Washington, and as
disinterested as a man could wish. If only so many people didn’t make it their chief
business to distort his phrases.”123 Putting aside Lippmann’s freewheeling interpretation of
Wilson in Drift, he certainly had a point that Wilson was prone to laborious grammatical
construction. Teddy Roosevelt himself once called Wilson a “byzantine logothete supported
by flub-dubs, molly-coddles, and flapdoodle pacifists.”124 Regardless of whatever
misunderstanding may have divided Wilson and Lippmann in the past, Wilson did prove to
be a friend to the progressive cause, passing favorable child labor laws, work day and farm
bill legislation. Perhaps most importantly, Wilson and the editors of the New Republic,
especially Lippmann, were unified in support of the Supreme Court nomination of Louis
Bandies. The New Republic worked fervently to ensure his nomination, and by the
beginning of American involvement in the war Lippmann and Croly were meeting weekly
with Colonel House, which helped secure the New Republic a reputation as the preeminent
insider’s journal.
As the war in Europe began, Lippmann and the other editors at the New Republic
initially prevaricated, undecided on which approach the United States should take to
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dealing with the issue. Besides the aforementioned break with Teddy Roosevelt, Lippmann
was as of yet unsure if Wilson, or anyone, really understood the matter properly. Prior to
The Stakes of Diplomacy, Lippmann hadn’t addressed foreign policy in any great detail,
however, with the war as the preeminent issue of the day, he turned to the subject with
many of the same critiques of idle, ineffectual reformism which he had characterized as
“drift” in his previous work. Though Lippmann’s work on foreign affairs is not the primary
subject of inquiry of this work, his views on diplomacy are informed by his emerging
distrust of the public. He opens Stakes with the declaration, “this book is primarily an
analysis of that popular gullibility which makes democracy the victim of its diplomacy. It
attempts to show how patriotism and idealism are subtly entangled in imperialist politics,
how they are unconsciously exploited for purposes which rarely appear on the surface of
public opinion.”125 The 1915 book already heralds the democratic critique to be solidified
in Opinion, but is marked and distinguished by a frank realism characterized by Lippmann’s
anger toward the utopian politics of the pacifists and early proponents of any sort of ‘world
government.’ Furthermore, Lippmann’s positive dislike of utopianism is difficult to square
with what appears to be an unabashed optimism in the expansion of democratic politics
through war. A survey of The Stakes of Diplomacy will show Lippmann’s early views on
diplomacy and war to be plausibly consonant with some of the high rhetoric he and The
New Republic would later seem to embrace because Lippmann, for a time at least, held the
view that ‘making the world safe for democracy’ did in fact further the more realist
objectives laid out in Stakes.
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In Stakes, Lippmann was especially disdainful of the pacifists, arguing that their
opinions were essentially useless: “The reason for this attitude towards pacifism is that the
world is not helped much by being told every morning that two and two are four. It is not
helped by being told to love men as brothers. Men have been told that for ages, and their
invariable retort is: ‘I would gladly love him if only he weren't so cussed.’”126 Insightfully,
Lippmann argues that every war is justified to its people in terms of defensiveness or
essential national interest. Thus the pacifist position is utterly irrelevant to the very real
problems of both peace and war because all nations were fighting for their perceived
interests.
The actual stakes of the current diplomacy were, in Lippmann’s mind, the
undeveloped nations and the prestige battles to control them. In a vividly matter-of-fact
paragraph he starkly enumerates the stakes of the current conflict:
Austria began the contest to secure her position as a great
Power in the Balkans; Russia entered it to thwart this
ambition; France was engaged because German diplomatic
supremacy would reduce France to a "second-class power,"
which means a power that holds world power on sufferance ;
England could not afford to see France "crushed " or Belgium
annexed because British imperialism cannot alone cope with
the vigor of Germany ; Germany felt herself " encircled," which
meant that wherever she went — to Morocco, Asia Minor, or
China — there a coalition was ready to thwart her.127
Lippmann clearly held no illusions about the nature of the war as an economic/political
instrument, and was in response critical of those who would use it as a moral crusade,
stating at one point, “No nation risks war for the sake of abstract justice in some corner of
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the world.”128 The real issue was which nation was going to lead the gentle imperialism of
the undeveloped world, and in this regard Lippmann felt there was little practical room for
America to remain isolationist. Because Lippmann would later advocate that it was in
America’s enlightened self-interest to become involved in the war, and it isn’t clear
whether he can be said to have remained above the temptation to moralize on behalf of a
democratic crusade.
Part of the confusion concerning Lippmann’s wartime democratic moralism is the
way he viewed the role of the democratic citizen. The contribution of Stakes to Lippmann’s
view of democracy is tied up in how the conditions of foreign affairs affect the practical
conditions of domestic affairs, “A victory for liberal democracy, the resurrection of a weak
people, makes life safer and prosperity more certain in all the regions where men work.”129
For Lippmann, there does seem to be an implicit link between the victory of liberal
democracy and prosperity. Though this may often be assumed by liberal democrats,
Lippmann’s early analysis prefigures more recent democratic peace theory as he suggests
that consciousness of foreign affairs in democracies also serves to insulate against the
‘submissive tendencies’ required by autocracies. This insight is especially important for
evaluating Lippmann’s later, seemingly paradoxical enthusiasm for the war effort on behalf
of liberal values and democracy. By this account, Lippmann wasn’t torn between his
original, modest and self-interested foreign policy advocating intervention on behalf of
preserving the ‘Atlantic community’ against German encroachment and his ardent fervor
following Wilson’s War Address to Congress. Rather, the positions were intrinsically linked
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through the sort of gentle imperialism he expected of American leadership in the peace
process and ensuing governorship of undeveloped state actors. Consequently, the
culmination of Stakes is a complex and nuanced argument for balance between the
democratic patriotism which is required for vitality in national actors on the international
stage and internationalists who understand the value of diplomacy as guarantor of peace in
contentious international disputes. This balance ultimately rests on the stewardship of
individuals of their own patriotism: “It is always possible that men will lose sight of the
ends and become fanatic about the means. There is no guarantee against this insidious
danger. Only constant criticism and candid discussion can guard against it.”130 As he will
argue, time and time again, it is the patience and virtue of the individual upon which rest
the conditions of peace and justice.
Stakes was by no means the end of the development of Lippmann’s view of public
opinion and knowledge in liberal democracy. He was deeply influenced by his role as head
of Wilson’s “The Inquiry,” a study group established to prepare materials for the peace
process to follow the war. Lippmann found this work essential to the role and exercise of
American power in the war effort, specifically in securing a profitable peace buttressed by
the liberal democratic tenets he believed guaranteed prosperity. Lippmann would
eventually leave his immediate position within the Inquiry for a role as a propagandist in
1918. He was commissioned as a captain in military intelligence and assigned to General
Pershing’s staff in France, where he prepared propaganda leaflets for German soldiers,
served as official liaison to the Inquiry, and was an unofficial advisor to Colonel House.
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Later writing in the New Republic Lippmann would say that “one of the genuine calamities
of our part in the war was the character of American propaganda in Europe. ... It was run as
if an imp had devised it to thwart every purpose Mr. Wilson was supposed to entertain.”131
Despite Lippmann’s defense here of Wilson, Lippmann’s association with the Wilsonappointed head of the Commission on Public Information, George Creel, began to further
erode Lippmann’s optimism for genuine political participation. Lippmann had previously
butted heads with Creel in a New Republic article concerning Creel’s insensitivity to civil
rights and free speech issues, but their antagonisms reached a height upon Creel’s
censorship of socialist leaning publications in 1918. Lippmann, who argued that the chief
challenge of American ‘propaganda’ would be controlling untruthful, rather subversive
information, was horrified by Creel’s belligerent censorship and furious when Wilson
seemed unwilling to restrain Creel.
The entire experience with propaganda and democracy raised deep questions which
Lippmann would not resolve until he furthered his investigation in Liberty and the News,
and extrapolated the theory in Public Opinion and The Phantom Public. However, the other
side to his disillusionment with Wilson was what Lippmann saw as a failure to win the
peace, one of the chief reasons he outlined in Stakes for American involvement in the war.
Lippmann himself did not take part in the Paris Peace Conference: House had fallen out of
favor with Wilson, who had decided to conduct the negotiations personally. Lippmann
instead returned to America where he waited on news and rumor, growing more
despairing in the face of mounting bad news. In 1919 when he published a collection of
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essays under the title, The Political Scene, Lippmann had fully broken from Wilsonianism.
As previously mentioned, it was not entirely because his belief in the viability of the idea of
war on behalf of expanding democratic ideals became untenable, rather he was distressed
by the inability to reconcile the philosophy behind the war aims with the practicalities of
peace.
In The Political Scene Lippmann is critical of the Fourteen Points132, particularly
where they were prone to abstract generalizations and the world that existed before the
war. A familiar refrain from Preface and Drift, Wilson and the others seemed most guilty of
routineer policies and an incomprehensible failure to anticipate the vacuum of power that
would exist in the world and for peoples once run by authoritarian regimes: “And until we
master the fact that the empires of Hohenzollern, Hapsburg, Sultan and Czar were the
foundations of law and order in Europe before 1914, we shall not understand either the
meaning of their destruction, or the consequences of our own victories.”133 Further,
because the Wilson doctrine lacked a clear vision of what was in our national interest, we
were bound to a defense of the status quo, a situation made especially untenable by the
borders being drawn around Europe that Lippmann thought were doomed to breed
revanchist sentiment, especially in Germany. Lippmann also refused the naive suggestion
common to the peacemakers that the war was solely the province of greedy elites, that the
masses had no appetite for war, “It assumes as its working theory that democratic faith in
regard to the causes of war, which says that aggression is the work of a minority; that the
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masses in no nation have anything to gain by conquest, and that the masses would refuse
such wars if they had a chance to examine their pretexts, and put pressure upon their
governments. This faith may be unfounded. It may be that there is a universal pugnacity
which requires war for its satisfaction, and the League may in the course of time fail to keep
the peace.”134 Lippmann stresses that there is cause for hope that the Fourteenth Point, the
League of Nations, might yet embody the hoped for ideals of democratic statesmanship, but
he was skeptical if its operators refused to deal directly with human nature, specifically the
nature of humans who had for so long been under autocratic rule.
Lippmann’s views on diplomacy in the war years do not clearly place him in either
the liberal camp of nature or in that of the Progressive idealist with faith in the future and
history. His nuanced definitions of the Stakes of Diplomacy offer a complicated picture of
the requirements of a moderated nationalism and patriotism with respect to international
affairs. He supports a nascent idea of the democratic peace theory, fully expecting that
liberal democracies would protect nations from avoidable wars, hopefully in the context of
some League of Nations framework, but he also continues to invoke recourse to human
nature, and ground this argument not in the inevitableness of History, but rather imploring
to raise the quality of democracies and democrats to achieve those ends. Yet, he saw
presciently the fatal nature of the Paris Peace Conference and Treaty of Versailles, and
combined with the indictment of free speech by his propaganda work, Lippmann grew
cynical of the entire experience, remarking that the war was “an anti-climax in a dreary,
savorless world.”135
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Lippmann was not alone in his cynicism. Many progressives had expected that the
idealism of the democratic war effort would carry domestic reformism. Lippmann himself
concludes Scene with the hope that, “we who have gone to war to insure democracy in the
world will have raised an aspiration here that will not end with the overthrow of the
Prussian autocracy. We shall turn with fresh interests to our own tyrannies — to our
Colorado mines, our autocratic steel industries, our sweatshops, and our slums.”136 Yet,
despite this optimism, or perhaps because this optimism went largely unrequited, many
felt that the age of progressivism had come to pass. Herbert Croly wrote in the New
Republic that “the chief distinguishing aspect of the Presidential campaign of 1920 is the
eclipse of liberalism or progressivism as an effective force in American politics.”137 For
many, the distasteful idealism surrounding ‘the war to end all wars’ became bound up with
the idealism of the progressive movement generally, a result of the great destruction of the
war and the end of the obvious practical progress of the industrial era.
For his part, Lippmann turned his criticism to the world of journalism. In light of the
wartime propaganda and censorship to which he was privy, the chief threat to sustainable
liberalism now seemed to be the failure of truth in reporting. He argued that a democracy’s
health depends of its access to an accurate picture of the events which surround it,
particularly in a world becoming more modern, more complex, and more obscured. Other
critics sensitive to the problem of free speech sought to remove government interference,
thus expecting unhindered speech to resolve the issue. Lippmann, however, was more
troubled by the assumption of knowledge so prevalent in the polite opinion-mongering of
Scene, Ch. 10
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sincere journalists. As Lippmann had once warned about George Creel, the struggle of
censorship is not so much bound in the careful construction of favorable news, but the
battle against untruth. He went so far as to claim that, “There can be no higher law in
journalism than to tell the truth and shame the devil.”138
Lippmann had little doubt about the sincerity of journalists, but his appeal in his
book, Liberty and the News, was simply to make an acknowledgment that it was human
nature to give unconscious bias to one’s predilections. The chapter, originally an article in
the New Republic, A Test of the News, chronicles the New York Times’s coverage of the
Russian Revolution. Lippmann and his fellow New Republic editor, Charles Merz,
demonstrate that the Times’s coverage was dramatically influenced by reporters who saw
the Russian communist revolutionaries as a sort of boogeymen. Their failure to see truth
resulted in their absurd assurances, offered on ninety one occasions, that the Bolshevik
regime was on the verge of collapse.
Lippmann condemned the proliferation of unexamined doxastic reporting, but had
little to offer as remedy, other than to point to some hope that the schools of journalism
could inculcate a love of the truth, and imbue it with a sort of moral imperative: “reporting
is a post of peculiar honor. Observation must precede every other activity, and; the public
observer (that is, the reporter) is a man of critical value. No amount of money or effort
spent in fitting the right men for this work could possibly be wasted, for the health of
society depends upon the quality of the information it receives.”139 He acknowledges the
naiveté of his position in part, but also is clear that he fails to see a better way forward than

138
139

Walter Lippmann. Liberty and the News. (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920), Ch.1
Liberty, Ch.3

85

to emphasize the truth in reporting, and to train journalists of such quality that they will
drive out the unserious panderers of opinion. In a way, it seems as though he is calling for
the philosophers to purge the sophists though the excellence of their journalism. He
concludes by stating that “We shall advance when we have learned humility; when we have
learned to seek the truth, to reveal it and publish it; when we care more for that than for
the privilege of arguing about ideas in a fog of uncertainty.”140
Public Opinion takes up the general theme outlined in Liberty, pressing the central
concern for liberal democracy: if consent is the measure by which liberalism judges
legitimate and popular sovereignty, what is the value of consent which is easily
manipulated by the complexities of the modern word? The corollary suggests the concern
that democracy may simply not be a viable form of political organization since the source of
its information depends so strongly on the truthfulness of the reports of the outside world
which keep public opinion informed. Lippmann’s thought has evolved from Preface and
Drift, where the primary concerns were the organization of society through masterful
statesman and scientific management, to a more fundamental inquiry into the basis of all
government: the knowledge upon which decisions are made. Opinion is a searching attempt
to critique the basic assumption of democracy, that the people possess the knowledge to
rule themselves. Lippmann’s general solution is to institute ‘intelligence bureaus,’ which he
defines as “specialized private agencies which attempt to give technical summaries of the
work of various branches of the government.”141 The imposition of intelligence bureaus, no
matter how vaguely described, demonstrates a counter-intuitive faith in the average
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democrat: where Preface and Drift largely dealt with organizing mass sentiment, Opinion
offers a means by which that sentiment, rearticulated as public opinion, can be informed. It
is misleading, though logical, that to diagnose the need for and nature of truth-seeking
information services, Lippmann must levy an incisive attack against the capacities of the
average democrat, and dismantle the icons of self-government and consent.
It is no coincidence that Lippmann’s epigraph for Opinion is taken from Plato’s
Republic. The famous allegory of the cave describes a cave where men are bound in chains
such that they are forced to look only at a great wall before them, seeing only shadows of
objects reflected from firelight. They suppose the shadows to be real and discuss them
together as though they are. Lippmann’s recourse to classical philosophy is interesting, and
it does reinforce his dramatic point that people, journalists, and political actors respond
only the “pictures in their head” rather than real events. His mounting cynicism reflected
the chaos of wartime propaganda and misinformation, but also his own practical
investigations from Liberty which helped confirm his suspicion that newspapers were
unable to be unbiased, even concerning, or perhaps especially concerning, critical issues of
political importance. Conscious distortion and manipulation of these channels were widely
practiced and curiously irremediable given the mounting complexity of the modern world
where biases, publicity, propaganda, advertising, and all kinds of special interests are
present, but often concealed.
Lippmann opens Opinion with a characteristically imaginative, and incisive analogy
of his own: he asks his reader to imagine that there is an island inhabited by Englishmen,
Frenchmen, and Germans, in the year 1914. The island receives its mail every sixty days via
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steamship. Imagine their surprise when upon that steamship’s arrival in mid-September
they should learn that, not only are they at war with one another, but that they have been
at war for weeks without their knowledge!142 Lippmann argues that no matter the interval,
six days, six hours, six weeks, this was the situation all over Europe before the war, and,
further, that this is only one example of the typical, dramatic misinformation that results of
the exigencies and fragility of information in the modern world. The people on the island
had (incorrectly) treated each other cordially because of a false “picture in their heads” of
the world they inhabit.
Lippmann takes care in drawing out the consequences of these pictures in our
heads, arguing that, “it is the insertion between man and his environment of a pseudoenvironment. To that pseudo-environment his behavior is a response. But because it is
behavior, the consequences, if they are acts, operate not in the pseudo-environment where
the behavior is stimulated, but in the real environment where action eventuates.”143 This
dissonance creates the problem that our actions are not in fact responses to the world
around us, but the world as we perceive it. There is the immediate platonic question of the
inherent lack of freedom of operating in shadows, but also the consequence for democracy,
which depends on consent for legitimacy, and good representation for leadership. Without
informed consent, what is democratic legitimacy? How can representatives lead if their
information is inaccurate? Lippmann’s concern for the sustainability of a liberal democracy
is manifest in his central remedy: “I argue that representative government, either in what is
ordinarily called politics, or in industry, cannot be worked successfully, no matter what the
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basis of election, unless there is an independent, expert organization for making the unseen
facts intelligible to those who have to make the decisions.”144 Lippmann’s trust of experts is
not so much distrust of the citizenry at large as it is rather acceptance of their limitation.
The limitations however, carry over to the elites who are supposed to represent them.
To characterize Opinion as simply a movement to trust elites is a misrepresentation
of the development of Lippmann’s thought because it ignores Lippmann’s distrust of the
representatives themselves. His remedy calls as much for their supplementation as it does
for the supplementation of the average citizen: “I attempt, therefore, to argue that the
serious acceptance of the principle that personal representation must be supplemented by
representation of the unseen facts would alone permit a satisfactory decentralization, and
allow us to escape from the intolerable and unworkable fiction that each of us must acquire
a competent opinion about all public affairs.”145 The challenge of representative
government is to accurately represent the facts to the decision makers, and to the voters
who elect the decision makers. This is a movement to a more democratic system of affairs
than in either Drift or Preface insofar as it seeks to make democratic elections more
authentic, more consequential. It is not a break from his earlier thought so much as it is a
reorganization, and an attempt at better representation. To be anti-democratic, as any
superficial reading of ‘elitism’ might suggest, Lippmann would try to eliminate the
influence of the demos rather than educate it. For all the gloom of the post war era,
Lippmann is surprisingly sanguine about democratic capacities, provided of course they
are properly informed.
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Lippmann then turns to some recounting of the difficulties the average citizen faces
in determining the facts of the world around him. He reflects on battlefield reports
organized favorably as propaganda generated by censorship of omission rather than
straightforwardly untruthful, “Without some form of censorship, propaganda in the strict
sense of the word is impossible. In order to conduct a propaganda there must be some
barrier between the public and the event. Access to the real environment must be limited,
before anyone can create a pseudo-environment that he thinks wise or desirable.”146 The
point which Lippmann teases out is novel, and as problematic as it is obvious: benign
organization of news is as effectively censorious as deliberate misinformation. Given the
preoccupation we have with our own affairs, our preconceived ideas, and how little “time
and attention”147 we have to give to the discernment of fact from fiction, the modern world
is a rather grim environment for truth.
The central argument of the book is bound up in Lippmann’s term for the methods
people develop to deal with news, events and ideas in their own lives. He argues that
people in modern societies are increasingly dependent on ‘stereotypes,’ perhaps the most
famous of Lippmann’s popularized terms,148 which is defined as a simplification and
reification of information applied to various sorts of people, groups, events, or ideas.
Stereotypes operate in both in the culture generally and in individuals, and they serve as a
sort of shorthand for busy, confused, or disinterested citizens. Lippmann’s great strength
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as a thinker is to bridge the divide between his new political philosophy of modern public
opinion and what many would call common sense behind some notion such as, ‘people see
what they want to see.’ Lippmann refines that common sense in one of the most precise
definitions in Opinion: “For the most part we do not first see, and then define, we define
first and then see. In the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the outer world we pick out
what our culture has already defined for us, and we tend to perceive that which we have
picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our culture.”149 Shaped undoubtedly by his
experience with the peace process in Paris, Lippmann recalls how leaders were unwilling
to negotiate in terms of the world as it was and would be, but rather as it had been. The
political consequence to stereotypes is analogous to lack of prudence or vision in
statesmen. The intelligence bureaus Lippmann proposes are a sort of clunky external
supplement to the modern statesman.
Lippmann labors over delineating the full consequences of using stereotypes, not
the least of which is that stereotypes derived from culture are themselves icons (a refining
of his use of ‘taboo, creed, and routine’ from his earlier work) which provide a measure of
security for the culture which employs them. Therefore attacking a stereotype is often
defensively rejected by polite society, causing benign, harmful, and even superficially
beneficial stereotypes to persist from generation to generation. One of the benign, possibly
beneficial stereotypes he mentions, “progress,” is of particular interest: “The stereotype
represented by such words as ‘progress’ and ‘perfection’ was composed fundamentally of
mechanical inventions. And mechanical it has remained, on the whole, to this day. In
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America more than anywhere else, the spectacle of mechanical progress has made so deep
an impression, that it has suffused the whole moral code. An American will endure almost
any insult except the charge that he is not progressive.”150 Lippmann takes great care to
distinguish the empirical progress of the mechanical world, which implies constant change,
with the progress of Herbert Spencer, “progress toward perfection.”151 Lippmann seems
skeptical of the latter, pointing out that the two notions, ‘progress as unalterable change’,
and ‘progress as evolution toward perfectibility,’ are entwined together in the popular
mind, with unclear consequences. It does not seem that Lippmann is working toward a
systematic theory of what ‘progress’ is, but rather he is appropriating Tocqueville’s
observation of “self-interest well understood.”
Remarkably, Lippmann does not quote Tocqueville until much later on, Chapter
XVII, in a part of the Opinion titled, “the Image of Democracy,” however, Chapter XII, “SelfInterest Reconsidered,” is a homage to Tocqueville, and, his discussion in Chapter VIII
borrows quite directly from Tocqueville concerning the use of the word ‘progress.’
Lippmann says that,
Certainly the American version of progress has fitted an
extraordinary range of facts in the economic situation and in
human nature. It turned an unusual amount of pugnacity,
acquisitiveness, and lust of power into productive work. Nor
has it, until more recently perhaps, seriously frustrated the
active nature of the active members of the community. They
have made a civilization which provides them who made it
with what they feel to be ample satisfaction in work, mating
and play, and the rush of their victory over mountains,
wildernesses, distance, and human competition has even done
duty for that part of religious feeling which is a sense of
150
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communion with the purpose of the universe. The pattern has
been a success so nearly perfect in the sequence of ideals,
practice, and results, that any challenge to it is called unAmerican.152
There is no quotation nor is there any allusion to Tocqueville here, and yet, this is parsed
almost directly from Democracy in America. It is beyond the scope of this essay to delve
deeply into the great work of Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, though
Lippmann does encapsulate Tocqueville’s observation concerning the American notion of
the indefinite perfectibility of man.
Lippmann argues here that the notion of progress moderates acquisitiveness and
lust for power into productive work without destroying the essential features of
community which are great boons to human flourishing, particularly religious sentiment,
and a general sense of purpose. Tocqueville’s rather more elaborate theory of the notion of
progress is bound in the doctrine of the indefinite perfectibility of man. Democracy is
written from the point of view of a French Aristocrat, a generation after the terror,
understandably preoccupied with the means by which the American democracy is
seemingly capable of sustaining itself against the excesses of the chief attribute of
democracy: the equalizing of conditions. Tocqueville does not argue that the purpose of
democracy can be the health of the soul and is confounded by the fact that democracy
trends toward materialism in a directly irremediable rush. The possibility for maintenance
of the soul (analogous to Lippmann’s comparatively trite, ‘communion with the purpose of
the universe’) is sustained partly in America through the doctrine of the indefinite
perfectibility of man because the notion pushes back men’s taste for material satisfactions.
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In a democracy, indefinite perfectibility describes a limit to human action: “as castes
disappear, as classes get closer to each other, as men are mixed tumultuously, and their
usages customs, and laws vary, as new facts come up, as new truths are brought to light, as
old opinions disappear and others take their place, the image of an idea and always fugitive
perfection is presented to the human mind.”153
Fugitive perfection at once torments men, but also moves their object of action back.
“His reverses make him see that no one can flatter himself with having discovered the
absolute good; his successes inflame him to pursue it without respite.”154 The indefinite
perfectibility of man suggests to men that there is a great goal which it is in their interest to
pursue. This bolsters pride and resists the materialism suggested by democratic ages, and
encourages the democrat to make great things to advance the progress he senses. “Thus,
always seeking, falling, righting himself, often disappointed, never discouraged, he tends
ceaselessly toward the immense greatness that he glimpses confusedly at the end of the
long course that humanity must still traverse.”155 Though ‘glimpsed confusedly’, the object
of human actions is gracefully pushed back by the idea of the indefinite perfectibility of
man: “When men have become accustomed to foreseeing from very far what should
happen to them here below, and to nourishing themselves on hopes for it, it becomes
difficult for them always to arrest their spirits at the precise boundaries of life, and they are
very ready to cross these limits to cast their regard beyond.”156
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The similarity of the arguments is obvious, but Lippmann is not straightforwardly
arguing that progress is a stereotype which possesses all of the capacities for sustaining
democratic order for which Tocqueville was perhaps searching. In a very curious passage
Lippmann defines the stereotypes of regimes, including that of “progress,” perhaps in a
“cycle” of governments:
The progressive stereotype, powerful to incite work, almost
completely obliterates the attempt to decide what work and
why that work. Laissez-faire, a blessed release from stupid
officialdom, assumes that men will move by spontaneous
combustion towards a pre-established harmony. Collectivism,
an antidote to ruthless selfishness, seems, in the Marxian mind,
to suppose an economic determinism towards efficiency and
wisdom on the part of socialist officials. Strong government,
imperialism at home and abroad, at its best deeply conscious of
the price of disorder, relies at last on the notion that all that
matters to the governed will be known by the governors. In
each theory there is a spot of blind automatism.157
There are many interesting implications of each of these stereotypes, particularly if they
are supposed to follow one another in the manner Lippmann expressed, but for now, the
most salient stereotype, progress, is importantly identified as a will to work with no cause
behind it. Lippmann’s endorsement of progress as the principle behind a particular regime
type is explicitly moderated in this passage. Like in Drift where he identifies the limits of
science without direction, he expands the trouble of progress without cause or clear sight
of to what we progress. Especially with his brief on progress as confounded change and
evolution, chaos and Darwin/Spencer, it cannot be read as anything other than a continued
rejection of fatalistic progressivism. Importantly, it is also the first time Lippmann steps
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away from the empirical progressivism which sustained much of his hope for the
expanding capability of bureaucratic/scientific management and the expectation of a
momentously declining scarcity which characterized his early work.
The immediate corollary is seen in Lippmann’s view of human nature in these
Tocqueville inspired chapters. In Chapter XII, “Self Interest Reconsidered,” Lippmann
seems to be identifying interests strongly with Madison in Federalist no. 10, rather than the
sort of economic determinism essential to socialist theory. He and Madison both seem to
agree that men are divided by their relation to property, with a sort of light probability to
align their opinions in relation to their property. The socialists rely on “false determinism”
of a proletariat mobilized against the bourgeois.158 Because the proletariat must be
constantly organized to produce the expected revolution, Lippmann finds that sort of
determinism, that movement in History, laughable. Lippmann’s point is that no matter
what sort of economic materialism you expect from a class of property holders, it is
impossible to fully predict their interests. It amounts to an argument that human nature is
inherently diverse and unpredictable. While he still holds out against a strict appeal to
Nature behind human nature worth exploration, he also holds a hard line against economic
determinism, soundly rejecting any notion of human nature which is to be evolved through
historical process.
It is on the surface difficult to see what Lippmann’s title shares with Tocqueville’s.
Tocqueville’s notion of self-interest well understood is that Americans successfully
combine their self-interest with the interest of the larger community, and Lippmann just
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argued that there is a lack of determinism in the way humans develop interests. There is
optimism in this part of his argument because it also suggests that men can choose their
own goals based on their interests: “He can find no ground for abandoning his highest
hopes and relaxing his conscious effort unless he chooses to regard the unknown as the
unknowable, unless he elects to believe that what no one knows no one will know, and that
what someone has not yet learned no one will ever be able to teach.”159 Assuming that
Lippmann did in fact have Tocqueville in mind when writing and titling this chapter, it can
be assumed that Lippmann was seeking a remedy for the fragmenting of society, partially
through the inadequacies of public opinion. The situation is opened, though also
complicated, by the extreme diversity of interests men can plausibly assume so far
divorced from, primarily, economic determinism. Tocqueville seems to share this mix of
optimism and distress in his chapter on self-interest: “No power on earth can prevent the
increasing equality of conditions from inclining the human mind to seek out what is useful
or from leading every member of the community to be wrapped up in himself. It must
therefore be expected that personal interest will become more than ever the principal if not
the sole spring of men's actions; but it remains to be seen how each man will understand
his personal interest.”160 The essential question for Tocqueville involves the equalizing of
conditions, and how that will affect the development of democratic community: “If the
members of a community, as they become more equal, become more ignorant and coarse, it
is difficult to foresee to what pitch of stupid excesses their selfishness may lead them; and
no one can foretell into what disgrace and wretchedness they would plunge themselves lest
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they should have to sacrifice something of their own well-being to the prosperity of their
fellow creatures.”161 Tocqueville’s chapters connect with Lippmann’s in the shared object
of concern in determining interest. If they remain “ignorant and coarse,” these dire
consequences follow. Lippmann may as well say, ‘if public opinion remains uninformed.’
The title appears in homage to Tocqueville because it drives the essential concern of
Lippmann’s entire book: informing public opinion.
It is no surprise then that the next part of the book is “The Making of a Common
Will.” The pending concern is the response to the difficulties of managing interest
described in the struggle to inform public opinion. If there is no reliable determinism
issued by the constraints of the material world to the variability of human nature, what
hope is there for developing some sort of common will by which a democracy should be
sustained? Lippmann’s answer seems to be a radical reconsidering of the way we deal with
information in the modern age. He first considers the nature of public opinion and the
approaches others have taken to making use of symbols and generalizations in order to
generate mass action. He quotes Sir Robert Peel, and Gustave LeBon, suggesting that some
people approach the manipulation of opinion as either chaos or low character, as “drift and
incoherence.” The other option seems the be that because there do appear, from time to
time, certain motivations and aims within a body public, there must be something “over
and above the inhabitants of a nation.” Proponents of this view, “invoke a collective soul, a
national mind, a spirit of the age which imposes order upon random opinion. An oversoul
seems to be needed, for the emotions and ideas in the members of a group do not disclose
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anything so simple and so crystalline as the formula which those same individuals will
accept as a true statement of their Public Opinion.”162 Lippmann is suspiciously unclear
that he is invoking a third way, something in between the ‘oversoul’ and chaotic ‘drift,’ but
that appears to be his goal, nonetheless.
Unfortunately his new theory is not neatly delineated. He descends into a discussion
of the uses leaders make of symbols. He approvingly cites Alexander Hamilton, who, as a
son of the West Indies, was not given to the particular interstate quarrels which arrested
other founding fathers, and could instead embrace and promote the symbol of the “union”
to great effect. Lippmann argues that the public interacts with the symbols created by the
leaders by simply responding affirmatively or negatively to proposals. Good leaders are
able to interpret the value and need behind certain symbols for the public good. However,
leaders themselves are often prone to falsely assuming that there is something like
‘thought’ behind public opinion: “Leaders often pretend that they have merely uncovered a
program which existed in the minds of their public. When they believe it, they are usually
deceiving themselves. Programs do not invent themselves synchronously in a multitude of
minds. That is not because a multitude of minds is necessarily inferior to that of the leaders,
but because thought is the function of an organism, and a mass is not an organism.”163 The
importance of this point cannot be overstated, especially for the purposes of contrast with
democratic theorists such as John Dewey, who had a completely contradictory notion of the
possibility of a sort of community intelligence in public opinion. Lippmann is suggesting a
focus on the individual against public opinion. Opinion is often treated superficially as an
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anti-democratic text, but delving into Lippmann’s nuance paints a more complicated
picture. Lippmann’s focus is to acknowledge the realities of public opinion while rejecting
the notion that it is merely a collective, mysterious force. Mysterious forces are not
democratic. Eclectic will and sentiment interpreted by strong leaders was the modus
operandi prescribed in Preface. Here Lippmann seems to have retained some of the theory
that led him to that prescription while simultaneously reversing the recommendation:
instead of leaders interpreting will and sentiment of a collective body, leaders offer
symbols to individuals who interact with various stereotypes and produce some mass
action as a result. To some degree the leaders are the ones who manufacture opinions, but
this manufacture is essentially grounded in the response of the public. This position
surprisingly reorients the onus of political participation back on the individual: however
lacking individuals may be in dealing with the confusing array of information necessary to
act in participatory self-government, they are themselves the only ones capable of the sort
of thought that sustains democracy against the drift of undirected collective action. It also
points towards his proposal to establish intelligence bureaus which offer a means by which
that sentiment, rearticulated as public opinion, can be informed constructively.
Lippmann invokes a new phrase, “the manufacture of consent.” Lippmann is subject
to a superficial criticism for suggesting that public opinion is a force to be manipulated;
after all, if a democracy depends on the consent of the governed, manufacturing that
consent should corrupt the connection between the citizens and the government. This
complaint is easily answered with attention to the only alternative: the chaotic
manufacture of consent. Lippmann does not neatly articulate the point, but at the heart of
his argument is the implicit rejection of a dichotomy between unregulated consent and
100

manufactured consent. Rather, as he struggles to explain, the manipulation and
manufacture of consent is unavoidable in the modern state, leaving the choice between
some attempt to lobby on behalf of truth and resignation to the George Creels of the world.
As was common to the progressive mind, and common to Lippmann’s approach to political
philosophy, he sees the problem in terms of the new world of complexity and mass culture.
In the past, forms of demagoguery had directly manipulated passions and ideas. In the
great giddy whirling of the modern age the impact of this style of manipulation has
advanced: “But it has not died out. It has, in fact, improved enormously in technic, because
it is now based on analysis rather than on rule of thumb. And so, as a result of psychological
research, coupled with the modern means of communication, the practice of democracy has
turned a corner. A revolution is taking place, infinitely more significant than any shifting of
economic power.”164
Part of the aim of Opinion is to begin to understand the depth and power of the force
of public opinion and how it is shaped by the modern world. As was previously examined,
public opinion is not just an intractable force, above and within a democracy, but operative
in individuals, individuals prone to persuasion as much as humans ever were. To maintain
political freedom within democracy depends on understanding how this persuasion is
effected: “Within the life of the generation now in control of affairs, persuasion has become
a self-conscious art and a regular organ of popular government. None of us begins to
understand the consequences, but it is no daring prophecy to say that the knowledge of
how to create consent will alter every political calculation and modify every political
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premise.”165 Lippmann has hinted throughout that the goal is to eliminate untruth, the
pictures in the heads of those participating in politics.
Lippmann’s focus then is set upon how best this could happen in the liberal
democratic state, which he views as deficient in attempting to account for public opinion:
“Yet democracies, if we are to judge by the oldest and most powerful of them, have made a
mystery out of public opinion.”166 He obliquely references America as the oldest and most
powerful democracy, and his critique is a continuation of his observation that there was a
hubris associated with the rise of democracy: that the liberal democratic state had done
away with the evils and susceptibility of classical demagoguery, and that instead the
average citizen had it within himself to participate in self- government. He claims, “just as
Aristotle had to insist that the slave was a slave by nature, the democrats had to insist that
the free man was a legislator and administrator by nature. They could not stop to explain
that a human soul might not yet have, or indeed might never have, this technical
equipment, and that nevertheless it had an inalienable right not to be used as the unwilling
instrument of other men.”167 Putting aside his reading of Aristotle, he sees the democrat
suspended and arrested by the central dogma of the omnicompetent citizen. To sustain
liberal democracy he must complete the critique of this view in order to open a discussion
of a way forward with the intelligence bureaus.
His critique of the founders and view of constitutionalism is a mix of praise and
disdain. On one hand Lippmann has clearly abandoned his facile view of the founders as
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mechanistic routineers. He sees them instead as appropriately cautious initiators of
representative safeguards against the democratic masses. Speaking generally of the
founders, he says, “The collisions and failures of concave democracy, where men
spontaneously managed all their own affairs, were before their eyes. The problem as they
saw it, was to restore government as against democracy.”168 Lippmann sees the founders’
view of representation is a means to ensure national aims supersede local vicissitudes.
Limited as this understanding is, it does point towards Lippmann’s evolving understanding
of the founders as observers of human nature, which he must admit for the first time they
took into account. However, it is upon the central point of their observation of human
nature which they failed. He attributes to Jefferson primarily the false notion of the
omnicompetent citizen: “Jefferson thought the political faculties were deposited by God in
farmers and planters, and sometimes spoke as if they were found in all the people. The
main premise was the same: to govern was an instinct that appeared, according to your
social preferences, in one man or a chosen few, in all males, or only in males who were
white and twenty-one, perhaps even in all men and all women.”169 The source of
Lippmann’s antagonism is that in their optimism concerning human nature, the founders
were anti-democratic. This is a difficult point to understand, and many, if not most,
Lippmann commentators miss it. By subscribing to a view that the democratic capacities
were inscribed within human hearts, the founders robbed democrats of a truly effective
means by which they could actually see their character reflected in self-government. This
state of affairs has only become more and more calamitous with the increasing technical
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capacity to manipulate opinion through unscrupulous and underprepared media. So while
the founders and Lippmann disagree (at least in Lippmann’s current understanding) on the
capacity of human nature, they are both appealing to it as a standard for making decisions
about what constitutes good governance.
Lippmann concludes the book by insisting that the stake of self-government is the
extent to which the citizen can be relied upon to choose good government against the ‘selfcentered’ opinions which stem from the pictures in their heads. “For the traditional
democrat risked the dignity of man on one very precarious assumption, that he would
exhibit that dignity instinctively in wise laws and good government. Voters did not do that,
and so the democrat was forever being made to look a little silly by tough-minded men.”170
The new democrat, it seems, is not forced to bind his hopes for self-government on the
mistaken impression that he is naturally capable of it. Lippmann lays the seeds for his
coming works on economics in a remarkable passage: “The criteria which you then apply to
government are whether it is producing a certain minimum of health, of decent housing, of
material necessities, of education, of freedom, of pleasures, of beauty, not simply whether
at the sacrifice of all these things, it vibrates to the self-centered opinions that happen to be
floating around in men's minds.”171 The capacity for truth and self-government is linked to
a sort of baseline of material well-being. Opinion is not in this regard an anti-democratic
text, on the contrary, the condition Lippmann estimates for self-government and
sustainable liberal democracy is the manifestation of the heart of democracy: the
equalizing of material conditions. The inherent equality of man is the foundation of his
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capacity to transcend the dull limitations of the pictures in his head. Democracy as the
driving manifestation of the equalizing of conditions is therefore a precondition for truth.
Still, Lippmann resists the temptation to draw this conclusion too casually. He
proceeds to enumerate the reasons why it is so critical for some form of his proposed
intelligence bureaus to come to pass: “It is because they are compelled to act without a
reliable picture of the world, that governments, schools, newspapers and churches make
such small headway against the more obvious failings of democracy, against violent
prejudice, apathy, preference for the curious trivial as against the dull important, and the
hunger for sideshows and three legged calves.”172 The curious position the modern
democrat finds himself in, is one such that simply seeking truth through conventional
means, merely having a passion or love of the truth is insufficient. Democratic theory must
catch up to democratic practice, and the first remedy is intelligence bureaus that will
organize the information necessary for people and institutions, from schools to
newspapers, to make use of in articulating for themselves a genuine form of selfgovernment. Only through some form similar to this can liberal democracy be sustained.
Lippmann’s description of the nature of the intelligence bureaus remains
frustratingly discursive given their centrality to his theory. The most precise definition is
given in Liberty as “specialized private agencies which attempt to give technical summaries
of the work of various branches of the government.”173 In many ways he is foretelling the
think-tank, and could perhaps even have in mind (though he does not mention it) The
Institute for Government Research, which would later become The Brookings Institution.
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However, concerning the nature of Lippmann’s political philosophy, it is more important to
consider the theory behind this move, and hopefully to resolve any pending concerns that
he is somehow an anti-democrat.
The remaining theoretical issue concerning public opinion and democracy can be
detailed by sketching Lippmann’s conversation with John Dewey. Lippmann concludes
Opinion emphasizing that political truth ultimately rests in the people who participate in
politics: “No electoral device, no manipulation of areas, no change in the system of
property, goes to the root of the matter. You cannot take more political wisdom out of
human beings than there is in them. “174 No matter how well constructed the intelligence
bureaus, and the secondary institutions which make use of them in dispensing the pictures
inside the heads of citizens, there is no fundamental elimination of the problem of truth for
democratic society. We are left in a sort of metaxic condition, left seeking truth, but, with
the problem properly diagnosed, finally seeking after it in a productive way: “When men
act on the principle of intelligence they go out to find the facts and to make their wisdom.
When they ignore it, they go inside themselves and find only what is there. They elaborate
their prejudice, instead of increasing their knowledge.”175
Throughout the 1920s Lippmann’s arguments put him in conversation, directly and
indirectly with democratic philosopher John Dewey, offering particularly fruitful discussion
in regard to the role of natural rights in each of their philosophies. Dewey’s work
Reconstruction in Philosophy, published in 1920, had an immensely important influence on
American political and philosophical thought. Speaking generally, Dewey’s aim was to

174
175

Opinion, Ch. 26
Opinion, Ch. 26

106

reorient philosophy such that it could enter into and solve the problems of the social
sphere: “When it is acknowledged that under disguise of dealing with ultimate reality,
philosophy has been occupied with the precious values embedded in social traditions, … it
will be seen that the task of future philosophy is to clarify men’s ideas as to the social and
moral strife of their own day. Its aim is to become so far as is humanly possible an organ for
dealing with these conflicts.”176 His work is a sustained critique of natural rights theory,
and an argument for a faith in progress177 which is aloof from empirical examination.
The strong point of the appeal to fixed principles transcending
experience, to dogmas incapable of experimental verification,
the strong point of reliance upon a priori canons of truth and
standards of morals in opposition to dependence upon fruits
and consequences in experience, has been the unimaginative
conception of experience which professed philosophic
empiricists have entertained and taught. A philosophic
reconstruction which should relieve men of having to choose
between an impoverished and truncated experience on one
hand and an artificial and impotent reason on the other would
relieve human effort from the heaviest intellectual burden it
has to carry. It would destroy the division of men of good will
into two hostile camps. It would permit the co-operation of
those who respect the past and the institutionally established
with those who are interested in establishing a freer and
happier future.178
Dewey both seems to reject fixed principles, and promulgate a blithe satisfaction in the
result: cooperation and a happier future.179
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Dewey was very satisfied with the structure of Lippmann’s Opinion, which he
reviewed in The New Republic, and is particularly impressed by the portion of the work
where Lippmann critiqued the shortcomings of democracy. However, Dewey was more
skeptical of Lippmann’s constructive solution, the intelligence bureaus. Acknowledging that
such an institution would be obviously welcome to any state of political affairs, he criticizes
Lippmann for overstating the measure of political affairs: “But his argument seems to me to
exaggerate the importance of politics and political action, and also to evade the problem of
how the latter is to be effectively directed by organized intelligence unless there is an
accompanying direct enlightenment of popular opinion, as well as an ex post facto indirect
instruction.”180 Traced into Lippmann’s response, The Phantom Public, and Dewey’s
counter, The Public and its Problems, it becomes clear that the center of their dispute is
differing opinions on the nature of truth itself.
Phantom deepens significantly Lippmann’s critique of the omnicompetent citizen, to
the point where Lippmann often feels as though he is belaboring what has already been
made rather obvious. Nothing changes much from Opinion to Phantom, and Lippmann
struggles generally to argue how public opinion can be enlightened simply through
exposure to truth seeking and a communicating to all a broad recognition that truth is
ultimately penultimate. Dewey’s critique from The New Republic seems to haunt Lippmann,
however, who concludes the book rather resignedly:
I have no legislative program to offer, no new institutions to
propose. There are, I believe, immense confusions in the
current theory of democracy which frustrate and pervert its
action. I have attacked certain of the confusions with
180
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conviction except that a false philosophy tends to stereotype
thought against the lessons of experience. I do not know what
the lessons will be when we have learned to think of public
opinion as it is, and not as the fictitious powers we have
assumed it to be. It is enough if with Bentham we know that
“the perplexity of ambiguous discourse...distracts and eludes
the apprehension, stimulates and inflames the passions.181
Dewey’s critique amounted essentially to two points: that the intelligence bureaus were
insufficient for sufficiently illuminating public discourse through an educational paradigm,
and that Lippmann makes a mistake in the general enterprise of looking to uncover truth.
Lippmann, in Phantom, reemphasizes the need to seek a particular truth, arithmetically, not
existentially working to eliminate untruth though the efforts of individuals freed of their
chains in Plato’s cave. Dewey had already voiced his doubts of the very notion of truth in
his Reconstruction in Philosophy. In The Public and Its Problems Dewey articulates the
replacement for objective truth as a sort of efficient truth elaborated through
communication between citizens: “Without such communication the public will remain
shadowy and formless…Till the Great Society is converted into a Great Community, the
Public will remain in eclipse. Communication can alone create a great community.”182
Dewey rejects the notion of truth advocated by Lippmann, which is more easily aligned
with a natural rights foundation, and endorses a more specifically progressivist faith in
History, in the apotheosis of the Great Society (a term borrowed by both Lippmann and
Dewey from Graham Wallas) in the Great Community. By appropriating the term in The
Public and Its Problems Dewey is jabbing Lippmann’s reliance on and love for his former
mentor, Wallas.
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Lippmann’s acquiescence in the end of Phantom stems from the inescapable
patience and ineffability of his overarching argument. Still skeptical of the doctrine of
natural rights as a cloak for political idealisms, he nonetheless sides with some notion of
objective truth against the pseudo-environments democratic citizens are prone to
constructing for themselves. Opinion structures many of Lippmann’s major themes: in three
decades he would find himself writing in Essays in the Public Philosophy an argument for
the rearticulating of the ‘traditions of civility,’ a sort of broad educational system based on
great works that would instruct people to be good citizens—to teach them to expunge the
pictures in their heads. For now, the lack of a legislative program leads him to pay more
attention in his next work, A Preface to Morals, to the character of the individual’s minds
who inhabit a democracy and, in the subsequent economic works, The Method of Freedom,
The New Imperative, and The Good Society, the material conditions necessary to facilitate
the individual’s pursuit of truth.
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Chapter Five – Solving Society: The Disinterested Humanist
To Lippmann, the next decade was a chaotic time of social upheaval and frenetic
change amidst attempts by a lost generation to deal with the fallout of the Great War. For
Lippmann personally, however, the twenties were largely a time of success and stability.
Amidst editorial conflict, and a sense that his efforts at the New Republic were leading
nowhere, he was lured away to the New York World. The World offered him a wider
audience and a larger salary, and by 1924 he had taken over the editorial lead upon the
death of Frank Cobb. It was an odd fit for Lippmann, for though the paper had begun to take
on respectability as a legitimate news source under the direction of Joseph Pulitzer’s son,
Ralph Pulitzer, its crusading tenor contrasted with Lippmann’s contemplative style.
Lippmann would write for the paper for over nine years and draft over twelve hundred
editorials, a majority of them on foreign affairs.183
Over the decade Lippmann would become a journalistic celebrity, writing a monthly
column for Vanity Fair, and other regular work for various periodicals including The
Atlantic Monthly, Foreign Affairs, Harper’s Magazine, the Saturday Review of Literature. He
even continued writing for the New Republic when time allowed, including a series of
articles critical of Intelligence Quotient tests wherein he argued that they were an
ineffective gauge of human capacities and could lead to a sort of implicit caste system. In
this busy schedule not only did he publish Opinion (1922), Phantom (1925), and A Preface
to Morals (1929),184 but also two smaller books, Men of Destiny (1928) and American
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Inquisitors (1928). Destiny was a collection of his works from many of the aforementioned
periodicals, the most interesting of which is an essay called, ‘Second Best Statesmen.”
Lippmann was suspicious that reason had become an empty shibboleth after the failures of
optimism and organization of the previous decade. His deepening concern over the tyranny
of the uninformed masses led him to attempt to reconcile this love of reason with its actual
operation on political matters. Too often, he found, reason was employed to serve the cult
of ‘interests’ where men employed reason in their own particular service, rather than on
behalf of what was objectively right: “reason was an apologist and an advocate rather than
a counsellor and a judge.”185 Lippmann specifically damns the “sophists” who conflate the
meaning of interest as the feeling of concern with the fact of actually being concerned with
an issue, and thereby exploit the masses for whatever gain they see fit. The true statesman,
it seems, is hindered by a facet of democracy which leaves him frustrated, for the
excellence of his character and intentions is not only confronted by the practical
contingencies of social/political life, but also by “a certain moralized and highfalutin doubt
about whether it is not undemocratic, unpleasantly superior, and almost sinful to do what
they feel to be the first rate thing.” Lippmann was no elitist, but he was quickly becoming
aware of the danger democracy posed to excellence. Reason was the current problem, but
also the solution: “It is as if the intellect of mankind had conspired against itself and had
lamed its right arm the eternal war of light against darkness. It is the business of criticism
to destroy this cult of the second best.”186
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His concern over the tyranny of the masses was predominant in Phantom, and in
Destiny his solution seemed to be philosophic criticism on behalf of the good against the
cult of the ‘second best.’ In Inquisitors, a publication from a series of lectures delivered at
Virginia University in 1927, he assumes the role of Socrates, whom Lippmann puts in
conversation with William Jennings Bryan, Thomas Jefferson, and an unnamed ‘teacher.’187
If the dialogues were not humorous, they would be abhorrently self-indulgent. Yet there is
in them a great sincerity, and a working out of the ideas arresting Lippmann concerning
faith, reason, and authority. The use of the dialogue (and of Socrates) points to Lippmann’s
ultimate conclusion that there is no easy answer to the general problem represented by the
conflict of faith and reason, and the locus of authority in the political realm. Socrates often
admonishes his interlocutors to reexamine their ‘foundational principles,’ and Lippmann
concludes in translation of his Socrates’ teaching: “In our age the power of majorities tends
to become arbitrary and absolute. And therefore it may well be that to limit the power of
majorities, to dispute their moral authority, to deflect their impact, to dissolve their force, is
now the most important task of those who care for liberty.”188 The lectures were given in
the context of the Scopes case which had intellectually perplexed Lippmann as a conflict
between not only science and religion, but the deeper questions of authority implied by
democratic capacities and self- government. His reluctant conclusion, echoing his inability
to produce a ‘legislative’ answer at the end of Phantom, led him to become a partisan of
liberty as a check on all tyrannical sovereigns, be they religious authorities in Tennessee, or
concentrated power structures in Washington.
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Morals reflects primarily Lippmann’s mounting need to defend reason insofar as he
had lost faith in the ability of reason to govern democratic society and restrain the masses.
Ronald Steel echoes the sentiments of other interpreters of Lippmann at this stage in his
career by stating that he was, “coming to look upon the public as a Great Beast to be tamed
rather than a force that could be educated.”189 This is partially correct, yet misses the
essential point that Lippmann made contra Dewey, that for all its seeming mysticism and
intractability, the force of public opinion consisted of the confused and nefariously
malleable notions of individuals. Morals offers almost no political theory, and is accordingly
concerned with the state of the souls of democrats, only venturing into the realm of politics
when discussing how a statesman ought to manage orienting this new class of disinterested
humanists towards an authoritative ‘good.’
Morals was written beginning in the year 1925, shortly after the publication of
Phantom. By the summer of 1927, Ronald Steel writes that Morals had ‘taken over
[Lippmann’s] life.” Lippmann kept to a grueling writing schedule, rising at five in the
morning and working on the book before breakfast, he would write his editorial for the
World after breakfast, go into the office for a busy day of meetings and editing, return home
for supper, and work on the book until midnight.190 All of his work was set to the backdrop
of rising tensions in Mexico, the Sacco and Vanzetti affair, and the failing health of his
father. Lippmann finished the first draft in the summer of 1927 and revised edits for nearly
a year before sending the manuscript to his publisher.
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Lippmann spent himself admirably in what was an intellectually draining exercise.
Morals reflected the dilemma of the lost generation, and lost progressive reformers. Many
had wilted, become disillusioned after the war, retreating into academic bastions, apathy,
or mysticism. Lippmann was similarly disillusioned by the lost promise of progressivism,
the trials of the prohibition era, the failure at Versailles, union organizations and union
busting, and the general frenetic chaos of the decade. Lippmann dutifully set himself to the
task of treating the age, and despite the thoroughly unpolitical nature of Morals, Lippmann
nonetheless is attempting to present a way of life which offers consistency with the
quandary of the world he observed. What Lippmann had sensed in his critiques of mass
culture and concern for liberty was precisely the problem of liberal democracy: a vacuum
of authority. Yet he was unable to address it through legislative means. His only recourse
was to turn towards the self, in a sense retreating from politics in order to tend to the
divided souls of democrats.
The predicament of liberalism generally is bound up in the retreat of aristocratic
mores, and the principle of political freedom expressed through political freedom from all
restraints, particularly the warring authorities of the state and the church. Lippmann’s
great concern for sustainable liberalism reflects this central problematic as his diagnosis
seems to mirror the conditions of liberalism’s crisis. In his first chapter he claims that “the
modern man who has ceased to believe, without ceasing to be credulous, hangs, as it were,
between heaven and earth, and is at rest nowhere. There is no theory of the meaning and
value of events which he is compelled to accept, but he is none the less compelled to accept
the events. There is no moral authority to which he must turn now, but there is coercion in

115

opinions fashions and fads.”191 This is the ‘problem of unbelief.’ Lippmann is acutely aware
what has been lost specifically by the increasing secularization of society, by the ostensible
battle between religion and reason. Yet, he does not unambiguously take the position that
there has been some great progress in this development. Rather, he is deeply concerned by
the continued oppression of the human person by the mechanisms of the modern world. He
continues, “[Man] can believe what he chooses about this civilization. He cannot, however,
escape the compulsion of modern events. They compel his body and his senses as
ruthlessly as ever did king or priest...They have all the force of natural events, but not their
majesty, all the tyrannical power of ancient institutions, but none of their moral
certainty...But they do not convince him that they have that dignity which inheres in that
which is necessary and in the nature of things” 192 Two important things happen in this
construction of the problem: Lippmann argues that the modern man is primarily
disadvantaged because he lacks political freedom, a freedom which is no less arrested by a
lack of purpose than by physical tyrannies, and, two, that however terrible these calamities
are which visit themselves upon modern man, no tyranny ultimately must affect him
essentially, for these events, “they do not compel his mind.”193 Lippmann’s solution is
implicit in his premise: to provide for more political freedom, men must train their minds.
To secure liberalism and give it direction, the minds of individuals must be mastered in
such a way which safeguards them against the vicissitudes of modern events, particularly
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the deleterious consequences of tyrannical majorities and the potentially disastrous effects
of public opinion on mass politics.
Lacking a clear authority, and unwilling to return to the authority of the church or to
that of the state, Lippmann sought a new way: “When men can no longer be theists, they
must, if they are civilized, become humanists.”194 The church’s authority was crushed by
the scientific method, and the secular state which had begat the Great War and failed to
arrest the emerging, decadent (more importantly, directionless) life of the twenties, had
failed to secure any real purpose through its institutions. Lippmann exhorts his readers to
adopt an enlightened ‘disinterestedness’ from political affairs, constraining their emotional
response to the stimuli of their environments. There isn’t so much a general philosophy,
but an expanded role for virtue and general civility in their daily conduct. The mature man,
“would take the world as it comes, and within himself remain quite unperturbed. When he
acted, he would know that he was only testing a hypothesis, and if he failed he would know
that he had made a mistake...For the aspect of life which implicated his soul would be his
understanding of life, and to the understanding, defeat is no less than victory. It would be
no effort therefore, for him to be tolerant, and no annoyance to be skeptical.”195 Lippmann’s
humanist is an ascetic, a calculator and ballast of disinterest against a world of agitation.
“He would face pain with fortitude, for he would have put it away from the inner chambers
of his soul. Fear would not haunt him, for he would be without compulsion to seize
anything and without anxiety as to its fate.” The disinterested humanist fulfills Lippmann
concerns about public opinion by retreating from the political area in order to strengthen
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it. How much harm can be done by the tyranny of the masses or by the force of public
opinion against men grounded dispassionately in an ascetic humanism?
Ronald Steel notes that, “The book was perfectly attuned to its times, codifying the
anxieties of a generation that had grown tired of its binge and was ready for a little
renunciation.”196 The book was an instant commercial success, a best seller and was chosen
by the Book of the Month Club. In its first year it had gone through six editions and was
eventually translated into over a dozen languages.197 The irony that the demanding
program outlined for the ascetic humanist was Lippmann’s greatest commercial success is
indicative of Lippmann’s character both as a public philosopher and as a democrat. His
style and prose made the book accessible to all, thus inducting the common man into the
society of civility which Lippmann thought was the only cure for the ails of democracy. H.L.
Mencken would be content to lambaste the ‘booboisie” in his critique of democracy, but
Lippmann’s specific attempt to civilize them is a practice in optimism, and though his
ascetic outlook at this stage of his career presents certain philosophical lacunas, his overall
paradigm places high demands on the practice of virtue in the common man.
Though the book was also warmly received by critics, not everyone shared
Lippmann’s high religion of disinterested humanism. Among the dissenters was
Lippmann’s former teacher, George Santayana. In a review of Morals, Santayana wrote that
Lippmann’s view was, “an epilogue to all possible moralities and all possible religions.” And
that from the vantage point of the detached humanist, “the pure intellect is divorced as far
as possible from the service of the will – divorced therefore, from affairs and from morality;
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and love is divorced as far as possible from human objects, and becomes an impersonal and
universalized delight in being.”198 By insisting that the human adopt an inhuman position,
Lippmann was ending the search for morality which Santayana thought brought such
aesthetic value to a morally relativistic world. Lippmann had misunderstood his former
mentor’s embrace of moral relativism acutely, and failed to see the consequences of his
withdrawal to dispassionate reason, namely, that the ungrounded man is no longer a man.
Lippmann’s sensitivity to this critique was highlighted in his sharp response to Santayana,
and is revealed throughout Morals in his loose attempts to ground his universalistic
rationalism in an ambiguous and idealized from of virtue.
At stake in Morals, in the scope of interpreting Lippmann’s intellectual movement is
the degree to which his disinterested humanism is essentially relativistic. While his appeals
are often to Historical contingency as the basis of ethical attitudes, there are obvious
refrains and an ultimate appeal to ground rationalism in human virtue. However, it is
difficult to say whether that virtue is grounded in an appeal to Nature or to History, as the
contingent morality is ambiguously bound up in the notion of ‘man’ as disinterested
spectator. Importantly this disinterested humanist is a response to the threats of mass
politics to sustainable liberalism, but it also sets the theoretical framework for the
conclusion of Lippmann’s political philosophy in Essays in the Public Philosophy. For now it
must be shown that there is this ambiguity about the grounding of natural rights in the
appeal to Nature and History, and that, to the extent that Lippmann does explore political
life in Morals, he links the freedom of the mind with political freedom, thereby accepting
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individual responsibility as the paramount consideration for sustaining a liberal
democracy.
In Part One of Morals, Lippmann diagnoses the milieu of modern liberalism and
finds it arrested by its great successes. The destruction of barriers to freedom has resulted
in more problems than solutions. Lippmann draws a quotation from Thomas Henry
Huxley’s Address on University Education: “a man's worst difficulties begin when he is able
to do as he likes.”199 Recall this issue from the birth of liberalism: once the obstacles to
freedom are eradicated, towards what goal should society direct itself? Lippmann has
identified a crucial problem, and remains unsatisfied with the delinquent truth behind the
experimental pluralism of Jamesian pragmatism which leaves no authentic room for
revelation and belief, and the delinquent truth of Santayana’s aesthetic approach which
would effectively relegate truth to a means to an end. For Lippmann, truth is an end in and
of itself: “When Mr. Santayana says that ‘matters of religion should never be matters of
controversy’ because ‘we never argue with a lover about his test, nor condemn him if we
are just, for knowing so human a passion,’ he expresses an ultimate unbelief.”200 In neither
James nor Santayana does Lippmann find a reasonable alternative to the authorities of the
church and the state. The pluralist pragmatism of James offers no solace to a believer who
knows God is made in his own image, and Santayana’s aestheticism similarly fills an
emotive need for a fatuous personal satisfaction. With the authority of revelation destroyed
by the scientific method, and neither James, Santayana, nor Dewey and his collectivistrelativism able to offer a satisfactory scientific alternative for the deep questions which
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interrogate men, Lippmann is forced to articulate a ‘new’ method of truth-seeking
humanism for the modern age. There is a deep logic which underwrites this premise: a
prima-facie need for authority, for truth. Implicit in his principle is the position that there is
a natural truth-seeking instinct which demands satisfaction.
Part Two is Lippmann’s attempt to roughly sketch the major elements of his
humanist alternative. He attempts to build from the inescapable need for an authority,
acknowledging that “the popular faith does not prove the existence of its objects, but only
the presence of a desire that such objects should exist.” Lippmann understands as a part of
his experience and repeated instructions in his earlier works to make man the center of
politics. What is emerging in Morals is the constituent elements of that man-centered
psychology and interpretation of human experience that is plausibly consistent with an
articulation of natural rights doctrine. He continues, “The popular religion, in short, rests
on a theory which if true, is an extension of physics and of history: the humanistic view
rests on human psychology and an interpretation of human experience. It follows, then,
that in exploring the modern problem it is necessary consciously and clearly to make a
choice between these diametrically opposite points of view.”201 Lippmann himself places
the choice between psychology/interpretation of experience and history. This pushes back
against the relativistic inclinations of his humanism by grounding his psychology in the
nature of man and experience. It is curious, however, that he associates the historical view
with that of the church. He claims that there has been a great emancipation for the modern
man in the wake of the retreating dogmas of the church, for which the replacement of those
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dogmas with the search for truth is the source of our present difficulty. This is perhaps
partially resolved in that some of the great religious leaders were also teachers of elements
of this valuable humanism. Of all the sources he cites as early teachers of this emergent
modern humanism, among Confucius, Spinoza, Buddha, and Jesus, he writes that they have
placed a greater emphasis not on the character of commandment and obedience, but on the
education and discipline of the human will. “Such beliefs as they had about God were not in
the nature of oaths of allegiance to a superior; their concern was not to placate the will of
God but to alter the will of man...because it is intrinsically good for man.”202 Though
Lippmann believes we have eclipsed the capacity for revelatory authority, he finds in
religious expression some essential constitutive elements of his humanism, which set the
foundation for the appropriately disinterested man.
In Part III, Lippmann moves to show the benefits of the practice of disinterested
humanism. The driving force of his argument, that neither the system of ‘naïve capitalism’
nor collectivist socialism is capable of producing meaning, would not be out of place in
even his first two books of political philosophy, Preface, and Drift. “The early doctrine of
laissez-faire was utopian because it assumed that unregenerate men were destined
somehow to muddle their way to a harmonious result. The early socialism was utopian
because it assumed that these same unregenerate men, once the laws of property had been
altered, would somehow muddle their way to a harmonious result. Both ignored the insight
of high religion that unregenerate men can only muddle into muddle.”203 Lippmann
continues to argue that the acquisitive dogma promoting simple pursuit of individual
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interests leads nowhere, least of all to a utopian land of plenty. Likewise he remains
disdainful of socialists who idealize man despite premising their theories on the faults
inherent in the acquisitive traits of man. Lippmann has yet to abandon his own utopian
dreams which turn toward the well managed society. Instead of the industrial
statesmanship of Drift, Lippmann seems to hope that his disinterested humanism will
moderate the acquisitive instinct in men of business into objective executive actions and
prudent risk management. The capitalist gives way to a host of Weberian managers and
bureaucrats (stoic and calculating, of course). Lippmann hopes that in the future “we shall
discern the ideals of our industry in the necessities of industry itself.”204 Lippmann is not
fully utopian, of course, for all the hopes of a well-managed industrial society lie in the
excellence of the dispassionate humanists whose mastery of self is far from vouchsafed.
The important takeaway is that Lippmann has moved the standards of economic affairs
from centralized authorities to the individual authorities of executives and managers who
have been elevated by their ‘high religion.’ Utopian, yes. But there is also a great theoretical
consonance with Lippmann’s delicate embrace of private enterprise as an element of
successful economic associations in his late work.
To the small extent which Lippmann is expressly political in Morals, it is fair to say
he extends many of the boons he foresees in the humanist executive to the statesman. The
key principle to his thought is the introduction of the necessity of decentralization to the
management of political affairs. No commenter has pointed to this explicitly, and Lippmann
himself does not emphasize it, but it is the key to his limited political reflections in Morals,
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and generative of much of his thought in The Good Society, and Essays in the Public
Philosophy. He foresees that the power structure of modern government lacks the coercive
structure of the authoritarian ancien regimes, and that “the crucial difference between
modern politics and that to which mankind has been accustomed is that the power to act
and to compel obedience is almost never sufficiently centralized nowadays to be exercised
by one will. The power is distributed and qualified so that power is exerted not by
command but by interaction.”205 Decentralized authority is not only contingently the
contemporary modus operandi of, but a necessary condition for sustainable liberalism.
Lippmann argues that the government cannot direct affairs through centralized authority
without losing the force of that authority, for it must remain invested in the communities
made up by individuals: “The prime business of government, therefore, Is not to direct the
affairs of the community, but to harmonize the direction which the community gives to its
affairs.”206 Ordering from on high through the great leadership of masterful men is doomed
to failure unless the great men become more like serious men of practical virtue who are
invested in their societies. Thus his new favored statesmanship “consists in giving the
people not what they want but what they will learn to want. It requires the courage which
is possible only in a mind that is detached from the agitations of the moment. It requires
the insight which comes only from an objective and discerning knowledge of facts, and a
high and imperturbable disinterestedness.”207 Far from the interpreters of will and
sentiment of A Preface to Politics and the commanding industrial statesmen of Drift, the
statesman of Morals is one who needs the objective information so prized in Opinion, but
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primarily to lead modestly by elevating individuals in their high religion of disinterested
humanism to the proper political action.
From the perspective of a meta-analysis, Lippmann’s recommendations look
simplistic at best, ironically utopian at worst. However, a final examination to exonerate his
position from a ultimate, damning relativism shows his prescriptions in Morals to be rather
more humble than the pomposity of a ‘high religion’ of disinterestedness might seem to
suggest. For instance, the task of the moralist in the unbelieving world is not a grand
systematizing articulation of the good. Lippmann begins his final chapter by critiquing the
old ecclesiastical orders for overemphasizing morals in the vein of sanction and reward.
The new moralist must adapt to the circumstances of his new world: “The disesteem into
which moralists have fallen is due at bottom to their failure to see that in an age like this
one the function of the moralist is not to exhort men to be good but to elucidate what the
good is.”208 That there is a good is a given, but Lippmann also stresses that the authoritative
force of any moral code depends on confluence with the disposition of the society in which
they live. Yet, morals do not appear to be historically contingent; Lippmann merely
expresses the practical nature and problem of relating truth to historical circumstances, a
far cry from an essentially relativist position. It does seem to be an enduring truth observed
by his humanism that civilization requires self-knowledge of its ideals, which is the central
problem of a liberal society set adrift seeking an authority. “There must exist in the form of
clearly available ideas an understanding of what the fulfillment of the promise of that
civilization might mean, an imaginative conception of the good at which it might, and if it is
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to flourish, at which it must aim. That knowledge, though no one has it perfectly, and
though relatively few have it at all, is the principle of all order and certainty in the life of
that people. By it they can clarify the practical conduct of life in some measure, and add
immeasurably to its dignity.”209 Lippmann is humbly suggesting that there is a penultimate
quality to any ‘truth’ sought after by the humanist teachers and statesmen of a society,
though there are great benefits to the act of seeking and promulgating it.
Lippmann concludes by rejecting the possibility of revealed authority and dogma,
event channeled through ecclesiastical authorities. His argument is that the way forward is
in some measure easier without the baggage of traditional attempts to understand God:
“The ideal way of life for men who must make their own terms with experience and find
their own happiness has been stated again and again. It is that only the regenerate, the
disinterested, the mature, can make use of freedom.210 Lippmann is effectively arguing for
the rebirth of virtues essential to the good life, though he does it closed and against the
encumbrances of tradition and experience with the authority of revealed truth and dogma.
It is unfortunate that the last words of Lippmann’ great searching book are his most
fatuous: “Since nothing gnawed at his vitals, neither doubt nor ambition, nor frustration,
nor fear, he would move easily through life. And so whether he saw the thing as comedy, or
high tragedy, or plain farce, he would affirm that it is what it is, and the wise man can enjoy
it.”211 Lippmann’s reach exceeds his grasp, and the essential point of Santayana’s critique
rings true: Lippmann’s dispassionate rationalism robs humans of their humanity. The
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disinterested man may balance and master his passions as far as he is able, and in this
humanism Lippmann may momentarily think he has found a way to balance the dangerous
lack of authority and the dangerous alternatives of church and secular state by investing
intellectual resources in the minds of individuals, but his thought would not rest there. His
final books, The Method of Freedom, The New Imperative, The Good Society, and Essays in the
Public Philosophy, would (especially among the first three) seek to guarantee the material
security of the individual though natural rights and compensated economies, and (in
Essays, primarily) Lippmann struggled to reconcile the claims of tradition expressed as
natural law as the final indispensable piece of a sustainable liberalism.
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Chapter Six – Economics, Material Well-Being, and The Good Society
Despite the great success of Lippmann’s Morals, by the end of the 1920s the World
was on the verge of collapse. The paper was running a great deficit, and Joseph Pulitzer’s
youngest son, Herbert, had assumed control of the paper from his brother Ralph in an
effort to eliminate the financial ‘burden’ to which he felt the paper was subjecting him.
Lippmann had done great work for the paper, but it was always a bit of an awkward fit with
his intellectualism at odds with the crusading tone of the paper, not to mention much of the
readership. Upset with massive cuts and restructuring, as well as having grown weary of
the nature of his journalistic enterprise at the World, Lippmann told Herbert Pulitzer that
he planned to leave when his contract concluded. In a curious letter to his friend, the art
critic Bernard Berenson, Lippmann wrote that, “I have never taken newspaper work very
seriously. It is to me a livelihood, a means of practical influence, and a laboratory for testing
theories. I am not at all worried about myself, and would like to wind up my term on the
World in a pleasant way and see that my own staff was provided for.”212 Shortly afterwards,
Herbert told Lippmann in confidence that he was planning to sell the paper to the ScrippsHoward chain. Lippmann would stay on until the sale in part to lobby for extended
compensation for his staff before setting out to seek a new avenue of ‘influence.’
He fielded many offers, including the presidency of the University of North Carolina,
an office for which he felt unqualified, and many other journalistic opportunities. He was
most intrigued, however, by an offer to write for the Herald Tribune, a conservative paper
run by Ogden and Helen Reid. From the outside, it seemed to be a strange offer, for while
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Lippmann had moved away from some of the more radical/progressive opinions of his
youth, he was still firmly a liberal, and fresh off the editorial board of one of the nation’s
largest Democratic papers. The Reids, however, were so impressed by Lippmann’s caliber
as an analyst that they were entirely unconcerned with his political affiliation and made
their pitch on the basis of Lippmann’s complete intellectual freedom: “It doesn’t matter that
you’ve been running a Democratic paper, and we’re a Republican one,” Ogden Reid told
him. “We want the Democratic circulation of the World. Come and write Democratic
editorials for us and sign them. Take any position you wish. We would never try and
restrict you.”213
The Reids’ offer of editorial freedom clearly appealed more to Lippmann and his
search for a ‘laboratory to test theories’ than Adolph Ochs’ offer that Lippmann could run
the Times Washington office, a position more suited to a daily executive journalist.
Lippmann wanted to pursue intellectual analysis, and his perspicacity would carry his new
column in the Tribune, called, “Today and Tomorrow,” to great fame and wide readership.
His column would eventually run in all the major newspapers in the United States for
thirty-six years. Ronald Steele observes that, “Lippmann commanded a loyal and powerful
constituency, some ten million of the most politically active and articulate people in
America. Many of these people literally did not know what they ought to think about the
issues of the day until they read what Walter Lippmann had said about them.”214 The calm
and stability of his position there allowed Lippmann a vantage point from which to work
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out the ideas that were he felt were the most pressing to the republic and of the most
interest to his readers.
Despite the stability of Lippmann’s professional position, the Wall Street crash of
1929 would follow just a few months after the publication of Morals and become the
preeminent issue for most Americans. Lippmann held a mixed opinion of Hoover; though
the president was keen on many of the principles which Lippmann admired, Lippmann
thought his temperamental leadership ultimately doomed any small opportunities for
remediation which lay open to him. Lippmann supported Newton Baker for the Democratic
nomination against Franklin Roosevelt, fearing that FDR’s affability and lack of concrete
policy left too much ambiguity concerning which course of action he would take once he
became president. After a hotly contested convention, and a biting editorial against FDR
which FDR never forgot, Lippmann ultimately endorsed him in the general election against
Hoover. His new relationship with Reid was strained over yet more biting editorials against
Hoover, which had become unsettling to the conservative readership of the paper. He
embraced FDR and would be cautiously won over for the early designs of the New Deal,
which offered in some respects a sharp distinction from the disinterested statesmanship
Lippmann favored in Morals. However, the second key to that work, and to Opinion, and
Phantom before it, was that there must be a baseline of material security before one could
pursue disinterested humanism. The crisis of the depression had brought that insight
tragically to light and motivated Lippmann’s support for the initial activity of FDR and the
New Deal programs.
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The collapse of the markets brought to Lippmann great intellectual turmoil. Ever
concerned with the influence of tyrannical majorities, he was also wary of the overencroachment of the executive branch. However, the situation had grown so dire in his
view that he would state that “The danger we have to fear is not that Congress will give
Franklin D. Roosevelt too much power, but that it will deny him the powers he needs.”215
Emergency situations called for emergency actions. Lippmann backed most of FDR’s early
New Deal reform packages (though not always without reservation), peaking in 1933 in his
endorsement of FDR’s plan to move off of the gold standard. All the measures undertaken
by FDR were circumscribed by domestic prices which were intractable insofar as the U.S.
currency was tied to the international value of gold. Lippmann’s Wall Street contacts urged
him to editorialize against the gold standard, and he adopted their view in an early column
of “Today and Tomorrow.” After the move from the gold standard, the international
economic community was thrown into a panic as world delegates met in London to work
on an agreement concerning international stabilization of currency. Lippmann covered the
conference and the fallout after FDR announced that the US would reject any and all
international stabilization measures. It was at the conference Lippmann also found time to
renew his friendship with Maynard Keynes.
Lippmann valued Keynes’ friendship highly, and combined with Lippmann’s
budding interest (not only of necessity) in economics, Keynes was particularly influential
upon him. Some of Keynes’ general theories on economics had been known for a few years,
following the publication of his Treatise on Money, which investigated the relationship
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between saving and investment. Keynes argued that where there was more savings in the
economy than there was investment, recession or depression would occur, and he
advocated general spending and deterrence to savings. During a long lunch Keynes detailed
his forthcoming book, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, to an
impressionable Lippmann.216 Keynes separated the classical economic link between the
price of labor and employment, and instead emphasized the impact of spending on
employment. Keynes argued that there is by the nature of the market economy an
unacceptable level of unemployment and underinvestment, absent active administrative
measures. Practically, this new insight dissuaded Lippmann from any lingering desire he
had for enforced balanced budget initiatives, for Keynes had plainly convinced him of the
potential effectiveness of countercyclical spending. Philosophically, Lippmann would
connect this new insight to an existing belief that political freedom, as well as the life of the
truth seeking philosopher/humanist, depends on a base level of material well-being. If the
modern economy had in its DNA underemployment, was it not simply just to enact
remediation procedures to save the common man from the gears of the economic machine?
The notion played well with Lippmann’s ever-present sense of a new world in need of new
solutions and his natural distrust of the large modern mechanisms of marginalization.
It was perhaps for this reason that Lippmann was so happy to support the early
reforms of the New Deal. To those that sense discontinuity in Lippmann’s own thought
before and after his break with the second wave of New Deal reforms, it bears mentioning
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that even in the midst of his enthusiasm for the New Deal, Lippmann was already warning
against it:
These experiments have their roots in the desire for recovery
rather than in a popular enthusiasm for the ideal of an
authoritarian state and a planned economy. They are,
therefore, practical expedients rather than revolutionary
processes. But it is possible that the dislocation may not yield
to the expedients, thus compelling resort to more drastic ones.
It is possible that the expedients may themselves deepen the
dislocation by inhibiting the free enterprise upon which an
essential part of recovery depends. It is possible that the
expedients will seem admirable and equally possible that they
will seem detestable.217
Lippmann was clearly still concerned about these expedients transgressing into the realm
of authoritarianism, but many of the collectivist controls which could insinuate the US
down that pass were also in his view plainly necessary. Much of Lippmann’s thought in this
period is a struggle to reconcile these ideas, and in the spring of 1934 Lippmann delivered
the Godkin Lectures at Harvard which would later be published as his book, The Method of
Freedom (1935). The book took a largely laudatory view of the New Deal, and elaborated
Lippmann’s conversations with Keynes into a new theory of “free collectivism.”
Lippmann was looking for an explanation of the logic behind a third way between
laissez-faire and collectivism. His conversations with Keynes and the drama of the
depression had led him to enthusiastically endorse FDR’s New Deal, and many
commentators point to Method and The New Imperative as signs of Lippmann’s
inconsistency, but the philosophical logic behind his embrace of modest collectivism would
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be the same reason for his later split with FDR. The forward for Method is particularly
telling, and Lippmann sketches out his theory which indicated that his cautious embrace of
elements of collectivism were the same as his reasons for avoiding it previously. He is
adamant that his notion of “free collectivism” is consistent with the views of the Lecture’s
namesake, Edwin Lawrence Godkin, a defender of laissez-faire, the gold standard, and free
trade. “The things I have to say would have been meaningless while Godkin was still alive.
At the time of his death in 1902 the issues with which we have to deal were in the making
but they had not been precipitated. In the past twenty years, in the two decades since the
beginning of the Great War, they have been precipitated. Yet I confidently believe that
while the principles set forth in these lectures depart radically from the liberal programs
which Godkin expounded so eloquently, they are nevertheless consistent with the spiritual
purposes of which those programs were the transient expression.”218 In essence Lippmann
is saying that the moderated collectivism represented by New Deal, and by other nations in
response to the changing economic atmosphere after the war and depression, could be
theoretically continuations of the promises of freedom and equality guaranteed by laissezfaire policies in the previous centuries. As in every one of his books of political philosophy,
Lippmann believed he was enumerating a response for a modern, unique problem which
required fresh thinking. He tells us, “Purposes and ends embodying a conception of the
good life and of what makes for dignity in human existence are older than all our working
principles and will survive them. And, therefore, he who would be loyal to the end must in
changing circumstances be prepared to alter the means; even the gods on Olympus took
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diverse shapes when they walked the earth.”219 What remained was to find how a new
method of economic situation can best provide for freedom, the good life and human
dignity. The aims are the same between Method, Imperative, and Good, as they have been
throughout his career in search of political freedom. It is the method which has to change
to provide that freedom: “I do not believe that liberty is, as we have been told on high
authority, a corpse. But neither do I believe it can live only or live forever in the body it
inhabited during the Nineteenth Century. And it is in the conviction that freedom is finding
a new incarnation in a new body of principles that these lectures have been written.”220
In part one, Lippmann explains the conditions under which laissez -faire died, and
why it is impossible to move forward without conscious acknowledgment of the situation.
He picks up the same themes he expressed in Opinion, arguing that the great equalizing of
conditions manifested and promised by the democratic state can only be fulfilled and
stabilized through external action. While in Opinion it had been intelligence bureaus, now,
influenced by Keynes, he argues that the economy must be managed by expert knowledge
in times of crisis. The old style, neutral state, “leaves out of account the rise of democracy
with all that that involves in the way of resistance and activity on the part of the masses of
the people. As long as democracy was unconscious of its power, it was possible to let hard
times be the purge of previous mistakes. But with democracy become active, there can no
longer be a fatalistic acceptance of the purge.”221 Boom and bust cycles have become
unacceptable as the modern economy has become so powerful that the state must protect
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the standard of life against the economic forces which stand outside the purview of the
common man who lives in civil society. Lippmann, with Weimar Germany and the Nazis in
mind, cautions that the failure to secure the basic necessities of life through a compensated
economy would greatly threaten liberty, “as we can see in all of Europe east of the
Rhine.”222
In Part Two, having shown that the neutral state of laissez -faire has passed,
Lippmann defines Free Collectivism by juxtaposing it to the planned and autocratic
collectivisms of the socialist and communist world. Free Collectivism “is collectivist
because it acknowledges the obligation of the state for the standard of life and the
operation of the economic order as a whole. It is free because it preserves within very wide
limits the liberty of private transactions. Its object is not to direct individual enterprise and
choice according to an official plan but to put them and keep them in a working
equilibrium. Its method is to redress the balance of private actions by compensating public
actions.”223 Lippmann seems to have Keynesian central banking concepts primarily in mind
when discussing the mechanisms of collectivist control in a private, unplanned economy,
but is nonetheless open to further developments in the field. He is only attempting to
establish the principle against that of unfettered capitalism and the strictly planned
economy. The planned economy cannot operate in a state given to liberty, for it is in its
internal mechanics an economy for planned scarcity. Even at the height of his admiration
for economic control, Lippmann is adamant that prosperity rests with the consumer-driven
market of free enterprise.
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In Part Three Lippmann attempts to reconcile his recommendations for a
compensated economy with the standard practice of democracy through representative
government. For all the great, though surmountable technical challenges of the economic
balancing tools the government should employ, the greatest threat to those actions are
from transient majorities and special interest groups. Lippmann lauds the founders with
glowing language, who “foresaw clearly all the real difficulties of political democracy, and
the Constitution is undoubtedly the greatest attempt ever made consciously by men to
render popular rule safe for the nation as a whole, the local community, and the
individual.”224 It is striking that Lippmann congratulates the founders for their prescience
and their ideals of limited government unabashedly in his endorsement of a massive
expansion of collectivist control. Yet, Lippmann still believed that a modest expansion of
these controls would be reconcilable with the principles of the founders if these essential
premises of democratic government are revisited in order to rebalance the executive and
legislative authority needed to operate economic controls. The precise controls, looking
backwards, put one in mind of the modern Federal Reserve System, though Lippmann does
not once mention it directly. If there is a general principle to his theory, it is that executive
authority should increase in times of crisis and recede once the crisis has passed. This
could help explain some of his eventual turn against the New Deal, which he never
endorsed as a social reform, but rather a necessary remedy and experiment. However, it is
not overall clear what precisely Lippmann has in mind to establish this constitutional
balance on behalf of limited government. For now, it is important to note that he has
embraced the founders’ principles of constitutionalism, and though he also plainly thinks

224

Method, Part Three

137

that the founders simply never considered the problems of the modern economy, their
methods would yield a similar result as that which he has in mind.
Lippmann’s theory depended in large part on his reading of Aristotle, whom he
quotes and references multiple times in the last few sections of Method: “The best political
community is formed by citizens of the middle class,” followed by another extended
quotation from Book IV, Chapter 11 of Aristotle’s Politics which elaborates the same point.
Lippmann states clearly that the greatest threat to free government is “proletarian
insecurity” and that the only remedy is to seek a balance between security and freedom in
the stability of the middle class. Since Keynes had convinced him the nature of the market
economy resulted in a level of unemployment and underinvestment without active
administrative measures, the principle of the stable middle seemed impossible without his
new free collectivism. Following this principle he advocates that the government guarantee
a right to work and protect private property as the “foundation of liberty.” Lippmann
rejects a natural right to property, but also maintains that it is the essential ground of
liberty because “Men cannot be made free by laws unless they are in fact free because no
man can buy and no man can coerce them.”225 Method concludes on this note, with
optimism for the procedure of crisis management through free collectivism, and a tension
between property and work as essential features of liberty, but not themselves natural
rights.
The New Imperative (1935) was a collection of two essays written in the spring of
1935. Lippmann advances mostly the same ideas he did in Method, notably finding that the
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Hoover and Roosevelt administrations had largely the same attitude towards recovery,
thus demonstrating that the principle of a free collectivism was already widely accepted
and that its advancement depended on this recognition. He also reopened the issue of
laissez-faire, and curiously advanced it as an attractive option with no practicality at this
time. The laissez-faire system had the same utopian defects as the syndicalist/socialist
utopias he critiqued in his early works. In the modern world he would claim laissez-faire
economics lost its practicality and its authority, “because those who preach this gospel do
not practice it.”226 He then repeats his refrain from Drift and Method in particular, about big
business, industrial cartels and stock holding as poor imitation of truly free markets
expressive of the ideal of private property. He concludes by arguing that individual liberty
was in fact compatible with active government mediation of the economy. Lippmann would
rest assured that government intervention in the economic realm did not constitute
intervention in the intellectual ream.
It wasn’t long after the spring of 1935 that Lippmann began to weary of some of the
New Deal programs initiated by FDR. He had always reserved a great deal of criticism for
some of the overreaching of the National Recovery Administration, but it was not until
Roosevelt announced his court-packing plan in 1937 that Lippmann turned fully against
the administration. In Lippmann’s view the time of emergency had passed, and the
programs failing to get through the courts now were reform acts rather than emergency
actions. All along Lippmann had consistently advocated for emergency actions (in various
forms), while warning against the inclination to overreach after the situation had passed.
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His work in Imperative and Method did argue for the expansion of executive control into the
management of the compensated economy, but this expansion was both tied to (admittedly
ambiguous and idealized) constitutional mechanisms, which were offered as morally
necessary and practically effective given the intricacy of the modern economy.
It is important to bear in mind for the forthcoming discussion of Good, the logical
point Lippmann reached with Keynes that justice requires some compensatory mechanism
for modern economics. For however much a partisan of liberty Lippmann becomes, two
major themes of continuity with Method and Imperative exist: one, that the model of free
collectivism is refined rather than completely abandoned, and two, that what progressives
and some liberals see as a retreat to free market moralism, comes only with heavy
qualifications through familiar repudiations of past dogmas of laissez-faire. To the former,
his explicit rejection of New Deal style programs is tempered by a call, repeated from
Method and Imperative, for money spent, not on direct public assistance, but on public
works, education and heath as both “relief and remedy.”227 To the latter, Lippmann
emphasizes what he sees as a false dichotomy between individual rights/laissez faire and
progressive statism/collectivism. He envisions property rights as managed extensively
through a court system that depends on common law jurisprudence.
The more substantive reasons for Lippmann’s reversal on the New Deal are
consistent with his overriding preoccupation with a stable liberal democracy, and it is a
change in his philosophy only so far as he bases his argument against Roosevelt’s overreach
in constitutional merits. Where early in his career the court was simply a cloak for self-
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interested actors to protect their property, it had now become an essential part of the
regime of liberty guaranteed through the separation of powers. Even at the height of
Lippmann’s enthusiasm for the New Deal he was lauding the founders for the separation of
powers as a principle of self-government. When news of the court-packing plan was
announced, Lippmann’s core belief in the necessity of the separation of powers doctrine
and firm conviction that the time of grave emergency had passed, led him to explode in
vitriol against the plan, calling it, “a bloodless coup d’etat which strikes a deadly blow at the
vital center of constitutional democracy.”228 He was shaken by the attempt to arrogate
power to the executive, and the overreach was likely a source of much of his motivation to
write The Good Society (1937).
Good serves two main purposes: to enumerate the features of liberalism and to
denounce collectivism. Lippmann’s exuberance in the latter aim, and comprehensiveness in
the former, were artifacts of his decaying optimism in the affairs of government. However,
it is important to understand that this decay of optimism is neither motivated nor manifest
in the often cited turn towards neoliberal economics, ‘natural law,’ or free markets of old
style liberalism. Rather, the tone of Good is impacted by Lippmann’s continuing conviction
that the old style laissez-faire economics must, for moral and practical reasons, be a part of
the compensated system, and that, as a result, the compensated economy must be directed
by executive functions which place the entire governmental system, the stability of the
liberal democracy, into constant peril. His final two books are attempts to address that peril
by describing the horrors of collectivism, particularly in response to the unexpected toll
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(unexpected to Lippmann) the expanded centralized government was having on
intellectual freedom.
In the acknowledgments of Good, for editions after 1937, Lippmann claims to have
begun the book in 1933,229 thus refuting any commentator who would seek to diagnose a
sharp break in his thinking on Roosevelt and the New Deal. As has been indicated,
Lippmann was already keenly aware the inherent dangers collectivism posed to liberty,
while simultaneously respecting a need to compensate for those caught in the machinery of
an economic system dependent on underemployment. Yet he also felt a great need to
reconcile his growing distrust of collectivism as a threat to intellectual security with
Keynesian methods of economic control that seemed to him to be so necessary. It is
therefore difficult to diagnose a hard break between Method and Imperative with Good,
particularly when Lippmann acknowledges a debt to Hayek and Mises as well as Keynes
within the same sentence.
Lippmann’s introduction is equally revealing, for he comments unusually directly on
his first two books, Drift and Preface, saying that he had assumed that “in a regime of
personal liberty each nation could, by the increasing exercise of popular sovereignty, create
for itself gradually a spaciously planned and intelligently directed social order.”230 The war,
he claims, robbed him of this simple belief that organization would produce the free and
just society for which he had hoped, and that he now believes that the world’s difficulties
are “inherently unsolvable.” He may have grown disillusioned, but it is not so clear that he
was ever wrought with despair over the situation of liberalism. He continues by arguing
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that the liberal vision was “devoid of any meaning whatsoever,” and, in continuity with his
early works, diagnoses part of the derailment with the laissez-faire old style capitalism of
the 19th century unadjusted for modern needs. He hopes to rearticulate the vision for the
modern world, and preserve the dignity and purpose of liberalism. The revelation that is
truly unique to Lippmann’s body of thought is not then a pivoting and balancing of
economic positions or disillusionment with scientific bureaucracy/management, but the
recognition of the need for a creed at the center of the wayward liberalism in order to
regain its lost promise.
In Book I of Good, Lippmann seeks this creed by returning to the basis of the liberal
paradigm—human flourishing depends on human freedom. In his observation there is a
sort of false choice between old style capitalism on one hand and mounting collectivist
totalitarianisms on the other. Liberalism, if its foundation can be reclaimed, offers an
alternative to them both. Lippmann identifies the method of liberalism in a way that is
present, but underemphasized in his earlier works: “For more than two thousand years,
since western men first began to think about the social order, the main preoccupation of
political thinking has been to find a law which would be superior to arbitrary power.”231
The tradition of western civilization has supplied the reasoning behind the restrictions on
arbitrary power, and the modern state, with its limitless faith that it would ‘providentially’
move towards apotheosis by any means necessary, was becoming increasingly hostile to
the liberty on which liberalism depends. Lippmann’s empirical progressivism was
shattered by the Great War, and while the depression had led him to conclude the necessity
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of some collectivist controls, the seeming inexorability of FDR’s power after the crisis had
passed, along with the ‘barbarians at the gates’ in Europe, cemented a new observation:
that fatalistic/providential authoritarianisms could not be restrained except through the
western tradition, which was itself spawned to emancipate men from arbitrary regimes.
The new observation for Lippmann was that arbitrary power was a greater threat to
human flourishing and liberal democracy than the concern that a government would fail
realize its capacity to serve its citizens. Where in his early works the concern was ‘when
shall we end drift and achieve mastery?’ he now perceives the complexity of the answer.
This clear rejection of fatalistic progressivism inherent in the collectivist regimes
does not necessarily mean that Lippmann makes his appeal to Nature concomitantly with
the appeal to western tradition. However, he does seem to argue that the collectivist
regimes which threaten human flourishing with arbitrary power are often set against the
traditions of western civilization, the purpose of which has always been to find justification
for the exercise of power. Lippmann says,
Men, have sought it in custom, in the dictates of reason, in
religious revelation, endeavoring always to set up some check
upon the exercise of force. This is the meaning of the long
debate about Natural Law. This is the meaning of a thousand
years of struggle to bring the sovereign under a constitution, to
establish for the individual and for voluntary associations of
men rights which they can enforce against kings, barons,
magnates, majorities, and mobs. This is the meaning of the
struggle to separate the church from the state, to emancipate
conscience, learning, the arts, education, and commerce from
the inquisitor, the censor, the monopolist, the policeman, and
the hangman.232
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This seems to suggest that there is a pragmatic reason to rearticulate the basis of liberalism
as the resistance to arbitrary power and its dismantling. Similar to the humanism of Morals,
reason guides Lippmann’s search for sustainable liberalism to a legitimate option for the
operation of philosophy in the public sphere; unlike Morals Lippmann has, through reason,
found legitimacy specifically in tradition to push back against the foundationless rhetoric
which supports collectivist and authoritarian regimes. There is some instrumentality to his
adoption of custom and religious revelation as bulwarks against arbitrary rule, but the long
history of debate and practice has formed these arenas of civility as foundations and made
them more supported than the directionless alternative: “The burden of proof is upon
those who would reject the ecumenical tradition of the western world. It is for them to
show that their cult of the Providential State is in truth the new revelation they think it is,
and that it is not, as a few still believe, the gigantic heresy of an apostate generation.”233 It
remains ambiguous if Lippmann has found a solid foundation in Nature, though it is clear
he has lost faith in a foundationless Historical method to provide value and direction
necessary to protect liberalism.
Another feature Lippmann has carried with him through all of his works is that the
modern world, or industrial revolution, has precipitated a great change upon the nature of
human organization. He does not abandon this principle in Good, or later in Essays. In fact,
in Good, a central piece of his argument denouncing authoritarian collectivist regimes is
that the sheer complexity of the market economy which does so much to enhance the
effective, material freedom of its constituents, is fundamentally compromised by the

233

Good, Ch. 1

145

attempt to plan human activity. “Directive laws, by their nature static and inert, are
technically suited to the highly dynamic character of the industrial revolution.”234 This is a
key point. In Book II Lippmann argues that as a general principle the planned economy
seeks to make its plan manifest—the plans of the people are therefore overridden or
ignored. Only a perfectly benevolent despotism makes freedom compatible with the
planned economy, and the planners of a collectivist society will always hope against reason
that their despots will be just. “Thus, by a kind of tragic irony, the search for security and a
rational society, if it seeks salvation through political authority, ends in the most irrational
form of government imaginable in the dictatorship of casual oligarchs, who have no
hereditary title, no constitutional origin or responsibility, who cannot be replaced except
by violence.”235 The collectivists’ resignation to hope for progress through benevolent
despotism is to also ignore that they have no plan, no recourse for selecting or replacing
the despot, thus, “The reformers who are staking their hopes on good despots, because they
are so eager to plan the future, leave unplanned that on which all their hopes depend.”236
In Book III, Lippmann further elaborates the principles of the regime of peace, the
government of laws rather than the government by commands. He fully embraces the
American founders, going so far as to call them geniuses, but curiously, this should not
necessarily be looked upon as a sharp divergence from his earlier contempt for the
founders’ methods. Lippmann’s frustration with the founders’ mechanistic constitution was
primarily because he found it to be a cloak to retard society and secure vested interests and

234

Good, Ch. 2
Good, Ch. 6
236
Good, Ch. 6
235

146

privileges of the propertied classes. The ‘Herbert Spencerians’ and others had used the law
to pervert the intent of the law such that it would protect property derived from the
corporate capitalism of the 19th century. This perversion is at the expense of Adam Smith
and other classical liberals’ ideal of an “obvious system of simple and natural liberty.”
Interpreted correctly, Lippmann seems to think that returning to the foundations of the
founders’ prescriptions and particularly their reliance on natural law can undo the very
evils with which he had identified them earlier in his career.
Lippmann argues that the founders’ prescience lay in their perception that the
political problem of their age was not only the one that faced the new liberals of the old
world, to seek protection against arbitrary power, but rather, having achieved roughly that
freedom, their problem was how to organize the power of the masses. Lippmann identifies
the founders’ position with his position in Phantom (which he cites at the end of this
quotation): “And since it was obvious that no mass of men can as a mass make more than
the simplest decisions of yes and no and is physically incapable of administering its affairs,
the practical question was how a government could be made to represent the people.”237 In
fact, Lippmann still declares some of the mechanical nature of the constitution to be
“defective”238, but this doesn’t negate the deep wisdom of their system of checks and
balances which guarantees as far as the document is able, the rule of law instead of the
arbitrary law of commands, and protects the true will of the people against the ‘arithmetic’
calculation of the tally of votes belonging to individuals who are easily beguiled by
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demagoguery. Lippmann notes that Madison would be unsurprised by Hitler, and that it
was against leaders such as him that the founders set up their system of elaborate
representation.
Book IV delves more deeply into the nature of the law and the common law
foundation of the constitution of the founders. Lippmann makes the case that the checks
and balances of the constitution are inherent in the development of the common law
tradition, and particularly in the English struggle since the Magna Carta to check the
privileges of the King and of arbitrary power. “Constitutional restraints and bills of rights,
the whole apparatus of responsible government and of an independent judiciary, the
conception of due process of law in courts, in legislatures, among executives, are but the
rough approximations by which men have sought to exorcise the devil of arbitrariness in
human relations.”239 Without these approximations, Lippmann argues, men have no appeal
against arbitrariness, no recourse from the immediate situation. This seems to incline him
to a grounding in Nature, for he also says that, “Among a people which does not try to obey
this higher law, no constitution is worth the paper it is written on: though they have all the
forms of liberty, they will not enjoy its substance.”240 Effectively the positive law is tied to a
larger ideal of precedential consideration as a part of a body of law tied to serious
reasoning about the nature of things. Lippmann senses criticism and responds
preemptively, “To those who ask where this higher law is to be found, the answer is that it
is a progressive discovery of men striving to civilize themselves, and that its scope and
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implications are a gradual revelation that is by no means completed.”241 He situates law,
and therefore his constitutionalism as an unfolding, from Hammurabi to the human rights
doctrine he began to explore in Morals, in pursuit of greater liberty within a constructive,
stable government. This does not appear to be an appeal to process, for Lippmann also
seems to sense the inherent fragility of the unfolding of common law, thus repudiating any
sort of historicism or relativism in the law as reaching its own apotheosis.
The pursuit of good law and of good institutions is tied to Lippmann’s conception of
man. Consistent through all his works is an insistence that man be placed at the center of
politics. In Good Lippmann’s consistency on this principle leads him to argue that because
of man’s inherent drive for liberty and freedom, because of an ‘energy’ within us that
pushes us forward with an image of man with inviolable rights and duties, we must order
politics around civility and dignity. To stabilize a liberal democratic regime, to render it
profitable against the collectivist totalitarian regimes budding in Europe, and nascently
present in some of FDR’s excesses, modern liberalism must re-interrogate its foundations
around this common drive:
Its essence is an energy, however we choose to describe it,
which causes men to assert their humanity, and on occasion to
die rather than to renounce it. This is the energy the seers
discerned when they discovered the soul of man. It is this
energy which has moved men to rise above themselves, to feel
a divine discontent with their condition, to invent, to labor, to
reason with one another, to imagine the good life and to desire
it. This energy must be mighty. For it has overcome the inertia
of the primordial savage. Against this mighty energy the
heresies of an epoch will not prevail. For the will to be free is
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perpetually renewed in every individual who uses his faculties
and affirms his manhood.242
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Chapter Seven – Making Liberalism Sustainable: The Public Philosophy
The years surrounding the Second World War were predictably busy for Walter
Lippmann. Still bearing scars from his struggle navigating the personal and political divide
between realism and Wilsonian idealism, Lippmann’s position as one of America’s
preeminent political commentators again thrust him into the spotlight of civic discourse. In
the thirties, he walked a fine line, seeking to make a case for at least some limited American
involvement without alienating the strong isolationist sentiment that was prominent in in
the country at the time. However, with the fall of France, Lippmann was forced to make
more explicit the degree to which American security depended on British independence
and Anglo-American control of the Atlantic.243 If the British naval power was destroyed or
captured by the Germans, Lippmann argued that for the first time in American history we
would be threatened at home. Remarkably, Lippmann’s policy prescriptions still displayed
a strong consistency to his pre-WWI concerns, particularly in defense of the Atlantic
corridor. Ronald Steel notes that Lippmann recycled some of his rhetoric from that time in
a 6/15/40 “Today and Tomorrow” article,244 and went further, arguing that the lesson from
the previous war was that our interest lay in thwarting unlimited German submarine
warfare and keeping the Atlantic corridor safe. To this end Lippmann labored tirelessly,
even enlisting General Pershing and others to support circumvention of the Neutrality Acts,
which forbade weapons sales to Axis or Allied powers. Prior to Pearl Harbor, Lippmann
was also noticeably less worried about the Japanese threat except the extent to which our
navy would be threatened by a war in two oceans.
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Yet, none of his policies for keeping America safe and out of the war would prove
effective enough to accomplish their aims. Anticipating the conflict to come, in an address
to a reunion of his Harvard class, Lippmann foresaw that, “We shall turn from the soft vices
in which a civilization decays...we shall return to the stern virtues by which a civilization is
made, we shall do this because, at long last, we know that we must, because finally we
begin to see that the hard way is the only enduring way.” The soft mores of the civilization
that took its stability for granted were about to be tested. In late 1941 we would write that,
“The modern skeptical world has been taught for some 200 years a conception of human
nature in which the reality of evil, so well-known to the ages of faith, has been discounted.
Almost all of us grew up in an environment of such easy optimism that we can scarcely
know what is meant, though our ancestors knew it well, by the satanic will. We shall have
to recover this forgotten but essential truth—along with many others we lost when,
thinking we were enlightened and advanced, we were merely shallow and blind.”245
Lippmann was not perhaps a pessimist in the sense of America’s hope for victory in the
coming conflicts, yet in the midst of post-depression listlessness, the recovery of the human
spirit required to endure those wars seemed far from vouchsafed.
By the end of the war Lippmann had emerged as the outstanding American foreign
affairs expert. In 1943 he would write U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, where he
repudiated a growing idealist belief in world government, and instead grounded policy in
national interest and balanced alliances. The dissolving of wartime alliances after WWI he
argued had led to the inability to check German power which began WWII. It expressed
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primarily realism and national interest in foreign affairs, though Lippmann would modify
his thesis slightly in his next work, U.S. War Aims (1943). Writing in the shadow of the failed
peace accords of WWI, Lippmann acknowledges that the lack of shared values between the
US and the Soviet Union would prevent the sort of cooperation between nations for which
he argued a year prior. Instead he favored conceding a sphere of influence of the Soviet
Union in Eastern Europe (with parallel spheres for the US in the Western hemisphere), and
arguing against limitless interventionism. Lippmann saw lingering Wilsonianism as the
greatest threat to secure this new peace, and instead argued that by tying together national
interest with stabilizing alliances, international relations could maintain moral perspective
on international conduct. Lippmann’s brand of realpolitik attempted to save morality
against moralism by limiting the assumptions of intervention though the balance of
national interest in the coming cold war. And though Lippmann was sharply critical of
interventionists, Wilsonians, and other globalists in the first 5 years after the war, he would
accept the general consensus behind the US cold war strategy between 1950-65, while
often arguing and critiquing some ways in which it was implemented.246
Though Lippmann gained even more fame and respect for his writings on foreign
affairs, it was the domestic situation which continued to drive the development of his
political philosophy. Lippmann’s refutation of this ungrounded liberal democracy began
the entire project of Essays in the Public Philosophy (1955). He opens the work under the
subheading “my reason for writing this book” with the comment, “During the fateful
summer of 1938 I began writing a book in an effort to come to terms in my own mind and
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heart with the mounting disorder in our Western society.”247 Like so many progressives
before him, his reliance on the observable progress of the world was halted with the first
World War, and the depths of the possible evil seen in the Second World War not only
reinforced his suspicion of ‘progress,’ but forced him to reconsider the foundation of a
secularism unchained from the vocabulary necessary to condemn such evil. To this end,
Lippmann advocated two lines of reasoning in Essays: One that the totalitarian cataclysms
of the past century had to do with executive weakness and ineffectualness in constitutional
government; and two, increasingly secular societies lacked a common language, the
traditions of civility, to bind them together, and through which laws could command with
authority and legitimacy. The problems are linked, Lippmann would argue, through the
inability of the modern masses to “believe in intangible realities”248 thus stripping
executive authority of wisdom and veneration needed to balance with the more
representational legislature. The difficult argument would depend on the fraught
rearticulation of the natural law doctrine for modern society.
For these reasons, Lippmann’s mature work of political philosophy is undeniably
Essays in the Public Philosophy (1955), his great attempt to recover a place for natural law
doctrine within a society struggling with postmodernity and purposelessness. Whatever
vicissitudes Lippmann’s thought underwent, he always remained preeminently concerned
with the problem of freedom in the modern world. Essays is no different. It is a
crystallization of the issues with which he struggled through his career and the riddle at the
heart of politics: human nature. Political freedom, as he had established in Morals had to be

247
248

Essays, Ch. 1
Essays, Ch. 5

154

more than simply unencumbered movement, and yet was also tied to the material wellbeing of the individual. After struggling to balance the issues in Method to Good, he
concluded that to extend political freedom in both the realm of the mind and the soul, and
the material well-being of the citizen, the maximization of this effect, of freedom would
come through public philosophy. Where collectivist sentiments of Method and Imperative
led in some sense to a logical conclusion in the extremes of the authoritarianisms of the
20th century, the trick it seemed was to provide for legitimate authority without
succumbing to totalitarian impulses engendered by proletarian insecurity, whether that
insecurity be of directionless liberalism, or economic scarcity. While Good had elaborated
the beginning of a liberalism which remained committed to the rebuttal of unrestrained
laissez-faire, and authority issued through constitutional law instead of command,
Lippmann clearly remained unsettled by his concluding prescription to seek out the energy
“which causes men to assert their humanity.” 249 His notes for Essays, which began about
the time Good was published and his pessimism peaked, reflected the paralysis of
democracies in the face of totalitarianism, and included scrawling such as, “the deracinated
masses...A civilization must have a religion...Communism and Nazism are religions of
proletarianized masses...Laws which lead to monopoly and proletarianism destroy law and
are a method of civilized suicide.”250 He was in search of a ‘religion’ that could serve the
modern needs of liberalism and extend political freedom to as many, as effectively, and as
securely as possible. It is for this end that he sought out the fundamental tenets of the
public philosophy through the natural law tradition.
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Part of Lippmann’s central thesis in Essays, is that the founders who established our
free and democratic political institutions “adhered to a public philosophy.” “Though there
have been many schools in this philosophy, there are fundamental principles common to all
of them: that, in Cicero’s words, ‘law is the bond of civil society,’ and … that these laws can
be developed and refined by rational discussion, and that the highest laws are those upon
which all rational men of good will, when fully informed, will tend to agree.”251 Lippmann
contends that our modern democracies stand radically divorced from this foundation, and
that apart from this public philosophy, liberal democracy “is not an intelligible form of
government”. He sees an inherent inconsistency between the rejection of reason’s ability to
uncover the natural law, and the belief that men in a condition of freedom are capable of
self-governance. In the founders Lippmann saw a constitutionalism established on the
basis of the balance of authority vs. authoritarianism. Unlike Diderot, and the Jacobin
heretics who wished essentially to abolish government, “Jefferson and his colleagues, on
the other hand, were interested in government. They were in rebellion because they were
being denied the rights of representation and of participation which they, like other
subjects of the same King, would have enjoyed had they lived in England. The Americans
were in rebellion against the ‘usurpations’ of George III, not against authority as such but,
against the abuse of authority.”252 The founders rebelled in order to take control of
government, not to “deny or subvert ... the moral foundations of [its] authority.”253 In so
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doing, the founders were exemplary planners, rebels, and liberals whose pursuit of political
freedom was grounded in Nature in their declaration of independence.
Despite his linking the founders with the natural law tradition and effective public
philosophy, Lippmann still had issues with the modern balance of the authority of the
executive in their constitutional order. The problem arises due to the very nature of mass
politics, the center of Opinion and Phantom, and the difficulty in representing the will of the
people without precipitating the tyranny of the majority. Lippmann sets up his discussion
of executive power by declaring an emergency “when elected assemblies and mass
opinions become decisive in the state, when there are no statesmen to resist the inclination
of the voters and there are only politicians to excite and to exploit them.” 254 As a result, in
the modern state “There is then a general tendency to be drawn downward, as by the force
of gravity, towards insolvency, towards the insecurity of factionalism, towards the erosion
of liberty, and towards hyperbolic wars.”255 The only response is to reevaluate the
foundations of popular government, particularly in the management of executive authority
as a balance to exaggerated legislative representation.
Lippmann warns that democratic states are in particular danger of the
devitalization of executive authority because the electoral process routinely refreshes their
dependency on their constituency. He therefore argues that in America “the constitutional
mechanisms have never themselves been sufficient to protect the executive.”256 A
representative body is justly responsible to its constituency, and helps revitalize the proper
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role for popular sovereignty and consent of the governed. However, the executive,
Lippmann argues, should not be an agent of the people, but rather an agent of the laws.
“For while the executive is in honor bound not to consider himself as the agent of his
electors, the representative is expected to be, within the limits of reason, and the general
public interest, their agent.”257 Because of the very nature of the electoral process
representation is confused with governing. Lippmann says explicitly that he attributes the
“democratic disasters of the twentieth century to a derangement of these primary
functions.”258 This is largely consistent with the track of Lippmann’s view of executive
power throughout his career, though instead of the early trope of masterful men who are
able to transcend petty legal hurdles and realities, Lippmann has linked well-constructed
executive power to a need to reexamine the constitutional order on which a strong
executive depends. He makes one practical argument, that the exigencies of war and
reconstruction have expanded the power of the purse which is in legislative control
(perhaps rightly so, perhaps not), but he also makes a linked argument: “The other
development which has acted to enfeeble the executive power is the growing incapacity of
the large majority of the democratic peoples to believe in intangible realities.”259 Lippmann
argues that the legislative and the executive must balance each other, but only points to the
capacity of the masses to believe in intangible realities as the possible solution. It is a
frustrating lacuna. However, Lippmann’s point is that secularization has stripped the
executive of the prestige it needs in order to govern the people according not to their
desires and passions, but their needs. This is not so far a departure from Morals, where he
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argued that statesmanship “consists in giving the people not what they want but what they
will learn to want. It requires the courage which is possible only in a mind that is detached
from the agitations of the moment. It requires the insight which comes only from an
objective and discerning knowledge of facts, and a high and imperturbable
disinterestedness.”260 But Lippmann’s thought has developed, and he detects that the
mechanism by which the necessary balance between the legislative and executive, between
representation and statesmanship, is upset is the secularization of ‘men’s minds.’
In reflection one could suggest that a certain degree of reverence for the
Constitution and founding principles could furnish a facsimile of the majesty required for
good executive governorship, but that is not the direction Lippmann takes. In fact, he seems
to hold the practical concerns of balancing the legislative and executive in abeyance,
suggesting by moving forward to a delineation of the natural law, public philosophy, and
traditions of civility that somehow de-secularizing men’s minds is the only way to revitalize
the executive in a responsible way. It is probable that for readers not predisposed against
the very concept of natural rights, this is the most frustrating intellectual gap in Lippmann’s
Essays. Still, his logic is theoretically sound, if not wholly convincing, and his subject matter
does not position itself to easy exegesis.
In addressing natural law, Lippmann retained one element common to the
progressive mind: he saw in the modern world a new and unmet challenge to the old order
of natural law. “The school of natural law has not been able to cope with the pluralism of
the later modern age—with the pluralism which has resulted from the industrial revolution
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and from the enfranchisement and the emancipation of the masses of the people.”261 The
mature Lippmann, however, instead of rebelling against the tradition, cites that very
rebellion as the cause for our inability to cope with modernity’s new challenges. Because
we have lost the means of rational inquiry into the structure of natural law, we have lost
the ability to adapt the foundational idea of nature to a changing society. As a result, we
must seek in the natural law a new understanding for a world at the brink of relativism and
postmodernity.
Perhaps the most crucial section of Essays, is Chapter 9, “The Renewal of the Public
Philosophy,” and its first subheading, “The Capacity to Believe.” Lippmann was not the only
thinker who had become sensitive to the questions of postmodern relativism. The political
theorist, Leo Strauss, was one of these to whom Lippmann had turned for explication of
natural law/natural right.262 Strauss identified as the chief characteristic of this new
modernism as that which “explicitly condemns to oblivion the notion of eternity.”263 By
rejecting the seriousness of the theoretical question of natural rights philosophy, the
American public was left foundationless, adrift among nihilism and relativism. Strauss and
Lippmann both thought it crucial to seek the revitalization of natural right because, as
Strauss said, “the more we cultivate nihilism the less are we able to be loyal members of
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society.”264 At a critical point in Essays Lippmann quotes Strauss’ Natural Right and History
indirectly, saying, “Yet when we have demonstrated the need for the public philosophy,
how do we prove that the need can be satisfied?” The nature of the indirect quote leaves
some ambiguity, but refers to page six of Strauss’ introduction to that work wherein
Strauss discusses the temptation to escape the rhetorical obscurantism of the relativists
who reject the concept of natural right, warning that “our aversion to fanatical
obscurantism must not lead us to embrace natural right in a spirit of fanatical
obscurantism. Let us beware of the danger of pursuing a Socratic goal with the means, and
the temper of Thrasymachus. Certainly the seriousness of the need of natural right does not
prove that the need can be satisfied.”265 To the question of instrumentality (does
Lippmann believe that there is such a thing as natural right to be uncovered, or is it merely
a useful device for the masses?), this quotation speaks volumes. Having read Strauss’
argument, and presumably understood it, Lippmann would have understood the futility of
engaging ‘natural right’ through any form of sophistry. Indeed, Lippmann seems rather to
have embraced Strauss’ admonition and advocacy for philosophic openness, finding great
consonance with Strauss’ claim that, “The gravity of the issue imposes upon us the duty of a
detached, theoretical, impartial discussion.”266
Where Strauss sought to revitalize the theoretical question of natural right,
Lippmann was more actively engaged in producing a means by which it could be renewed
in the public sphere. To that end, Lippmann offers two examples of natural rights in
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practice: Property, and Freedom of Speech. Lippmann’s discussion of property relies
heavily on a discussion of William Blackstone and his Commentaries on the Laws of England.
Lippmann repeats his argument from Drift that stock holding and other forms of artificial
private property are unsupportable within the tradition of property rights, yet instead of
dismissing the notion as pragmatically undesirable, he examines the common law to show
that the public philosophy, aligned with the ends of civilization, commanded both a respect
for property rights and a refusal to make them absolute and above the needs of a particular
society. The discussion is valuable because it forces Lippmann to refine further his idea of
the natural law: “When we speak of these principles as natural laws, we must be careful.
They are not scientific ‘laws’ like the laws of the motions of the heavenly bodies. They do
not describe human behavior as it is. They prescribe what it should be. They do not enable
us to predict what men will actually do. They are the principles of right behavior in the
good society, governed by the Western traditions of civility.”267 Reason, he continues, is
grounded in examination of the nature of things, and there are therefore obvious limits on
the consensus of reason. And further, though there could be a plurality of principles
devised by seeking the natural law, without seeking laws as they “should be” society itself
cannot be ordered around “freedom and the good life.”268
In the case of Speech, Lippmann’s argument is very similar: free speech needs to be
respected in order to have a flourishing society, ‘free and good,’ but the rights of free
speech are also not absolute. The authoritarianisms of communism and fascism exist to
propagate their own dogmas, and censorship in liberal society can only, and should, be
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delineated by the degree to which speech adheres to the principles of liberalism and the
public philosophy (the two seem to have become linked): “The borderline between sedition
and radical reform is between the denial and the acceptance of the sovereign principle of
the public philosophy: that we live in a rational order in which by sincere inquiry and
rational debate we can distinguish the true and the false, the right and the wrong.”269
Inherent in the public philosophy then is a need for positive affirmation of the values of
liberalism’s underlying assumptions, along with a recognition that “tolerance of all
opinions leads to intolerance.”270 Though Lippmann does illuminate a reasonable
procedure for establishing a connection between freedom of speech and the values of
public philosophy as open debate in pursuit of truth, engaging censorship and allowing
debate seem left to the prudence of authority.
These examples highlight the role of prudence in establishing and maintaining
liberal order. This has the effect of redoubling the emphasis and importance of good
executive function in a liberal society. Unfortunately, Lippmann left this reasoning
somewhat scattered after making the initial point about executive authority being linked to
public philosophy/the will to believe. Lippmann puts himself in a position where he must
elaborate the practice of statesmanship in a general way, while remaining consonant with
the demands of a liberal society’s reliance on natural rights and with the revered executive
restrained by prudence. The remaining chapters are a gloss on the sort of statesmanship
implied by a liberalism dependent upon liberal society.
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Confusingly, Lippmann makes an attempt to equate the classical rationalism of
Aristotle with the pragmatism of James and Pierce. From James he argues that in the
natural ‘flux’ of things, "things are off their balance. Whatever equilibrium our finite
experiences attain to are but provisional . . . everything is in ... a surrounding world of other
things."271272 Lippmann seems to be undoing the arguments he made for grounding a
version of natural rights in reason, but instead suggesting that they are determine by
historical contingency: “Words like liberty, equality, fraternity, justice, have various
meanings which reflect the variability of the flux of things. The different meanings are
rather like different clothes, each good for a season, for certain weather and for a time of
day, none good for all times.”273 Yet, on the next page, Lippmann is quoting Aristotle,
insisting that the appropriate application of reason appeal to the “nature of things.”
Lippmann’s marriage of experimental pluralism and classical political rationalism is ill
advised and not well thought out, but it appears to be the case that he takes from his
pragmatist roots not the historicity of essential virtues, but rather the spirit of
experimentation and modulation within and for particular societies. This is a far cry from a
conventionalist sophistry, however, because Lippmann constantly reiterates that the ‘good
society’ depends on the standards and limits within certain conceptions of these virtues.
Essentially, though different meanings of ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’ might be predominately
effective in a given time or place, he also insists upon hard limits to the extent of those
different interpretation.
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Lippmann attempts to settle any philosophical disquiet by exploring the role of the
executive who must make these judgments through the Aristotelian approach to
statesmanship and politics. In the good society, judgments which reflect statesmanship are
not based on strict understanding of a set of rigid laws, but rather reflect the principle that
social conditions are inextricably linked to the state of men’s souls by employing similarly
diverse methods to achieve fixed ends. The Jamesian pluralist method can be considered in
part consonant with this approach.274 Yet, Lippmann does not in the end embrace James,
but rather Aristotle in his approach for the application of natural law by appealing to the
Aristotelian virtue of prudence: “In this actual world of diversity and change, how do we
find the right rule? We shall not find it, says Aristotle, if we look for more ’clearness’ than
‘the subject matter admits of.’ Matters concerned with conduct and what is good for us
have no fixity, and, he added, ‘the agents themselves must in each case consider what is
appropriate to the occasion.’”275 The rule, Lippmann continues, to which these agents
appeal is always ‘the nature of things’. Consider the extreme and defect of courage: a man
who rushes to all danger, and a man who flees from everything. The proper application of
the virtue of courage is a mean between the two, though Lippmann cautions, “We must not
think of the mean as being a fixed point between the extremes. … The true mean is at the
tension of push and pull, of attraction and resistance among the extremes.”276
Though Lippmann very closely follows Aristotle, his critics often misunderstand this
very crucial point in Lippmann’s work. Lippmann recognizes that the outcome of this sort
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of political practice is “imprecise and inconclusive,” but that there” is little reason to think
that the wisdom of the world can ever rise above these imperfections.”277 Lippmann
essentially places man in a tensional, metaxic relationship at the center of liberal politics.
The success of the liberal project depends on philosophers who know human nature, and
can communicate it through the public philosophy to the democratic masses.278 The
responsibility extends to those who must communicate the public philosophy and to those
who must be open to it. Liberal politics then depend on philosophical openness, openness
to the questions of eternity. Lippmann knows the intellectual milieu into which he writes is
less than amenable to this suggestion, and he says near the end of his book that, “I have
been arguing, hopefully and wishfully, that it be possible to alter the terms of discourse if a
convincing demonstration can be made that the principles of the good society are not, in
Sartre's phrase, invented and chosen — that the conditions which must be met if there is to
be a good society are there, outside our wishes, where they can be discovered by rational
inquiry, and developed and adapted and refined by rational discussion.”279 To push back
against the “anomy of our society” a prudent public philosophy needs to be rearticulated
that has at its core the belief that the principles of a good society are not merely contingent,
but can be discovered through reason and refined through discussion. Though he grounds
this seeking of public philosophy in nature, it is also a re-grounding in the fundamental
faith of Liberalism that left to their own devices, given rights such as freedom of speech,
they will move towards a good society. The addendum Lippmann offers, is simply that to
keep this faith, a society must reject foundationlessness which is anathema to liberal order,
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not to mention very ineffective and prone to authoritarianism. A public philosophy allows
Lippmann a balance to the authority and legitimacy of popular government without
devaluating and pushing executive authority to extreme ends. Lippmann recognizes that
the premise of liberalism cannot be the condition of men’s souls, suggesting a return to
religious rule or orders, but neither will a society flourish when it has at its heart no
motivating principle. By remaining open to these principles, believing that they can be
discovered and refined through reason, he pushes against both reactionaries and
progressives, finally finding a home, or at least a foundation, for a sustainable liberalism.
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Conclusion
Essays was Walter Lippmann’s last book of political philosophy. It was a conclusion
to a life in search of an understanding of the liberal regime, and the difficulty of the text
reflects the nature of the intractable, vast, and uncertain problems faced by any study of
politics. Essays is not meant to be a final standard of governance for which Lippmann was
advocating, and as much was indicated by the tentativeness of the title, Essays in the Public
Philosophy. Rather, it reflected a concentration of the arc of Lippmann’s career as a friendly
critic for American democracy.
There is great consistency in the focus of Lippmann’s views, and in the way he
approached politics, from the beginning of his career, until the end. However, this is not to
suggest that his work forms a comprehensive political philosophy. There are continuities to
be sure, even perhaps a consistent animating spirit, but Lippmann was too active a thinker,
and too engaged in experimentation and public discourse to offer a systematic theory of
politics. The value of his thought, seen most prominently by distilling it through his works
of political philosophy, is in facilitating evaluation around a central theme: the sustainable
liberal polity.
Lippmann’s intellectual journey traced, mirrored and reflected the journey of
American liberalism in the 20th century, beginning in his early progressive idealism, and
culminating in his return to the stability of human rights and political freedom. The
purpose of this dissertation has been to understand this journey as a defense of the liberal
democratic state, and the political freedoms upon which it depends. By appeal to both
Nature and History in each phase of his career, Lippmann always positioned himself
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between the reactionary seeking a return from liberalism’s excesses, and the progressive
full of hope without restraint. Lippmann’s philosophical openness and thoughtfulness kept
his outlook too philosophical to be ideological, and too curious to reject out of hand
arguments from idealistic progressives or democracy’s more severe critics. Lippmann
occupied a role of conscience and friendly critic, ultimately a consistent supporter of the
liberal democratic state. Despite his eventual conclusion that liberalism lacked direction
without the ‘traditions of civility,’ he was certainly no reactionary. Likewise, he was never a
blithe idealist, displaying as early as Drift an intense concern about the direction and limits
of scientific inquiry and organization. Through his entire career Lippmann had a sense that
the indeterminable freedom of liberal society was both its great strength and its Achilles
heel, and that it must be guided without conceding the extreme good it offers mankind.
In Preface Lippmann’s enthusiasm for the promise of the organization of liberal
societies allowed him to embrace a host of typical progressive positions, but his theorizing
was oddly conflicted by his Freudian psychoanalysis, a confused yearning for essentialism,
and his misunderstanding of the founders’ constitutionalism. The young Lippmann saw the
founders only as ‘routineers’ and missed the ways in which they also appealed to human
nature as the guide to politics. Lippmann shared their distrust of democracy, but wouldn’t
fully appreciate their agreements until decades later. Drift as a sequel to Preface fills in the
inchoate executive functions of the leaders who ‘interpret will and sentiment’ around
inflexible constitutionalism, painting Teddy Roosevelt as the archetypical industrial
statesman capable of taking down barriers to progress. Yet at the culminating point of his
argument Lippmann retreats from his own conclusion concerning authority. Though
convinced that society’s lack of will and direction (drift) required scientific organization
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(mastery), Lippmann could not escape the corollary problems of his own conclusion: what
would then guide science? He recognized that no internal mechanism could guide science
to a specific end in History, but rather that that end had to be found in some human
investigation into the nature of things. Lippmann’s optimism in the future of scientific
management suggested that he did have some measure of progressive faith in the direction
and movement of History, but it was a faith furnished by the empirical progressivism of
observable progress, declining scarcity, and expanding freedoms. His philosophical
openness led him to question the direction of his own brand of scientific exceptionalism,
grasping instead for another sort of guide.
After the First World War, and Lippmann’s conflicted relationship with Wilsonian
idealism, many progressives were forced to renounce their empirical progressivism in
favor of a fatalistic version that radically placed its hopes on apotheosis in History. But
Lippmann was already questioning the logical conclusions of progressivism before the war,
and was more concerned with the root causes of misrule. At the heart of his critique of the
omnicompetent citizen and the tyranny of the uninformed masses was the understanding
that the case for self-government depends on the extent to which the citizen can himself
choose good government above the self-centeredness of his own opinions, and the pictures
in his head. Lippmann’s policy prescriptions in the middle stage of his career underscore
his continued insistence that the modern world required fresh thinking, unbound from old
world taboos and mechanical thinking. However, he also sought a foundation in a notion of
‘truth’ independent of the pseudo-environments of the ‘pictures in people’s heads.’ His
endorsement of intelligence bureaus seems undemocratic, but his politics had moved from
‘masterful’ statesmen alone, to a sincere focus on the preconditions for self-government. In
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this manner he expanded the role of the democrat by attempting to describe some way to
ensure both self-government and political freedom.
However, these two aims could not be easily reconciled. Lippmann had no
legislative program to offer by the end of Phantom, and retreated into the moral realm of
the individual in hopes of cultivating a spirit of the disinterested humanist who could be a
better statesman or citizen in the dangerous, modern world to come. Lippmann laid some
foundations for his later work in Essays, but ultimately tried to reject both History as a
guide, and Nature. Morals was a tenuous concoction of experimental pluralism, and an
essentialist longing which refused to acknowledge revelation in any capacity of authority.
However, this subtly moved Lippmann to the precipice of his great problem: where is the
authority needed to give liberalism its direction? By now his critique of the ‘acids of
modernity’ and the resulting directionlessness of liberal society were taken for granted,
and he hoped to rest in some great articulation of the ‘disinterested humanist’ who could
serve the practical needs of society without subjecting himself to dogmas from History or
Nature. Lippmann could not escape the critique of his old teacher, Santayana, that he had
removed the humanity from his humanism, and was ultimately forced to move closer to a
foundation in Nature by the time he wrote Essays (and perhaps Good) as he found it
necessary to somehow ground his humanism in ‘tradition,’ and find direction by taking
seriously the claims of Nature.
Lippmann was violently pulled back from his acetic humanism by the Wall Street
crash of 1929, and all of its corollary theoretical and practical considerations for politics.
Economic stability, one of the great promises of a successful liberalism, had been
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threatened and its underlying premises brought into question. Lippmann’s difficult
relationship with FDR and the New Deal had to do mostly with the distinction he drew
between emergency measures, and unconstitutional reform, the former which he felt was
necessary and proper. He was convinced that some measure of collectivism was necessary
to account for the practical consequences of the modern economy, a conclusion he had
reached through discussions with Keynes, but was also consonant with his early, very
typically progressive concern with the exigencies of an economy within a closed frontier.
And yet his advocacy for a limited, or ‘free’ collectivism developed at the same time he
established a deeper understanding of how self-governance depends on good law and
political freedom rather than simply the proper direction of authority, or the proper
disinterested humanist disposition. He concluded that to stabilize a liberal democratic
regime, and thwart the mounting totalitarianisms in Europe, and perhaps becoming
present in FDR’s America, modern liberalism had to confront and re-interrogate its own
foundations in search of a common drive, a common purpose.
Lippmann found this purpose in the ‘traditions of civility,’ and a fresh understanding
of the public philosophy. Confronted with WWII and its aftermath, Lippmann concluded
that the war had been a result of devalued executive authority out of balance with
legislative, popular authority. The increasing secularity of the liberal world threatened
liberalism in a fundamental way because it left no common ground, no public philosophy,
wherein to debate, understand, and act upon political problems. Lippmann was looking for
a way to keep the basic principles of liberalism and political freedom operative in a society
no longer buoyed by the expectation of apotheosis in History. His attempt to reinvigorate
the principles of the good society by remaining open to them, by practicing a prudent,
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classical statesmanship, was his culminating suggestion of the last best means to sustain
the liberal state.
Nobody familiar with his career should be surprised to find Lippmann so
comfortable asserting a prudent public philosophy whose creeping revival depends on the
day to day activities of rearticulating it to the intractable mass public he described so well,
and fought so hard to educate and understand. For all the messiness of political life which
Lippmann was famed for both analyzing and confronting, he seems to have remained
hopeful, despite his own brilliance in describing the challenges we face:
“There is not much doubt how the struggle is likely to end if it lies between those who,
believing, and care very much—and those who, lacking belief, cannot care very much.”280
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Notes
Following Ronald Steel and other Lippmann chroniclers and commentators I will cite
Lippmann’s books by chapter reference. The reason for this convention is primarily
because there are so many editions of his work, particularly in mass media paperback
editions which make looking up citations by page number alone difficult. Lippmann
typically writes in short form chapters, which make this version of indexing citation
worthwhile, and it is why it has been so often employed by those who have studied him.
What follows in this section of Notes is a list of books by Lippmann, both major works and
reprints/compilations, and the appropriate abbreviation used in the text of the dissertation
and in the shorthand citations. The full citation is contained in the bibliography.
Major Works

A Preface to Politics [Preface]
Drift and Mastery [Drift]
The Stakes of Diplomacy [Stakes]
The Political Scene [Scene]
Liberty and the News [Liberty]
Men of Destiny [Destiny]
American Inquisitors [Inquisitors]
Public Opinion [Opinion]
A Preface to Morals [Morals]
Method of Freedom [Method]
The New Imperative [Imperative]
The Good Society [Good]
U.S. Foreign Policy [Foreign]
U.S. War Aims [Aims]
Essays in the Public Philosophy [Essays]
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